Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "Leach states that the hit on the compass platform was at 0602:30... "

Hi Duncan, I don't want to use Leach as a source for exat timing or any detail, I think Anonio timing, built with exact sources from both sides, photos and evidences is quite reliable .

However we must trust Leach that honestly admitted he NEVER had in mind a re-engagement. The hit in compass is at 6:01, the dis-engagement manoeuvre starts at 6:01 and there was no decision to re-engage as this is not a "detail" that could be overlooked by Leach in ANY report: his honor as an officer and his career in the RN were depending on such a decision.

Instead he said: "It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director."

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

Let me try to make some clarifications here, I have summarized the concepts we have discussed in details recently on the PoW official maps I attach here below.

Basically we are still NOT in agreement with the turn to be considered the TURN AWAY, because I think nobody would disagree at this point on the fact that we DO have 2 turns made by PoW looking at her own official maps.

To make our discussions easy to be realized by everybody on the PoW maps, I have circled with LIGHT BLUE the FIRST turn area, and with YELLOW the SECOND turn area.

PoW_2_turns_01.jpg (114.44 KiB) Viewed 821 times

My personal opinion at this point is that ONLY the FIRST turn can be considered the TURN AWAY, for the reasons I have listed on previous post, and I fully support both Alberto Virtuani and Paul Cadogan additional explanation about the logic of this event.

I do not see any evidence about the need to “ open range” by Capt Leach since he never mentioned this anywhere, and delay his decision AFTER the Y turret jammed at salvo 20, so after 06.04 and move consequently “forward” the TURN AWAY decision he took from the FIRST turn he ordered and PoW made starting at 06.01 and 30 seconds, to the SECOND turn started after 06.04, so after the Y turret jammed. Following this logic, how Capt Leach could have written this statement at 08.00 the same morning, less that 2 hours after the event if Y turret was jammed before he took his important decision :

I decided to break off action and consolidate position and ship.
I therefore turned away firing X turret ( should be Y turret) in local control on the turn and making smoke

If the Y turret jammed was part, or THE decision factor since it reduced dramatically his battleship firepower, Capt Leach would have never wrote that clear statement to justify his decision. It just does NOT match, it tells us and the Admiralty just the opposite, he thought he could fire the Y turret disengaging so it was obviously NOT jammed yet .

In the opposite I do see all the evidences we have on official reports and narrative supporting the FIRST turn being the TURN AWAY, since it happened when the distance was the closest to the enemy ( 14.000 yards ), simultaneously with the ordered 160 turn to port at 06.01 and 30 seconds ( we can check on all PoW official maps ), followed by the smoke screen developing during minute 06.02 ( we can see on photo Nh69731), that OBSCURED the aft director ( reported by PoW gunnery report), causing the Y turret local control to take over at 06.03 ( PoW gunnery report), firing the last 3 Y turret local control salvoes before battle time 06.04. During those last 3 salvoes, at salvo 20, the Y turret jammed ( PoW gunnery report) and had to cease fire after spending the available shells.

As Alberto and Paul underlined several times and I am pleased to underline too, it is Capt Leach himself that made clear his decision event sequence and logic I listed above and followed thru, … and this goes for sure on his favor as an Officer.

I have just double checked everything he wrote, synchronized the event timing with the official maps and all the available evidences and reached my conclusion that ONLY the FIRST turn can be the TURN AWAY.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "Leach states that the hit on the compass platform was at 0602:30... "

Hi Duncan, I don't want to use Leach as a source for exat timing or any detail, I think Anonio timing, built with exact sources from both sides, photos and evidences is quite reliable .

However we must trust Leach that honestly admitted he NEVER had in mind a re-engagement. The hit in compass is at 6:01, the dis-engagement manoeuvre starts at 6:01 and there was no decision to re-engage as this is not a "detail" that could be overlooked by Leach in ANY report: his honor as an officer and his career in the RN were depending on such a decision.

Instead he said: "It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director."

Bye, Alberto

Leach ordered the turn at ~0603; why?

[dunmunro]

If the Y turret jammed was part, or THE decision factor since it reduced dramatically his battleship firepower, Capt Leach would have never wrote that clear statement to justify his decision. It just does NOT match, it tells us and the Admiralty just the opposite, he thought he could fire the Y turret disengaging so it was obviously NOT jammed yet

Leach's statements on the action are not very clear and cannot be considered definitive because they don't explain the two turns. It seems to me that there must be a source somewhere that will shed some light on what happened at 0603-0605. Personally, I think McMullen and Leach discussed a decision to re-engage at ~0604 and Leach ordered a turn to facilitate this, but abandoned the idea after Y turret jammed. I don't think there is evidence for a smokescreen prior to the last turn at 0605.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: "Leach ordered the turn at ~0603; why?"

