I am not sure where a lot of this is leading, but from what we have learned, Dorsetshire was fitted with a depth charge rack, and she had Asdic, probably the Type 132. So Captain Martin had options available to him other than pulling out and doing nothing, on sighting what he thought was a U-Boat.
No one here is suggesting that cruisers were organised into sub-hunting groups, though the first asdic set was sent to sea in a cruiser in the 1920s. Each cruiser was fitted with a single rack carrying seven charges, half the number of racks which a destroyer, or a corvette would carry. The charges were of the Mark 2 type and could split a U-Boat's hull at 20 feet or render it unlikely to make base at 40 feet. The Type 123 was accurate for line, but could not show the target's depth, so an attack would be good for line at least. Apparently the Type 123 was accurate enough for escorts to learn the position of ships in convoy during fog. So, although a cruiser is not the ideal design for sub hunting, it could most certainly do so if called upon.
There are records of crusiers attacking U-Boats, but there are no sinkings recorded, though there may be more detailed records somewhere showing that claims of 'possibles' may have been made.
On sighting what Captain Martin thought was U-Boat his first reaction should have been to issue an enemy sighting report and using his asdic, try to locate it. The rescue operation would be abandoned in the face of this action. With so many men around the ship, carley rafts should have been put over the side, to keep the men safe whilst the U-Boat was dealt with. If Dorsetshire was incapable of dealing with the threat herself or of playing any useful part in the hunt, she should join the C-in-C as she had been ordered to do. In doing this she would pass on the rescue operation to other ships.
None of the above was done, not even an enemy sighting report, which would have aided the Admiral Western Approaches in charting potential U-Boat movements coming in from the south.
I don't for one minute doubt that Captain Martin was a very quick witted and competent officer. He seems to have been willing and ready to come to grips with the enemy at each and any opportunity. So it is quite clear that the U-Boat was not a serious consideration that day, but did provide him with the excuse to get out of the area.
One reason for curtailing the rescue, might be the attitude of some, or many who had been rescued. According to one account the Germans were singing Deutshchland Uber Alles and making a row, there may even have been Hitler salutes. One man who died after rescue is said to have been given Sieg Heils when buried at sea next day. I don't know how true that is, but it is possible that as the men had to be put under armed guard until they calmed down when they first came aboard, it is possible that their behaviour left something to be desired.
It is quite common after a heavy and dangerous ordeal, for euphoria and bravado to set in among survivors. Fear of the unknown can also make people become aggressive and maybe Captain Martin did not like the types he was rescuing that day. That might be a good reason to take a suspicious object for a U-Boat.
I questioned why scrambling nets were not used that day and very possibly this was a conscious decision on Martin's part, to prevent a crowd of panicked and distressed hooligans coming aboard in large numbers. Using single lines would enable those who came aboard to be singled and dealt with according to their behaviour and their needs, more efficiently.
The above are considerations only. I remain convinced that the rescue was just a sampling for intelligence gathering.
Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
Moderator: Bill Jurens
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phil gollin
- Member
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Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
.
YOU are misrepresenting the scarecrow dropping of depth charges as "attacks".
You idiocies about imaging what the attitude of the survivors was flies in the face of the reports from the ship where the state of the survivors is piteous and "the Baron" is almost panicky and rather voluable as to the horrors he had seen on board.
.
YOU are misrepresenting the scarecrow dropping of depth charges as "attacks".
You idiocies about imaging what the attitude of the survivors was flies in the face of the reports from the ship where the state of the survivors is piteous and "the Baron" is almost panicky and rather voluable as to the horrors he had seen on board.
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Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
OK now let me see...light the blue touch paper and retire....
Here is a personal recollection from a Guy Called Walter Fudge, who served in Dorsetshire during the action against Bismarck;
"A Dorsetshire crew member that was a fine large well-muscled South African Afrikaner was put in charge of the Bismarck prisoners. Yes, they sang Deutschland Uber Alles until they were silenced by the South African who yelled for them to "shut up or he would fill them all with lead". He was armed with revolver and ammo!
When Scharnhorst went down Petty Officer Godde could hear his ship-mates in the icy water and with little hope of survival shouting "Heil our Fuhrer!" and "Scharnhorst! Hip-Hip-Hooray!"
