Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

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Byron Angel
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Byron Angel »

Noticed this in Tovey's report -
7. 825 Squadron, by very good navigation and with the assistance of the ASV, located the Bismarck at 2330 and altered to the southward with the object of making their attack from ahead. The cloud was increasing and they lost touch, but after circling round for some time located the Norfolk and Prince of Wales and were redirected by the former. A few minutes later the ASV gear again indicated a ship and the squadron broke cloud to deliver their attack, only to find themselves over a United states Coastguard cutter. The Bismarck was six miles away and, observing this incident, opened H.A. barrage fire, keeping it up throughout the attack. Eight aircraft got in their attacks, the ninth losing touch in a cloud layer and failing to find the target. At least one hit was obtained.

..... Does anyone know the identity of the US Coast Guard vessel and when she appeared on the scene. I find it most interesting that this ship was apparently only 12,000 yards from Bismarck that night.

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paulcadogan
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by paulcadogan »

Hi Byron,

It was the Modoc. The story's been mentioned in most if not all of the major Bismarck chase accounts.

A fairly detailed account of her involvement is here:
http://www.bismarck-class.dk/miscellane ... modoc.html

Paul
Qui invidet minor est - He who envies is the lesser man
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Hello everybody,
I just found this very interesting topic. My two cents opinion here:
after Hood blew up on 24/5, PoW was engaging an enemy battleship in a 1 to 1 confrontation. PG was engaging as well but her 8 inch guns were not a real danger for a modern battleship like PoW. In addition Wake Walker could have engaged Bismarck as well if he decided to, just increasing speed. Therefore the point that PoW was in an inferiority situation is not really exact.
PoW was scoring hits on Bismarck and her gunnery director (McMullen) was aware of this fact. At this point in time Captain Leach decided to disengage after receiving only 2 hits causing minor problems (except casualties that are never minor of course...): 1) hit in compass platform, 2) hit in secondary armament fore directors. However secondary armament was still able to fire under direction from aft directors (there were other two of them on KGV class battleships) and the ship could be led from the conning tower without any fighting impact.
I always wondered how this decision was taken by Capt Leach (perhaps under the shock of HMS Hood blowing up and (just after) of the shell in compass platform ???) but, even if in an aftermath evaluation the decision was the right one, the risk of disengaging, loosing contact with two very dangerous merchant hunters (BS and PG), was extremely high.
Therefore in my opinion, while perfectly understandable, the decision of Captain Leach was not fully in line with the RN traditions. Leach himself was aware of this fact and he immediately wanted to share with his staff the reasons why he decided to interrupt the battle.
W.Churchill was aware of this fact and very unhappy of Leach and Wake Walker. Adm. Tovey, being strong after Bismarck sinking, protected them and at the end no Court Martial was held, however, in my opinion, Court Martial would have been unavoidable in case Bismarck was not sunk and still able to threaten convoys.
Just as a comparison, the Captain of HMS Rawalpindi (Capt Kennedy) attacked the 2 German Battlecruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) being in far worse situation compared to Leach: don't you think so ?
Bye
Alberto
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

it is enough to read what Geoffery Brooke wrote about the turning away manouvre to port 160 degrees that day, ... started as said at 06.02 ...

... and what happened into Y turret loading mechanism ... directly reported from the people involved.

This is the real reason why Y turret only fired 4 shells in local control.

Here the extract from his book on page 62 ... and now you can correlate it with the quadruple turret arguments mentioned before ...

Bye Antonio :D
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In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

more interesting reading from Brooke book on the recognition ( DSO ) received by Capt Leach and Commander (E) L.J. Goudy ... while McMullen only a Mention in Despatches ...

... and the awkward question about the Court Martial requested by Sir Winston Churchill : " British battleships do not turn away from the enemy ! " ... thru the First Sea Lord ... until Admiral Tovey strong reaction ...

Bye Antonio :D
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In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Byron Angel »

paulcadogan wrote:Hi Byron,

It was the Modoc. The story's been mentioned in most if not all of the major Bismarck chase accounts.