Clearly to hide behind his own smoke screen (ordered just after 6:01) that was drifting to West, as it's clearly visible in all the photos.
NEVER Leach mentioned ANY intention to re-engage: such an hypothesis is just speculation. However, as this was not a detail for a RN Captain who retreats his warship for an action, the fact that it is not mentoioned demonstrates that it was never the case.

Sorry Duncan, the dis-engagement of the PoW is at 6:01 after being hit by.....a single salvo.

Bye, Alberto

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Dunmunro and all,

In my personal opinion Capt Leach statements are very clear about the sequence that determined his breaking-off from the action, turning away disengaging behind a smoke screen while firing the after Y turret on the execution of the retreat.

So not only we have his irrefutable intention statement I provided you above from his own 08.00 radio message, but on his narrative he confirms the whole sequence providing us other evaluation elements of the Y turret firing and jamming event.

Capt Leach himself wrote on his narrative to Admiralty that Y turret was firing DURING the turn away as the SMOKE SCREEN blanked the after director, … and jammed DURING the turn away execution.

Those additional information directly from Capt Leach narrative confirms the first turn being the BREAK-OFF and TURN AWAY, at 06.01 and 30 seconds.
You can read yourself from his narrative details :

It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen.
"Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.

….. and immediately after … another very important statement …

The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos.
"Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825.

Now if you like we can cover the second turn made at 06.05 to follow the smoke screen and probably react to the German warships course change too.

But having closed now the details of the break-off and having determined the correct timing and sequence, I like to go back the thread original intention that was to understand what caused it and what evaluations can be made about it.

For this reason I like everybody to focus now that we know better the details of the events on what Capt. Leach wrote as preface of his narrative on June 4 th, 1941.

SECRET - H.M.S."PRINCE OF WALES" - 4th June 1941 - No. 001.B.
Sir,
I have the honour to submit the following account of operations between 22nd May and 27th May, 1941, in which H.M.Ship under my command took part.
2. Throughout the operations, and in particularly during and immediately after the morning engagement on Saturday, 24th May, the behaviour of my officers and ship's company was in all respects admirable, and the morale throughout the Ship was unquestionably high. The sinking of the "Hood" produced no noticeable adverse effect. It is intended to submit, as soon as is practicable, a list of those officers and ratings who are considered deserving of special mention for outstanding devotion to duty.
3. Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. "Hood" - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the "Hood" I felt confident that together we could deal adequately with "Bismarck" and her consort. The sinking of "Hood" obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three further considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before action was joined.
Namely:
(a). The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament was not to be expected.
(b). The working up of the Ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was (sic) immensely keen and well drilled, but inexperienced.
(c). The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage.
In all circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency.
Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favourable opportunity.
4. A detailed narrative is attached as an appendix, and tracks charts are forwarded under separate cover.
I have the honour to be, … Sir, … your obedient servant,
(Signed) J.C.Leach - Captain, Royal Navy

In light of we have determined now about timing and event sequence, I like everybody to focus on the 2 very important statement Capt Leach wrote above ( in bold ) to his Admiralty explaining what he did only 11 days after the event.

… of which the first two had been in my mind before action was joined.

… I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships ...

In my personal opinion inside those 2 statements there is everything we have discussed and realized so far, … and for having written so clearly the truth, … my personal opinion on Capt. J.C. Leach as a man and an Officer his very high indeed.

I leave open the military, strategic and political analysis to all of you now … knowing that probably we will not be in agreement and that is ok to me.

Bye Antonio

[wadinga]

All,

Alberto has said

his own smoke screen (ordered just after 6:01) that was drifting to West, as it's clearly visible in all the photos.

and in the following sentence says

such an hypothesis is just speculation.

whilst failing to admit his own statement is similar speculation.

There is no evidence of an order for a smoke screen at 06:01, and as Duncan has pointed out from the photos there is no visual evidence either. PoW was firing main and secondary armament salvoes, generating huge amounts of gunsmoke, (look at the Schmalenbach film for the smoke from Bismarck's salvoes) and smoke was pouring from her funnels as she strived for maximum speed. There is smoke indeed but it cannot be a smokescreen because it is so ineffectual.

Antonio's previous maps showed the sharp turn toward the enemy made before the Compass Platform hit as PoW steered to avoid Hood's wreck. There must have been, and here the speculation starts, a countermanding order. There are two formats for a course change, an instruction to a given course, say when the vessel is on course where only a minor change is required. The Admiralty Manual of Seamanship 1937 gives the example order "Steer 132 degrees" when the ship is currently steering 142, and therefore the helmsnan in his protected position down below with no visual reference other than the compass card, is allowed to judge how much rudder to use. However for major course changes, and especially in tense or even emergency conditions the order is direct, eg "Starboard 30" whereupon the helmsman repeats the order exactly to confirm correct receipt, and then reports the purport has been carried out, when the rudder indicator shows 30 degrees achieved in the format "30 of Starboard on". Later the manual continues "Always remember to carry out the last steering order given, which remains in force until another order is received. The order "Steady" cancels all previous orders. This instruction when the desired course has been achieved is given to the helmsman, "Steady" whereupon he repeats back "Steady 256 degrees" being the course at the time of the order, and then when he has adjusted the wheel to achieve this course "Course 256 degrees".