What motivates people to behave this way when they are in such dire straits is anybody's guess, but whatever it is, such behaviour defies all logic.
Here is a personal recollection from a Guy Called Walter Fudge, who served in Dorsetshire during the action against Bismarck;
"A Dorsetshire crew member that was a fine large well-muscled South African Afrikaner was put in charge of the Bismarck prisoners. Yes, they sang Deutschland Uber Alles until they were silenced by the South African who yelled for them to "shut up or he would fill them all with lead". He was armed with revolver and ammo!
When Scharnhorst went down Petty Officer Godde could hear his ship-mates in the icy water and with little hope of survival shouting "Heil our Fuhrer!" and "Scharnhorst! Hip-Hip-Hooray!"
What motivates people to behave this way when they are in such dire straits is anybody's guess, but whatever it is, such behaviour defies all logic.
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
I'd imagine the adrenaline rush the survivors were expiriencing would be incredible. I'd also imagine that a few hours later they'd come down and were very quiet indeed.
In the Highest Tradition of the Royal Navy - Captain John Leach MVO DSO
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
All,
Just been to see the latest Star Trek movie where a crygenically stored warrior is defrosted and unleashed upon a stunned world bringing all his ancient hang-ups and misconceptions and misinformations to create a nuisance in the now. Hmmm what does that remind me of?
Just one example of such nuisance is to create this scurrilous new thread, so as cut off and hopefully bury the comprehensive disproving of the last attempt to smear Captain Martin over the curtailed rescue efforts in the last pages of the "I have discovered these fuzzy, misidentified, misattributed photos that prove that all the all the official records have been falsified and Victorious was at the Bismarck's end, torpedo down the funnel etc etc thread ". Amazing new revelations based on misidentified photos, and a previously undetected major cover up exposed based on a bunch of non-factual speculation.... Hmmm now where have I heard that before.
For those interested in factual information about real things that happened in the real world , the main reason why cruisers were useless for depth charge attacks is they were too long and unmanouevrable. Getting the stern racks of a surface vessel within the 20 ft kill radius (good God that was actually about right
) was difficult enough with a dedicated A/S design like a corvette. Especially when the Asdic lost contact as the target passed underneath. The longer the vessel, the more time the twisting submerged target had to move out of the lethal location. This "loss of contact" led to the development of ahead throwing weapons like the Hedgehog, Squid and later Limbo all of which could be aimed to certain extent and allowed an attack whilst Asdic still illuminated the target.
The stuff about scrambling nets also has to be snuffed out on practical grounds. A percipient contributor has already pointed out the enormous freeboard of the County Class. Dorsetshire would have needed the huge, cumbersome nets lowered by attack transports to put troops in landing craft. Not standard equipment in cruisers.
At the launch of Ian Ballantyne's book "Killing the Bismarck" which also strayed into the create controversy school, (the Blue flag "black flag of parley"was an identifier for u-boats), a fine old gentleman revealed himself as the signalman stood by Captain Martin when the decision was made. He said no-one liked leaving those survivors in the water, but there was genuine concern they were being stalked by an undersea killer. The presence of u-boats is also discussed in the Victorious thread.
All the best
wadinga
Just been to see the latest Star Trek movie where a crygenically stored warrior is defrosted and unleashed upon a stunned world bringing all his ancient hang-ups and misconceptions and misinformations to create a nuisance in the now. Hmmm what does that remind me of?
Just one example of such nuisance is to create this scurrilous new thread, so as cut off and hopefully bury the comprehensive disproving of the last attempt to smear Captain Martin over the curtailed rescue efforts in the last pages of the "I have discovered these fuzzy, misidentified, misattributed photos that prove that all the all the official records have been falsified and Victorious was at the Bismarck's end, torpedo down the funnel etc etc thread ". Amazing new revelations based on misidentified photos, and a previously undetected major cover up exposed based on a bunch of non-factual speculation.... Hmmm now where have I heard that before.
