Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

[alecsandros]

The KGV armour scheme is not wrong

... Check with primary sources, and get a grip.
KGV armor above magazines was 5.9" RHA laid on 0.5" D steel.
In Tirpitz, the 50/80mm upper deck was laid on 16-25mm St52 construction steel. Where is that in the drawing ?

The drawing is incorrect - and you should do more research.

I understand perfectly. PoW was under helm from 0600 onward ( as Antonio's drawing shows) and this, along with Bismarck's own turn away, disrupted her gunnery.

You're getting realy ridiculous.

If Bismarck and PoW were both turning away, how come Bimsarck scored 4 hits and PoW none ?

"KING GEORGE V" Class Immune outside about 15,000 yards.

I'm sorry, but this is getting pretty retarded, Duncan.

That IZ of 15-30k is against 15"/L42 gunfire... which fired at 770m/s... They seem to have considered foreign artillery equal to their own...
How and why did they not correlate Bismarck's artillery fire (as well as France and Italian designs - which had even more muzzle velocity) with the IZ... is beyond me.
It is more strange as the Second inquiry into Hood's loss worked with M.V. of 830-920m/s for Bismarck's guns... a huge difference from Briitsh 15"/L42 muzzle velocity...

Please do some research... and a little bit of thinking...

[alecsandros]

The horizontal protection of KGV and TP are equal in terms of effective thickness:
6" over the magazines.
5" over the machinery.

Pretty much,
except the areas of 80mm weather deck on Tirpitz, were effective thickness was 7" or more.

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote:
King's Regulations don't come into it, this is confusion and chaos within a barely-worked up crew.

I tend to agree, and this is the key point ! As per your ipothesis, the turn to disengage can be the result of temporary inability of Capt.Leach to order the counter-turn.
However, in any case, this decision to disengage at that point in time, when PoW was still perfectly efficient, is debatable from a naval external strategic viewpoint. It can only be justified by the aftermath result of BS sunk anyway 3 days later.

Re. the possible Court Martial, I think that Capt.Leach could fall under the Naval Discipline Act (1866, still valid until 1957) that clearly says (please see in red):

Misconduct in the Presence of the Enemy.
2. Every Flag Officer, Captain, Commander or Officer commanding subject to this Act who upon Signal of Battle, or on Sight of a Ship of an Enemy which it may be his Duty to engage, shall not,
(1.) Use his utmost Exertion to bring his Ship into Action;
(2.) Or shall not during such Action, in his own Person and according to his Rank, encourage his inferior Officers and Men to fight courageously;
(3.) Or who shall surrender his Ship to the Enemy when capable of making a successful Defence, or who in Time of Action shall improperly withdraw from the Fight,
shall, if he has acted traitorously, suffer Death; if he has acted from Cowardice shall suffer Death, or such other Punishment as is herein-after mentioned; and if he has acted from Negligence, or through other Default, he shall be dismissed from Her Majesty's Service, with or without Disgrace, or shall suffer such other Punishment as is herein-after mentioned.

The above applies in my opinion, given the naval discipline and tradition in place in 1941, then the Court, after having analyzed justifications and overall environment could have even taken the decision to fully justify Capt.Leach conduct due to what you explained.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

@ Wadinga,

I agree with your wise analysis Sean, under those dramatic circumstances and given the very short time between Hood explosion, the wild turning while receiving on board the first 2 hits ( one very dramatic as you described ) and the necessity to get out of worst troubles immediately, Capt Leach decision was understandable.

Still Alberto points are correct too and in line with the existing discipline procedures at that time.

@ Alecsandros and Dunmunro,

all the warships scoring hits at Denmark Strait, so Prince of Wales, Prinz Eugen and Bismarck lost the target and did not score any hit after the major turn they made.