It is clear, instants before the Compass Platform occured, Leach gave an order like "Port 30 degrees" and the helmsman would have repeated the order "Port 30", moved the rudder, and then reported "30 of Port on". It then required positive intervention by Leach or somebody else in authority to specify "Steady" to designate the desired course. Leach was not playing a wargame or driving a simulator, allowing him to make his requirements known easily, but instants later was in a charnel house of death, where a shockwave which sucked Sam Woods through the hatch and threw him across the deck, permanently deafened the Yeoman of signals and undoubtedly deafened and stunned Leach himself, plus a storm of shredded metal, possibly including the voicepipes to the helmsman scythed across the deck, pulping the two young midshipmen Dreyer and Ince.

When Leach says "It was expedient" he is covering for his Executive Officer or whoever else should have realised, in the 120 secs that the Compass Platform was out of action and could have stopped PoW turning away, turning so far that the forward turrets and DCT ceased to bear, which was of no advantage even if a withdrawal was planned since Leach would want to continue to try and hurt Bismarck, even in retreat.

According to Bernard Ash's "Someone Had Blundered" there was a lower deck whispering campaign against PoW in some ships because she turned away and never really re-engaged, based only very little information indeed and Tovey's despatches were only published at the end of the War. He reports some Gutter Press stories about "The Battleship That Ran Away" after the War but that they were disregarded when the justifications in Tovey's report became available. Leach was exonerated in as much as he received the DSO for his actions, and Ash says Leach actually spent some time in hospital, recovering from injuries received. He was not unhurt in the Compass Platform hit.

All the best

wadinga

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote: "There is no evidence of an order for a smoke screen at 06:01,"

Sean, in my opinion 2 statements from Leach himself :
1) " The sinking of "Hood" obviously changed the immediate situation.......... I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency. Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favourable opportunity."
2) It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen.

are much more than an evidence. In addition he never mentioned ANY intention to re-engage, and this is the final point. . However I think we will continue to disagree about that.

What happened after May 27 was conditioned by the sinking of BS, a lot of decorations were given to all Captains involved to underline the success and to capitalise on the victory . I guess that if BS ran away, no decoration would have been distributed, don't you ?

Bye, Alberto

P.S. Leach was in hospital after the battle for an hernia surgery not exactly a battle wound......

[dunmunro]

Dunmunro wrote: "Leach ordered the turn at ~0603; why?"

Clearly to hide behind his own smoke screen (ordered just after 6:01) that was drifting to West, as it's clearly visible in all the photos.
NEVER Leach mentioned ANY intention to re-engage: such an hypothesis is just speculation. However, as this was not a detail for a RN Captain who retreats his warship for an action, the fact that it is not mentoioned demonstrates that it was never the case.

Sorry Duncan, the dis-engagement of the PoW is at 6:01 after being hit by.....a single salvo.

Bye, Alberto

I showed you examples of smokescreens and it is very clear that PoW is NOT making a smokescreen at ~0603:30. If she had been she would be well covered and NOT visible. Again, we have Jasper stating that PoW is still making the same amount of smoke at ~0620 as at ~0602, so clearly this smoke was the result of funnel and boiler room fan damage suffered at ~0601. I don't understand why there has been such an effort to correlate the timing of ship movement with the film and photos but then such a willingness to ignore such evidence when it doesn't support PoW making a smokescreen before ~0605.

[Byron Angel]

The photo images of PoW making a lot of smoke do not IMO show a smoke screen being laid. The behavior of smoke when being laid down is quite different from that displayed.
An unambiguous reference to Leach actually having ordered the laying of a screen needs to be presented. Impressions of remote observers do not suffice.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

[Alberto Virtuani]

Dunmunro wrote: " I don't understand why there has been such an effort to correlate the timing of ship movement with the film and photos but then such a willingness to ignore such evidence when it doesn't support PoW making a smoke screen before ~0605."

Let's stay in our opinion: for me the smoke in photo taken at 6:03:30 shows without any doubt a smoke screen), not just a (slightly) damaged funnel smoke. I respect your opinion that this is not the case.

However even forgetting the smoke appearance on photos, Leach NEVER mentioned ANY intention to re-engage: therefore the re-engagement never happened and it made more sense to hide behind the smoke while retreating under a very precise fire (after 6:01) then at 6:05 when no hit from BS was received since a while as BS herself had lost precision due to her turns. Don't you think so ?