For those interested in factual information about real things that happened in the real world , the main reason why cruisers were useless for depth charge attacks is they were too long and unmanouevrable. Getting the stern racks of a surface vessel within the 20 ft kill radius (good God that was actually about right
) was difficult enough with a dedicated A/S design like a corvette. Especially when the Asdic lost contact as the target passed underneath. The longer the vessel, the more time the twisting submerged target had to move out of the lethal location. This "loss of contact" led to the development of ahead throwing weapons like the Hedgehog, Squid and later Limbo all of which could be aimed to certain extent and allowed an attack whilst Asdic still illuminated the target. The stuff about scrambling nets also has to be snuffed out on practical grounds. A percipient contributor has already pointed out the enormous freeboard of the County Class. Dorsetshire would have needed the huge, cumbersome nets lowered by attack transports to put troops in landing craft. Not standard equipment in cruisers.
At the launch of Ian Ballantyne's book "Killing the Bismarck" which also strayed into the create controversy school, (the Blue flag "black flag of parley"was an identifier for u-boats), a fine old gentleman revealed himself as the signalman stood by Captain Martin when the decision was made. He said no-one liked leaving those survivors in the water, but there was genuine concern they were being stalked by an undersea killer. The presence of u-boats is also discussed in the Victorious thread.
All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
Since opening this topic, I have been amazed by the wealth of new information which various contributors have been able to present, not least of which comes from the latest contributor, who has been able to confirm that it definitely was a U-boat which was sighted from Dorsetshire and which initiated her withdrawal from the rescue operation. The reference was a trifle cryptic, so if a clearer reference could be provided, I am certain we would all be very grateful, so that we could view the content for ourselves. I have to wonder why stunning this revelation comes so late.
So now that we know beyond all doubt that it was a U-Boat, we have to ask ourselves; why there was no sighting report made, why the Senior Officer in the battle area was not alerted and why no attack arrangements were made. In addition we should ask why no sighting report was was made to the Senior Officer Western Approaches and others, advising them of the sighting, and why no anti-U-boat resources were called upon to suppress or try to sink the enemy craft. Why no U-boat warning was given to other vessels operating in the battle area. The Home Fleet could have suffered serious losses that day. That one U-Boat could have been just the tip of the iceberg, a single unit of a hunting pack, tasked to aid Bismarck perhaps, by attacking the Home Fleet, or grouping for interception of convoys coming up from the south. SLs 74 and 75 were due to enter the area in a few days and Dorsetshire herself had been escorting SL74 only three days previously. Surely Captain Martin, of all people, would know the danger a U-Boat sighting meant for his erstwhile charges.
We might ask why Dorsetshire's own resources were not aggressively directed against the contact. Why Asdic was not employed to try to locate and possibly pin-point the target, why no smoke-marker was dropped, why the Walrus was not armed and tasked to locate and make an attack and why Dorsetshirer's own DC racks were not charged. We have not even been given any indication that Dorsetshire was not in any position to attack, or reasons why she should be so ill-prepared. The ship was venturing into a field of debris and bodies and in waters where U-Boats might be lurking. Did Dorsetshire go in completely unprepared and unarmed in the face of such an obvious threat?
I have to wonder also why, in the face of such overwhelming evidence, that if what Dorsteshire sighted really was a U-Boat, Admiral Tovey was so vague about it in his Post Operation Report.
I served in the RN and no one should underestimate us. We were always prepared to deploy any weapon we carried and within a very few minutes and as for scrambling nets, we could get one over the side in about fifteen minutes, quicker if the net was already in a suitable position. The photo below shows Kent in 1941, complete with scrambling nets. The freeboard of the County class was only three decks, about 28 feet and that is precisely the level from which we regularly deployed our scrambling nets in HMS Albion. The two scrambling nets shown in the photo, indicate one stowed for Ready-Use and the nearer one stowed as a standby.
Still on the Albion, we picked up a Russian submarine on our Sonar one night and tried to give chase, but it soon left us behind. It seems our peacetime navy was more aggressive against submerged targets than the wartime navy in 1941 - if the U-Boat story is to be believed.
As for turning circles, the Town class destroyers from the USA had a turning radius comparable to a battleship. They were considered very bad to handle, yet they were still deployed against U-boats. Not the ideal, but any port in a storm.