Only difference is that PoW started turning at 06.00 to avoid Hood and that turned again to disengage. Prinz Eugen and Bismarck turned out to starboard at 06.03 and some seconds, first Bismarck and than Prinz Eugen as film shows.
This is the only reason why in that timeframe, from 06.00 until 06.03 Prince of Wales received 7 hits while not scoring any on the enemy.

Both McMullen and Jasper were very unhappy about that with their respective warship commanders Leach and Brinkmann; we do not know about Schneider vs Lindemann.

@ everybody,

In my opinion given the deep analysis made until this point on this matter, everything seems to me pretty clear, unless those remaining 3 points were more information are required if ever they will become available :

1) Was King George V quadruple turret reliability problem something analyzed and shared among warship commanders, Admiralty and turret producers ?
Were recommendations in place to manage it properly on spring 1941 ? Were the technicians left on board the warships part of this containment plan ?

2) Was the communication occurred between Churchill, Sir Dudley Pound and Admiral Tovey regarding this whole matter something made available ?

3) Does the biography book I have not read yet on Capt Leach cover the very unexpected statement associated to Capt Leach by Stuart Slade on 1998 :

“ The gunnery problems on KGV and POW seem both to be over-stated. After the Denmark Strait, Captain Leach asked to be court-martialed to dispel allegations that his ship had run away. He was emphatic that he was fully able to continue the action with Bismarck, had every confidence in his ship and was, at the time he was ordered to withdraw, making good gunnery practice on Bismarck having " largely overcome the problems with his guns ". He would have to be very sure of his grounds to ask for a court ”.

Was Capt Leach referring to the first or another action on that day ? Who ordered him to withdraw and at what time that day ?

Bye Antonio

[Byron Angel]

Byron Angel wrote:
Philpotts did not signal S.O. 5BS until perhaps 2.5 hours later, long after he had already withdrawn his ship from the action.

Capt. Philpotts did not withdraw his ship from the action, Warspite was just unable to keep her position and she was left alone while turning a couple of circles due to her jammed steering. Philpotts tried to re-join action as soon as the steering problem was bypassed. However the speed of Warspite was too low, the distance from the battlefleet was too much and the order of withdrawal came from the Admiral of the 5th Battle Squadron, who decided not to put at risk the battered Warspite.

..... With all due respect, Alberto, please re-read the above excerpt from Captain Philpotts' report. Philpotts could not withdraw from the battle altogether and head for home without permission from his senior officer, but he DID withdraw Warspite from the battle line on his own initiative at 7:00pm after deciding that the ship's steering was too uncertain and her speed too slow to keep up. During the two hour time interval between 7:00pm and 9:00pm, Warspite was on a northerly heading away from the action while Philpotts was surveying the damage suffered by his ship (after 7:00pm, the course of 5BS was southeasterly). Warspite's own track chart corroborates this. After approx 9:00pm, when Philpotts ultimately received the order to return to Rosyth, Warspite's track chart shows course westerly.

This in no way impugns Philpotts courage. It is simply an example of good command sense on his part.

B

[Alberto Virtuani]

Byron Angel wrote:
Philpotts could not withdraw from the battle altogether and head for home without permission from his senior officer, but he DID withdraw Warspite from the battle line on his own initiative at 7:00pm

It's correct that Capt.Philpotts set course to the North (possibly NNE according to the chart I have from V.E.Tarrant book "Battleship Warspite") at 7 PM. However Warspite didn't withdraw from a fire action as at that time she was not anymore engaged by German ships (they had turned away to SW at around 6:30 PM after seeing the Grand Fleet).

I apologise for not being clear, what I was referring to was the behaviour of Capt. Philpotts during and just after the circle turns of Warspite under jammed helm (from 6:18 till 6:40) when Warspite was engaged by the whole Grand Fleet receiving several hits. The reaction of Capt. Philpotts to Commander Walwyn referring damages at that time was a sharp "I don't care a damn about the damage. Can we join the line?" while still under fire.