A fairly detailed account of her involvement is here:
http://www.bismarck-class.dk/miscellane ... modoc.html

Paul

..... Thanks, Paul. Reading the Modoc account leads me to wonder if the British might have RDF'ed Modoc's radio interrogatory to Bismarck and "put two and two together".

B
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Alberto Virtuani wrote:Hello everybody,
I just found this very interesting topic. My two cents opinion here:
after Hood blew up on 24/5, PoW was engaging an enemy battleship in a 1 to 1 confrontation. PG was engaging as well but her 8 inch guns were not a real danger for a modern battleship like PoW. In addition Wake Walker could have engaged Bismarck as well if he decided to, just increasing speed. Therefore the point that PoW was in an inferiority situation is not really exact.
PoW was scoring hits on Bismarck and her gunnery director (McMullen) was aware of this fact. At this point in time Captain Leach decided to disengage after receiving only 2 hits causing minor problems (except casualties that are never minor of course...): 1) hit in compass platform, 2) hit in secondary armament fore directors. However secondary armament was still able to fire under direction from aft directors (there were other two of them on KGV class battleships) and the ship could be led from the conning tower without any fighting impact.
I always wondered how this decision was taken by Capt Leach (perhaps under the shock of HMS Hood blowing up and (just after) of the shell in compass platform ???) but, even if in an aftermath evaluation the decision was the right one, the risk of disengaging, loosing contact with two very dangerous merchant hunters (BS and PG), was extremely high.
Therefore in my opinion, while perfectly understandable, the decision of Captain Leach was not fully in line with the RN traditions. Leach himself was aware of this fact and he immediately wanted to share with his staff the reasons why he decided to interrupt the battle.
W.Churchill was aware of this fact and very unhappy of Leach and Wake Walker. Adm. Tovey, being strong after Bismarck sinking, protected them and at the end no Court Martial was held, however, in my opinion, Court Martial would have been unavoidable in case Bismarck was not sunk and still able to threaten convoys.
Just as a comparison, the Captain of HMS Rawalpindi (Capt Kennedy) attacked the 2 German Battlecruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) being in far worse situation compared to Leach: don't you think so ?
Bye
Alberto
Hello everybody,

I fully agree with you Alberto, … having only 8 old 150 mm guns ... and despite being hopelessly outgunned, 60 years old Royal Navy Captain Edward Coverley Kennedy of HMS Rawalpindi decided to fight, rather than surrender as demanded by the Germans.
He was heard to say : " We’ll fight them both, they’ ll sink us, and that will be that. Good-bye".
The German warships sank Rawalpindi within 40 minutes. She managed to score one hit on Scharnhorst, which caused minor splinter damage. 238 men died, including Captain Kennedy. Thirty-seven men were rescued by the German ships, and a further 11 were picked up by HMS Chitral (another converted passenger ship). Captain Kennedy — the father of broadcaster and author Ludovic Kennedy — was posthumously Mentioned in Dispatches.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Rawalpindi
Ironically no DSO for Capt Kennedy, … like for Capt Glasfurd of HMS Acasta or Capt Barker of HMS Ardent … both honoring RN officer traditions like Capt Kennedy.

Those are the explanations of Capt Leach supporting his retreat while engaged with a Royal Navy battleship :
From Geoffrey Brooke book “ Alarm Starboard ! “ immediately after the breaking off while speacking to his warship crew that morning :

“ He said it had been very hard decision to break off the action as no British naval officer likes to retreat, but he had decided to do so because of the poor state of the ship’s guns … and he did not think it worth continuing to pit the ship against such odds when she was by no means the last card the Commander in Chief had to play.
If the Prince of Wales had stood on much longer things would certainly have gone hard for her”.