So now that we know beyond all doubt that it was a U-Boat, we have to ask ourselves; why there was no sighting report made, why the Senior Officer in the battle area was not alerted and why no attack arrangements were made. In addition we should ask why no sighting report was was made to the Senior Officer Western Approaches and others, advising them of the sighting, and why no anti-U-boat resources were called upon to suppress or try to sink the enemy craft. Why no U-boat warning was given to other vessels operating in the battle area. The Home Fleet could have suffered serious losses that day. That one U-Boat could have been just the tip of the iceberg, a single unit of a hunting pack, tasked to aid Bismarck perhaps, by attacking the Home Fleet, or grouping for interception of convoys coming up from the south. SLs 74 and 75 were due to enter the area in a few days and Dorsetshire herself had been escorting SL74 only three days previously. Surely Captain Martin, of all people, would know the danger a U-Boat sighting meant for his erstwhile charges.
We might ask why Dorsetshire's own resources were not aggressively directed against the contact. Why Asdic was not employed to try to locate and possibly pin-point the target, why no smoke-marker was dropped, why the Walrus was not armed and tasked to locate and make an attack and why Dorsetshirer's own DC racks were not charged. We have not even been given any indication that Dorsetshire was not in any position to attack, or reasons why she should be so ill-prepared. The ship was venturing into a field of debris and bodies and in waters where U-Boats might be lurking. Did Dorsetshire go in completely unprepared and unarmed in the face of such an obvious threat?
I have to wonder also why, in the face of such overwhelming evidence, that if what Dorsteshire sighted really was a U-Boat, Admiral Tovey was so vague about it in his Post Operation Report.
I served in the RN and no one should underestimate us. We were always prepared to deploy any weapon we carried and within a very few minutes and as for scrambling nets, we could get one over the side in about fifteen minutes, quicker if the net was already in a suitable position. The photo below shows Kent in 1941, complete with scrambling nets. The freeboard of the County class was only three decks, about 28 feet and that is precisely the level from which we regularly deployed our scrambling nets in HMS Albion. The two scrambling nets shown in the photo, indicate one stowed for Ready-Use and the nearer one stowed as a standby.
- Kent's Scrambling Nets.jpg (52.92 KiB) Viewed 2578 times
As for turning circles, the Town class destroyers from the USA had a turning radius comparable to a battleship. They were considered very bad to handle, yet they were still deployed against U-boats. Not the ideal, but any port in a storm.
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
Vic,
forgive me but you should chose your sarcasm more carefully. The previous poster did not quote a source which spoke of a definitive U-boat sighting, but a source which said
"there was genuine concern they were being stalked by an undersea killer."
That is a difference.
I think this thread is going nowhere by now. I don't want to undermine any discussion, and I value provoking comments which often lead to new insights. But nobody of us was there, and as other posters and myself stated before, war is hell. From the fragmentary knowledge we have 72 years later, I can't deduce that Captain Martin deliberately let the Bismarck survivors die. You give the impression that you believe this - and this is okay. But I just feel we should keep it at that - let us agree that we disagree. Anything else bears the danger that it becomes disgraceful.
Just my 2 cents...
forgive me but you should chose your sarcasm more carefully. The previous poster did not quote a source which spoke of a definitive U-boat sighting, but a source which said
"there was genuine concern they were being stalked by an undersea killer."
That is a difference.
I think this thread is going nowhere by now. I don't want to undermine any discussion, and I value provoking comments which often lead to new insights. But nobody of us was there, and as other posters and myself stated before, war is hell. From the fragmentary knowledge we have 72 years later, I can't deduce that Captain Martin deliberately let the Bismarck survivors die. You give the impression that you believe this - and this is okay. But I just feel we should keep it at that - let us agree that we disagree. Anything else bears the danger that it becomes disgraceful.
Just my 2 cents...
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
To Northcape.
If you would take the trouble to read my posts you will see that I am not convinced about anything which has been reported about that rescue and that includes the U-Boat. Whilst we are on that subject the focus of my "sarcasm" as you put it, did present with a sizable portion of tongue in his own cheek and was clearly trying to dissolve the thread with some ham-handed attempt at humour. I do not apologise, nor beg forgiveness for replying in like kind. If he has some evidence let him present it and we can all look at it again.