After cease fire (at about 6:40 PM) it's correct that Capt. Philpotts withdrew to NW stopping engines to check damages and to switch steering position (from V.E Tarrant book: "With the helm still unmanageable, Philpotts decided to draw of to the NW stopping engines to shift the steering gear to some other position........ Then he set off again at 16 knots course NE (NNE) to try to re-join the 5th Battle Squadron". NE was by the way the last course of the 5th BS known to Capt.Philpotts but "both the 5th BS and the Grand Fleet were out of sight to the NE".
In the meantime the Battle Fleet had instead changed course to SE and then to South.
At 8 PM the message to Adm. Evan-Thomas asking the position of the Battle Fleet and the answer to retire to Rosyth.
All the charts I have are from V.E Tarrant book. Do you have other ones ? Can you share or indicate source, please ? From the charts I have the only NW course (possibly NNW) is the very short time interval during the "S" shaped turn at the end of the 2 circles Warspite did under jammed helm (therefore from 6:35 till 6:45 PM).

Completely different is in any case Capt. Leach decision to withdraw during the fire action when he was engaging the enemy with the only battleship able to fight against Bismack.
At that time PoW was still in full fighting efficiency except for the A1 gun, and I guess that after the sharp turns from 6:00 till 6:02 she could again get the target and hit BS if the course was stabilised (this seems to be also the opinion of her gunnery director McMullen, by the way, as Antonio Bonomi correctly stated). Any hit and damage to BS at that point in time could have been very valuable to catch her.

Antonio Bonomi wrote:
This is the only reason why in that timeframe, from 06.00 until 06.03 Prince of Wales received 7 hits while not scoring any on the enemy.

Of course after her turn at 6:03 also BS could have hit PoW again but this is unavoidable during a battle..... I just think that the disengagement was done too early , before getting any sure sign that the German battleship was seriously damaged, and this could have had serious consequences for Capt. Leach if BS was not sunk 3 days later.

[alecsandros]

Of course after her turn at 6:03 also BS could have hit PoW again but this is unavoidable during a battle...

... Bismarck and Prinz Eugen DID hit PoW again, after their manouvre to avoid imaginary torpedoes was completed (around 6:04)

[wadinga]

Hi Alberto,

In my opinion, Captain Leach was incapable of making a decision about "disengaging" at 06:01 because he was deafened, stunned, probably semi-conscious and covered in the brains and entrails of other crew members somewhere in a wrecked command facility. He had just undoubtedly given an order like "hard a port" to counteract the emergency turn toward the enemy when PoW swung away from Hood's wreck, and the only thing to come out of the Compass Platform for the next two minutes was the blood that spoiled the plot.

The helmsman several decks below did not change the rudder angle until ordered to do so sometime after 06:03 by Leach or somebody else, by which time Bismarck and PoW were seperating from each other at about 50 knots. Also Y turret loading had been effectively disabled by the turn itself.

PoW then made further course changes, during which time the German squadron headed on its way at maximum practical speed, until PoW settled on a similar course but having lost a huge amount of distance. Antonio's diagram shows PoW turning to parallel the enemy at 06:05, but turning away again when it is realized Y turret is inoperative. Having taken stock of his command, and realizing he had a new superior officer, a recovering Captain Leach asked for orders having turned to an intercept/chasing course with no speed advantage at 06:31.

All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

All the charts I have are from V.E Tarrant book. Do you have other ones ? Can you share or indicate source, please ? From the charts I have the only NW course (possibly NNW) is the very short time interval during the "S" shaped turn at the end of the 2 circles Warspite did under jammed helm (therefore from 6:35 till 6:45 PM).

..... Dear Alberto,
I have a copy of the original publication of the Official Despatches, which includes various fold-out charts accompanying certain reports (including New Zealand's track chart which show the famous BCF 360deg circle that Beatty denied ever having occurred). I also have the chart set which accompanied Corbett's official Naval Operations historical series. Warspite's track chart from the Official Despatches show two distinct legs - the first being distinctly north, the second distinctly west; unfortunately times are approx. and no distance scale was provided.