From Admiral Tovey dispatch - Admiralty record ADM 234/509 - Home Fleet, 5th July, 1941 - No. 896/H.F. 1325 :
Decision to Break off the Action
22. The Commanding Officer of Prince of Wales in his report says:
"Some explanation remains to be made as to my decision to break off the engagement after the sinking of H.M.S. Hood - a decision which clearly invites most critical examination. Prior to the disaster to the Hood I felt that, together, we could deal adequately with the Bismarck and her consort. The sinking of the Hood obviously changed the immediate situation, and there were three other considerations requiring to be weighed up, of which the first two had been in my mind before the action was joined namely:-
a. The practical certainty that owing to mechanical "teething troubles" a full output from the main armament could not be expected.
b. The working up of the ship after commissioning had only just reached a stage where I felt able to report to the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, that I considered her reasonably fit to take part in service operations. This was the first occasion on which she had done so. From the gunnery point of view the personnel was immensely keen, but inexperienced.
c. The likelihood of a decisive concentration being effected at a later stage
In all the circumstances I did not consider it sound tactics to continue single-handed the engagement with two German ships, both of whom might be expected to be at the peak of their efficiency. Accordingly I turned away and broke off the action pending a more favourable opportunity."

So the answer to your question is pretty easy and obvious in my opinion :

1) Capt Leach was not confident on his warship guns efficiency state, on that moment ( poor state ) and mostly on the immediate future (full output from the main armament could not be expected). I remind everybody that on that precise moment he still had 9 main guns working out of 10 ( only gun A1 was out of action ). So we can realize that he was conscious of the poor reliability he was going to face soon based only on the previous experience during the gunnery training period of 7 weeks they went through were the quadruple turret loading mechanism problems become very evident as Brooke reported.
Brooke wrote also on his book that at the end of the first action, Prince of Wales was having 5 main guns out of action. So A1 plus the whole Y turret jammed because of the turn away ( Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4). This confirms that A2, A3 and A4, plus B1 and B2 were working just as before the turn away, and cannot be used only because they cannot bear to the enemy due to the sailing course during the disengagement.
2) From the gunnery point of view the personnel was immensely keen, but inexperienced.

It is evident that his main reasons were based on the guns and the gunners experience.
Back we are on the whole considerations on the 2 main guns quadruple turrets efficiency and reliability.
It is necessary to underline that exactly the same thing on both main 14 inch guns quadruple turrets occurred on HMS King George V on May 27 against the Bismarck, … so Admiral Tovey for sure well understood Capt Leach explanations and feelings about the matter.

I just remind our discussion about the HMS Warspite during the Jutland battle … and once back to the harbour entrance in England …

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Antonio Bonomi wrote:
Brooke wrote also on his book that at the end of the first action, Prince of Wales was having 5 main guns out of action. So A1 plus the whole Y turret jammed because of the turn away ( Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4). This confirms that A2, A3 and A4, plus B1 and B2 were working just as before the turn away, and cannot be used only because they cannot bear to the enemy due to the sailing course during the disengagement.
As Antonio says, the key point is that PoW was having only one gun out of action at the very moment Hood exploded. To avoid HMS Hood, a very hard turn to starboard and then to port was done. At this point in time, as I know, still 9 guns were in action. Y turret loading mechanisms jammed just after the counter-turn to port was prolonged to become a 160 degree disengagement. Therefore the decision to disengage came when fighting efficiency of PoW was still almost full. The rate of fire was poor due to A1 gun out of action but, in average, the other guns performed in line with expectation (no battleship can expect 100% output when in action).
Based on the above, my opinion about disengament, even if fully understandable and in an aftermath judgement also quite wise, was not in line with the tradition of the Royal Navy and it would have had as a consequence a board of inquiry or more probably a Court Martial (as per Articles of War) if Bismarck was not sunk.
Can you imagine Bismarck, fully operational, running against a convoy escorted by a slow, unmoderized and poorly protected "R" class battleship (I think I remember Ramillies was escorting a convoy at that time....) ? Consequences for Wake-Walker and Leach would have been serious.
PoW was very well protected and Leach should have engaged Bismarck for a while before retreating. At the same time, even if he wanted to preserve the precious Suffolk radar, Wake Walker should have increased speed and engaged as well with Norfolk. Any damage inflicted to Bismarck and Prinz Eugen on 24/5 could have been very valuable and actually it was with the hit from PoW but again, the decision of disengaging at 6:03 is very debatable.