Bye the way Leach himself says clearly "the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen", and not "behind a damaged funnel smoke"....

To use your expression, "I don't understand why there has been such an effort to" move the turn away from 6:01 to 6:05. Others then moved it even till 6:13.......

Bye, Alberto

[Tom17]

Wadinga,
I believe there was normally an order "for wheel amidships (or 'midships)" to centre the rudder before the 'steady' order.
Regarding the statement by Captain Leach...why does he state twice his intention to dis-engage it just sounds (and reads) so clumsy?

1) " The sinking of "Hood" obviously changed the immediate situation.......... I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single handed the engagement with the two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency. Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favourable opportunity."
2) It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen.

Could the first mention be merely stating his intention, and the second mention, when he made his decision (acted on the first)?

Me. If I was planning to dis-engage at 06:01 I'd have just continued the initial turn to starboard and settled on a course towards Norfolk!

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

those are the 3 OFFICIAL evidences of the smoke screen being ORDERED by Capt Leach and executed BEFORE that salvo 19th showed on photo Nh 69731 was fired.

If anybody wants to keep a different opinion about that smoke, ... I will respect their opinion, .. but it is NOT mine, since I am in line whit those reported evidences and for me what Nh 69731 shows as smoke, ... is what they reported here, ... the PoW disengagement SMOKE SCREEN !

Capt Leach radio message 08.00 May 24 th, 1941

I decided to break off action and consolidate position and ship.
I therefore turned away firing Y turret in local control on the turn and MAKING SMOKE.

Capt Leach narrative to Admiralty June 4th, 1941

It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away BEHIND a SMOKE SCREEN. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as SMOKE blanked the after director.

PoW official gunnery report

When the Fore Director was wooded during the turn away after salvo 18, the main switch in the T.S. was put over to after director. This director was also unable to see the enemy due to the ship's SMOKE SCREEN, and the Officer of "Y" turret, using his own initiative, went into local control and fired three salvoes as he was able to see under the SMOKE.

Bye Antonio

[RF]

[As per what another forum member is saying, the excuses to justify Wake-Walker for not re-engaging are absurd.
1) BS could go to west at any time, with or without the re-engagement decision

That is certainly true. But where there is no maneouvering for a re-engagement Suffolk (the principal radar carrying shadowing ship) is able to do its job of shadowing. Any starboard turn by Bismarck can be picked up and the three RN ships can respond with their own starboard turns. Yes, there is still a chance of contact with Bismarck being lost - but the chances of losing contact in a re-engagement being initiated would be much greater.

2) Suffolk was already at starboard quarter of BS when Holland attacked, should we blame Holland (the only hero with all his crew) for "exposing Suffolk" to a BS turn ?

Suffolk was not part of Hollands forces and was not maneovering to attack. It was much further back, concentrating on its shadowing mission.
Bismarck could not make a substantive turn starboard at the point of Hollands run in at the start of the DS battle because the presence of the Greenland ice field prevented it. That is why Lutjens was forced into battle at this point and had (after delaying his decision) to give the order to open fire. German Fleet orders were quite clear about avoiding battle with a superior force and Lutjens own previous behaviour with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau makes it clear that he would otherwise have avoided battle.

Any damage inflicted to BS was precious for Britain on May 24. PoW, firing just 20 salvos, was able to seriously damage BS. Why she couldn't inflict more damages after resuming fight ? The "problem" was that he was not willing to re-engage without a clear superiority, listing all the good resons why he could not, at least until the Admiralty asked for explanations.

Clear superiority on a two to one basis was the British naval doctrine; Hood/POW on Bismarck, and Norfolk/Suffolk on Prinz Eugen was the original plan, only the latter could never come to fruition. That was not Leach's personal doctrine. it was in my view a sensible battle tactic on the part of the British to achieve the desired result.
Yes, any substantive damage inflicted on Bismarck was precious to the British. But at that time Leach in his view wasn't going to achieve it so he dis-engaged believing that waiting for KGV to join him was a better option.
It also left the two shadowing cruisers some protection against ambush from their quarry.

[RF]

What happened after May 27 was conditioned by the sinking of BS, a lot of decorations were given to all Captains involved to underline the success and to capitalise on the victory . I guess that if BS ran away, no decoration would have been distributed, ....

I'm quite sure there would have been no decorations if Bismarck had reached France.

But naval officers are there to do their duty rather than simply seek to collect gongs.

Bismarck in France with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would pose a dire threat to the Allies if they got back into the Atlantic - but there would be problems for the Germans as well, indeed there would be problems for the Germans in having Bismarck in a French port in the first place, what with the attention of RAF Bomber Command and the French resistence keeping tabs on what is going on in the dockyards Bismarck is in.