B

[paulcadogan]

Bismarck and Prinz Eugen DID hit PoW again, after their manouvre to avoid imaginary torpedoes was completed (around 6:04)

I don't think so. By 6:04 PoW had her stern towards the Germans and the last hits to come in were from Prinz Eugen on the waterline aft as the ship started turning away (i.e. a bit aft of the beam) - according to the diagram of the hits on the HMS Hood website:



Bismarck's hits all came from forward of the beam - i.e. PoW was still inclined towards her. Once PoW turned away and made smoke it became much more difficult for the German ships to hit her and, to me it's not surprising or discrediting that they didn't.

[alecsandros]

Bismarck and Prinz Eugen DID hit PoW again, after their manouvre to avoid imaginary torpedoes was completed (around 6:04)

I don't think so. By 6:04 PoW had her stern towards the Germans and the last hits to come in were from Prinz Eugen on the waterline aft as the ship started turning away (i.e. a bit aft of the beam) - according to the diagram of the hits on the HMS Hood website:

I used this reference, also from HMS Hood site:

http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarks ... trait3.htm

"At 06:04 the Prince of Wales was still within clear range but the German units were sailing away. Her gunnery, which was on target when the torpedo alarm was issued by Prinz Eugen, now needed to be re-adjusted because of the evasive turn. The smoke screen from the Prince of Wales had been effective and was progressively covering her from the enemy's view. Distance was quickly increasing since the two groups were now sailing in opposite directions and was soon once again more than 14,000 meters. No torpedoes had been launched by the Prinz Eugen (even if the course change of 160° by the Prince of Wales would have cleared any danger from that initiative); the British battleship could sail away to south east more safely.

The Bismarck fired her next complete salvo (turrets A+B and C+D) while sailing on a course west (270°) from 15,500 meters, and hit for the fourth and last time the Prince of Wales in the centre, destroying the port side crane and splintered some boats, making a hole on the second funnel and damaging the Walrus airplane that was there from the beginning of action.

After having turned to starboard on a course of 270°, the Prinz Eugen fired her eighteenth complete salvo (turrets A+B and C+D) from 14,500 meters, and hit the Prince of Wales with 2 shells. One on the stern below the waterline, and the other on the fourth 133 mm turret ammunition depot on port side, but luckily for the British battleship, this shell had not exploded either."

[Alberto Virtuani]

Wadinga wrote:
In my opinion, Captain Leach was incapable of making a decision about "disengaging" at 06:01 because he was deafened, stunned, probably semi-conscious and covered in the brains and entrails of other crew members somewhere in a wrecked command facility

Agree. I always suspected such an explanation. I could even imagine that someone else gave the order to disengage.
Does anybody know where was the action station of the Executive Commander on PoW when the compass platform was ravaged ? Was he close to the helmsman in the conning room two deck below the compass ? who else could have given such an order on board during action ?

However, if this is the case, why this was not quietly stated as the reason for the disengagement (Capt. temporarily unable with the helm put hard to port) ?
Why Capt. Leach said in his report "Captain unhurt" ?
Why he "accused" PoW guns and his own gunnery that until 6:00 had done quite a good job ?
Why was he so careful to explain the reasons of disengagement as a wise decision instead of admitting it was just an accident ?

This version of facts could have been better both to justify PoW behaviour (no Court Martial could have condemned him for being disabled) and to avoid speculations re. KGV class battleships reliability overall and especially re. quadruple 14 inch turrets.

If your hipothesis is correct (Capt. Leach unable), the only explanation to me is that perhaps someone else gave the order to disengage and Capt. Leach wanted to cover him. In this case he deserves all my respect.
On the other hand, if he was able to give the order of disengagement, his decision looks to me very debatable vs. Naval Discipline Act , even if he was "expecting" 14 inch turret problems.