As a comparison, at Jutland Warspite jammed steering put her in severe danger receiving several hits from the wholeGerman High Sea Fleet.
The Executive Commander who was reporting the ship damages to Captain Philpotts was answered: " I don't care a damn about the damage ! Can we join the line ? ". A different mindset.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Alberto,

as you know and we discussed for quite a good time, here declarations that were not fully in line with the real events.

1 ) HMS Prince of Wales radio message to the Admiralty on 24 May 1941 at 08.00 were at the end, one can read how the sequence of the events declared by Capt. J.C. Leach is written on a very " strange " way.

I mean :

A) " At this time only 3 of the 10 guns of PoW were in action ". Maybe YES is if we consider " in action on a single particular battle moment " of that morning ( a single salvo snapshot maybe ), ... but he still had 9 guns working even if not " in action simultaneously " of course on the exact moment Capt Leach decision was taken ( because only gun A1 was out of action) :think: .

B) " Y Turret would not bear ". Again, for some seconds only, maybe 30 seconds after Hood sunk looking at PoW battle map, due to the needed Hood wreck avoidance manoeuvre, but only for that short and particular time slot, since before and after Y turret fired the enemy so was possible to be used up until the turn away almost immediately ordered, which caused the jamming of the loading mechanism of Y turret as we all know now :think: .

The time of the PoW receiving Bismarck hit was listed at 06.02-03 on the PoW radio msg( Hood board of inquiry and PoW battle maps demonstrate this was over stated by 1 minute at least ), .... and the firing of Y turret in local control ( from 06.04 until 06.05 on PoW gunnery map ) declared of course after the turn away 160 degree to port ordered by Capt Leach as he himself wrote, ... so this means that PoW turned away at 06.03 that morning according to Capt Leach radio message at 08.00 to C in C Home Fleet that morning ( in reality a minute before at 06.02 more or less ).

2 ) Admiral Tovey London Gazette attachment point 19 were the whole event is described in an incorrect summary sequence of the events and with an associated wrong turn away timing and distances, adding 10 minutes ( ??? ), and writing it occurred at 06.13 at 14.600 yards ( ??? ) :negative: .

You can read the exact things yourself …

Bye Antonio :D
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Admiral Tovey London Gazette attachment  point 19
Admiral Tovey London Gazette attachment point 19
Tovey_London_Gazette_attachment.JPG (56.55 KiB) Viewed 1999 times
HMS Prince of Wales radio message to the C in C Home Fleet  - Admiralty on 24 May 1941 at 08.00
HMS Prince of Wales radio message to the C in C Home Fleet - Admiralty on 24 May 1941 at 08.00
PoW_msg_0800_may_24_1941.JPG (71.85 KiB) Viewed 1999 times
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Byron Angel »

Some thoughts -

At Jutland, Warspite, after finally regaining a semblance of steering control, in fact withdrew from the action.

Rawalpindi, to the everlasting credit of her captain and crew, disdained surrender and fought to the death against overwhelming odds, but only after expending every possible effort to escape.

Jervis Bay, again to the credit of her captain and crew, committed themselves to an impossible fight. But they knowingly sacrificed themselves in order to afford time for her convoy to scatter.

The case of Prince of Wales at Denmark Strait was IMO a different and much more complicated proposition. Leach had command of the newest and most modern, but inadequately worked up, capital ship in the fleet. He had little confidence in the mechanical reliability of her main battery during an action. Prince of Wales' loss, in addition to that of Hood, would have been both a terrific material and morale blow. In addition, the situation was far more than a simple meeting of opposing capital ships at sea. Leach's over-arching objective was to frustrate the operational plan that had sent Bismarck to sea in the first place. That was what all the excitement was really about. Leach had no immediate tactical need or obligation to commit his ship to battle against difficult and uncertain odds. So long as Luetjens proved unwilling to press the issue, Leach's most rational course of action was to shadow Bismarck in order enable additional forces to be brought to bear to guarantee the destruction of Bismarck with the least loss.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Byron,

while talking with Alberto, which loves Royal Navy history and traditions, we were just comparing the different mind set of a warship commander whit a warship very difficult to manoeuvre, being hit many times by the enemy fleet ( more than 20 hits on board ) that was responding that way to his officer presenting him the damage list, and only willing to join back the line and continue the fighting. Ironically, not knowing those facts, once back in England, Warspite was not saluted happily from the population, just because she was not able to stand up and fight until the very end at Jutland.

I think Kennedy on Rawalpindi was just trying as much as he could to be able to bring on the twins the Royal Navy warships he knew were on the area. His manoeuvre back toward the enemy does not look to me like an intentional way to try to escape; just the opposite. Have you ever seen a battle map of that engagement ? The question that day was related to HMS Newcastle at 19.30, … but this is a different story.

I agree about Jervis Bay and Capt Fegen, they wanted only to give the merchant ships more time to try to escape, and they succeeded on doing that with their sacrifice.

A mention, in my opinion in reality a Victoria Cross, was deserved by HMS Ardent ( Capt Barker ) and mostly by Capt Glasfurd ( HMS Acasta ) for standing up there to protect HMS Glorious in any possible way, and once she was doomed and sinking, also to attack the Gneisenau ( HMS Acasta ) and successfully torpedo the Scharnhorst.

Finally on the matter of this thread, I see all your points.

I agree about Capt Leach feelings on his main artillery not being on the best conditions to stand up alone in front to a similar enemy battleship for a long time, he clearly wrote this on any possible way. In my opinion this bad feeling was due to a couple of factors : the known evident reliability limitations of the 14 inches quadruple turrets newly designed and the consciousness that there was nothing the gunners and mechanics on board could do to resolve those problems forever on that moment given what he experienced on 7 weeks intense gunnery trials.

I am sure that those problems had been already discussed and carefully analyzed either during HMS King George V trials as well as HMS Prince of Wales trials, that there was a plan to fix them and resolve those unexpected matters, but that the whole things required time and probably stop the warship for some time too and Royal navy could not do that on early 1941, so a mitigation plan was put in place with turret technicians left on board. It seems to me evident and logic, it make common sense.

I can be wrong, but in my personal opinion Capt Leach and the British admiralty knew about all this and this is the real reason why, as soon as PoW remained alone there having lost HMS Hood, Capt Leach immediately thought that he was no match for Bismarck alone there and before things were getting worst, having already been hit, it was the case to get out from that situation immediately.
If you carefully read back Geoffrey Brooke reported announcement of Capt Leach to HMS Prince of Wales crew just after the battle, to justify the warship retreat, he basically explained what I wrote above. He used 2 main reasons on his explanation, the gun poor state and expected inefficiency, and the certainty that remaining there things could have only be gone worst based on that.

He kept on underlining the german state of efficiency compared to his warship that was not 100 % fully operational because of the artillery poor reliability and this is not a minor handicap for a battleship.

So I fully agree with you on this statement : “ He had little confidence in the mechanical reliability of her main battery during an action “.

Having realized that being the main reason of his decision at 06.02 that morning one must evaluate what happened after as a consequence.

Capt Leach had to explain it to his warship crew and we read thru Brooke what he said, including the disappointment of his artillery officer Colin McMullen.

He had to communicate it to C in C Home Fleet and we read his radio message at 08.00 were he underlined his warship gunnery limitations during the engagement.

Finally he had to manage a report supporting Admiral Tovey dispatch as we read.

What is missed here are the real communications occurred between Sir Winston Churchill, Sir Dudley Pound, the British Admiralty and Admiral Tovey regarding the whole matter of this disengagement and what caused it that in my personal opinion was mainly due to the HMS King George V class quadruple turret reliability problems on that moment.

This was a very critical issue, for the Royal Navy crew morale, for the British population morale, for the enemy knowledge of it.

You wrote : “Leach had no immediate tactical need or obligation to commit his ship to battle against difficult and uncertain odds”.