Bye Alberto

[paulcadogan]

I used this reference, also from HMS Hood site:

http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarks ... trait3.htm

Hi Alec,

I think Antonio needs to clarify this since he wrote the text. It does not match up with the battle map (also his) which by 6:04 puts PoW moving away so the shells described could not have hit her at that time. The hit on the aircraft crane arrived much earlier with the ship inclined towards Bismarck for it to have gone on to hit the aft section of the rear funnel. Here's the map:

http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/map.gif

The only possible hit for the period in question would have been PG's hit in the ammo handling room below the port #3 5.25-inch turret. Yet diagram shows it coming across the ship from the starboard side - I guess that must have been deduced from its point of entry? In order for it to have got so far without exploding, it had to be a dud (since PG was firing HE). Looking at a model of the ship, at 14-16,000 yards range it would have to have passed through ship's boats (unless those had been blown away by Bismarck's funnel hit), the shelter deck plus bulkheads to get into the space below the turret. Otherwise it would have to have been a late hit coming in from astern with a clear passage to the location.

Paul

[alecsandros]

The only possible hit for the period in question would have been PG's hit in the ammo handling room below the port #3 5.25-inch turret.

... It depends on the sources we're relying on...
One interesting aspect, which is rarely mentioned is that Bismarck was also making course alterations in order to confuse Prince of Wales gunnery. I remember reading this in one of the survivors interviews.
So the actual orientation of Bismarck was not 270* all the time, but was slightly altered along a continous, imaginary, line.

Thus the actual geometry of a trajectory coming from Bismarck and into Prince of Wales could be rather different from the way we normaly imagine it.

Anyway, I believe Antonio knows best the details of the battle, and I am inclined to use his insights and papers, as he studied the matter much deeper than I have...

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

My Denmark strait battle re-construction was released on several steps.

First issue was on July 2003 on the internet, than I have published an updated version on December 2005 on Storia Militare.

The reference Alecsandros used are from this 2005 version.

After that publication I have kept working on the Denmark Strait battle and several updates were released on this website/forum as well as on the HMS Hood forum and the Marinearchiv forum thru last 8 years.

If I remember well I have received the HMS Prince of Wales damage analysis document sometimes on 2007, and on same time Frank Allen posted that PoW drawing with all the correct orientation of the hits received from the German warships.

In fact, if you look at my small PoW disengagement map above I think I have posted on 2009 on HMS Hood website at first, I did place on the right up corner exactly that drawing reduced, to be used as reference.

Using that you can correlate all the hits received with the PoW orientation and the enemy shells landing on her, with correct battle timetable.

In summary it is evident to me that NO hits were achieved by German warships after 06.03 on PoW, and my references on 2005 were not correct although the only one available to me at that time.

That is why I wrote above on July 16 this statement :

@ Alecsandros and Dunmunro,

all the warships scoring hits at Denmark Strait, so Prince of Wales, Prinz Eugen and Bismarck lost the target and did not score any hit after the major turn they made.

Only difference is that PoW started turning at 06.00 to avoid Hood and that turned again to disengage. Prinz Eugen and Bismarck turned out to starboard at 06.03 and some seconds, first Bismarck and than Prinz Eugen as film shows.
This is the only reason why in that timeframe, from 06.00 until 06.03 Prince of Wales received 7 hits while not scoring any on the enemy.

Both McMullen and Jasper were very unhappy about that with their respective warship commanders Leach and Brinkmann; we do not know about Schneider vs Lindemann.

Surely my battle 2005 version needs a lot of updates I already have in my hands, and many more I am still collecting, another example of update I am anticipating you is the salvo list of all warships, especially the HMS Prince of Wales ( and I take the occasion to say thank to dunmunro for his help on that ).

This thread as well is another part of the future Denmark Strait battle updates …

Bye Antonio