Well this is debatable, at least for the “ Old Lion “ Churchill I think, … and what you expect from a person on his position on that war moment that even asked Admiral Cunningham to sink HMS Barham to block an harbour entrance in Libia only for strategical reasons, … once he realized that a British battleship did not due his job till the very end that was damaging the Bismarck in any possible way and at any cost in order to try to eliminate the threat to his strategically vital atlantic convoys ?

Back we are to your last correct statements, the need to destroy Bismarck with the least loss of weapons and life.

Capt Leach knew he could not do it alone and correctly retreat that day, … saving his ship and crew, … things went the way we all know and after a risk to see Bismarck escaping … that surely made Churchill more furious compared to Hood loss and a British battleship retreat in front of the enemy , … she was doomed and finally sunk.

Churchill wanted Leach and Wake-Walker court martialled, Admiral Tovey defended them and himself, … there was KGV class gun/quadruple turret problem to be protected or revealed and all thing were tightly connected.

We know now how it went and was managed and communicated.

Bye Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Byron Angel »

Dear Antonio,

It is usually the man on the spot who has the clearest view of things and, as long as that man has been well chosen, the matter will best be handled by him. The RN was fortunate in having a man of high moral courage and clear vision such as Captain Leach on the bridge of Prince of Wales that day. Churchill was a great politician, but a poor military leader who too often permitted his heart and ego to overrule the wise professional counsel of others. The combination of Churchill and long distance wireless had been a poisonous brew for the RN, going all the way back to Coronel. What a gigantic propaganda victory it would have been if Bismarck had also sunk Prince of Wales, then simply returned to to Norway.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Hello everybody,

@ Byron,

Your considerations are wise and your analysis is correct, I agree with your opinion.

In fact it was not Capt Leach responsibility having caused that situation he found himself and his crew/ship into on that day.

He could only manage it as best as he could and in my opinion he did it well enough, just like his ship crew including the gunners that deserve a mention and not part of the responsibility of what happened.

Apparently he was so sure about it that he even forced a verification in case anybody wanted to do it as reported by Stuart Slade on 1998 : “ The gunnery problems on KGV and POW seem both to be over-stated. After the Denmark Strait, Captain Leach asked to be court-martialed to dispel allegations that his ship had run away. He was emphatic that he was fully able to continue the action with Bismarck, had every confidence in his ship and was, at the time he was ordered to withdraw, making good gunnery practice on Bismarck having " largely overcome the problems with his guns ". He would have to be very sure of his grounds to ask for a court ”.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-016.htm

I agree with your statement: “ The RN was fortunate in having a man of high moral courage and clear vision such as Captain Leach on the bridge of Prince of Wales that day”.

His problem was managing everything after that day, his retreat and the direct consequences of the Articles of War, his defence line directly involving the revelation of the 14 inches quadruple turrets known problems and not last a very strong and difficult personality like Churchill as you correctly described, adding some more “food for thoughts” on what me and Alberto already wrote about the Old Lion.

I suppose, as logic dictate and facts confirm, that after the political analysis and having evaluated all the positive and negative impacts that the revelation of all the details would have required and the immediate consequences that would have caused to Royal Navy crew and British population morale during a war, Churchill had to back off his initial intentions, as we all know.

Now all can be written also on Wikipedia as we can read here in on ref. armament :

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_Georg ... hip_(1939)

Anyway, after all the wrong or partially true things written about what really happened it was the Royal Navy itself to put the things correctly on their sequence as we can all read now on battle Summary Nr 5 re-written on 1948 and recently released to everybody.

Here it is with the correct sequence statements, timing and even the correction on what was wrongly written before.

Bye Antonio :D
Battle Summary Nr 5 - page 8
Battle Summary Nr 5 - page 8
PoW retreating from Battle Summary No 5_1942 01.jpg (239.3 KiB) Viewed 1960 times
Document cover of Battle Summany Nr 5 - The chase and sinking of the Bismarck - 1948 version
Document cover of Battle Summany Nr 5 - The chase and sinking of the Bismarck - 1948 version
Battle_Summary_Nr_5_Nov_1948.JPG (20.36 KiB) Viewed 1960 times
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by paulcadogan »

Hello all,

I think the crux of the matter is the rapidity with which Captain Leach came to the decision to withdraw. Hood was hit at about 6:00 and took 2 to 3 minutes to sink and by 6:03 PoW was turning away - so Hood had barely gone under and her consort had already given up the fight. We all know the graphic descriptions of the storm of multi-caliber shellfire that enveloped the ship once the German's realized Hood was finished (within 1 minute) as well as the descriptions of the violent turns to starboard, then port to clear Hood's wreckage zone. Still, to those experiencing such an event, 3 minutes can be a long time.

Leach's quotation of only 3 guns in action and Y-turret not bearing as part of his decision suggests it was taken after the turn to starboard to avoid Hood, but before coming back to port which would have "un-wooded" Y as PoW passed between Hood's wreck and the Germans. Given A-turret's on-going problems with individual guns, it could have been that 2 were missing salvoes at that time.

Tovey's 6:13 error - and I cannot imagine it being deliberate - did create a false impression for many that PoW had fought on for a significant amount of time, and even spawned the thought that Bismarck was hit in that period hence her ability to distinguish which British ship hit her. But PoW's gunnery reports and battle maps, which had the correct timeline, were available so the error should have been obvious.
Antonio Bonomi wrote:Apparently he was so sure about it that he even forced a verification in case anybody wanted to do it as reported by Stuart Slade on 1998 : “ The gunnery problems on KGV and POW seem both to be over-stated. After the Denmark Strait, Captain Leach asked to be court-martialed to dispel allegations that his ship had run away. He was emphatic that he was fully able to continue the action with Bismarck, had every confidence in his ship and was, at the time he was ordered to withdraw, making good gunnery practice on Bismarck having " largely overcome the problems with his guns ". He would have to be very sure of his grounds to ask for a court ”.
I find this to be in conflict with Leach's stated reasons for withdrawing as set out in his narrative and Tovey's report. Plus, it was entirely his decision to withdraw, not an order from a superior.
Qui invidet minor est - He who envies is the lesser man
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Alberto Virtuani
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Re: Denmark Strait and RN Articles of War

Post by Alberto Virtuani »

Byron Angel wrote:
At Jutland, Warspite, after finally regaining a semblance of steering control, in fact withdrew from the action.
Correct but her Captain was willing to re-join the line and just after receiving a direct order from Adm. Hugh Evan-Thomas she withdrew. Capt.Leach didn't ask nor receive any order form Adm.Wake Walker. He decided to withdraw on his own.
Byron Angel wrote:
The RN was fortunate in having a man of high moral courage and clear vision such as Captain Leach on the bridge of Prince of Wales that day
I agree that in an aftermath judgement Capt.Leach was wise in his decision to withdraw. However, would have BS escaped, his decision would have been judged very unwise by a most probable Court Martial, to be very fair.
Antonio Bonomi wrote:
I agree about Capt Leach feelings on his main artillery not being on the best conditions to stand up alone in front to a similar enemy battleship for a long time
Well, Capt. Leach could have been expecting some gunnery problems, but at the time he decided to withdraw, PoW was scoring hits on BS despite the poor gunnery and I do believe his decision was really taken too early. Some considerations here:
1) Pow was better protected than BS (at least on paper) and she could sustain some heavy hits from BS
2) PoW was scoring hits on BS (and McMullen was aware of this fact)
3) PoW was in good fighting efficiency a the very moment the decision to withdraw was taken (9 out of 10 main guns were still working)
4) Any damage or additionalhit on BS would have been very important to allow RN to catch up with her and finish her
5) Capt.Leach could not know yet at that time about the damage inflicted to BS with the bow hit

Due to all above I still consider Capt.Leach decision wise enough but not an example of willingness to fight. The potential danger of loosing contact later (as it happened) was too high to give up fight without being sure to have crippled or severely damaged BS before doing that.
"It takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition" (Adm.A.B.Cunningham)

"There's always a danger running in the enemy at close range" (Adm.W.F.Wake-Walker)
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