Apart from references to Star Trek and some erroneous assertions, the post did include this; ".... a fine old gentleman revealed himself as the signalman stood by Captain Martin when the decision was made. He said no-one liked leaving those survivors in the water, but there was genuine concern they were being stalked by an undersea killer." In anyone's book this is a bit cryptic, if we are looking for evidence. This fine old gentleman intrigues me and I would be grateful if someone could point me in the direction of his name and his written testimony.
So they were being stalked by an undersea killer which they were hoping to slink away from eh? That does not sound a bit like Captain Martin or the navy I joined. He didn't even put a gun on the sighting. If it was a U-Boat it could easily have been one in difficulty and might have surfaced close too. You'd never find out unless you had a look see. At periscope depth in that heavy sea, with waves of 15 feet peak to trough or more, the tower of a stalking U-Boat should be consistently revealed by wash. The scope needs to be well above the tops of the highest waves to be able to see any distance. The scope can be raised and lowered - the boat cannot.
Let me remind everyone of Captain Martin's record as a fighting seaman, according to a fine old gentleman named "Walter G. Fudge" who served in Dorsetshire during the rescue on the 27th of May '41 and later when; "Off Freetown, Dorsetshire accounted for the sinking of two U-boats, one by the ship's depth charges, the second by our Walrus amphibian seaplane." You can read his whole story here; http://www.world-war.co.uk/dorset_fudge.php3
There were 35 U-Boats sunk in May of 1941. Prompt and decisive action on the 27th could have made it 36. The U-Boat story is water thin and simply will not hunt.
I believe Captain Martin took Dorsetshire into that rescue operation blind and with no idea of what he was going to face. Bismarck had been shelled for more than an hour and surely few of her crew could be left alive. Bismarck was a far more survivable ship than anyone could have known to that point and as Dorsetshire moved in and found herself surrounded by many hundreds of men struggling in the water, her crew was in danger of being physically and emotionally overwhelmed. We know of Joe Brooks and his heroic attempt to get at an injured man. What we do not know about is what other superhuman efforts were being strained on the main deck of Dorsetshire. From his vantage point, Captain Martin will have been able to see the chaos as his men struggled to get as many survivors aboard as possible and he will have known that at some point he would have to call a halt to the operation and, yes, leave men to drown. If his ship pulled away, there would be no hope of another vessel seamlessly taking her place and those around Dorsetshire would no doubt drown.
With such poor preparation, the rescue will have been going very inefficiently, and some of the men involved may have begun to direct their frustrations at their officers. Very possibly Martin will have seen how discipline could completely break down under such circumstances and very rapidly too. His dilemma would be; continue the rescue and take the risk or call a halt to get the ship and her company back to an even keel. Captain Martin's first priority was his ship and if he saw danger as outlined above, he was correct to pull out. Perhaps it was Joe Brooks' action which finally made up his mind. Who could say where it would all end if Brooks' example was to be emulated? How long before one of Dorsetshires own men killed themselves in their desperation? Things could easily get out of hand and may even have got that far before the suspicious sighting. If the above conditions did prevail, the U-Boat would be about the only way Martin could get his ship back under control, without turning out armed marines of course.
If you would take the trouble to read my posts you will see that I am not convinced about anything which has been reported about that rescue and that includes the U-Boat. Whilst we are on that subject the focus of my "sarcasm" as you put it, did present with a sizable portion of tongue in his own cheek and was clearly trying to dissolve the thread with some ham-handed attempt at humour. I do not apologise, nor beg forgiveness for replying in like kind. If he has some evidence let him present it and we can all look at it again.
Apart from references to Star Trek and some erroneous assertions, the post did include this; ".... a fine old gentleman revealed himself as the signalman stood by Captain Martin when the decision was made. He said no-one liked leaving those survivors in the water, but there was genuine concern they were being stalked by an undersea killer." In anyone's book this is a bit cryptic, if we are looking for evidence. This fine old gentleman intrigues me and I would be grateful if someone could point me in the direction of his name and his written testimony.
So they were being stalked by an undersea killer which they were hoping to slink away from eh? That does not sound a bit like Captain Martin or the navy I joined. He didn't even put a gun on the sighting. If it was a U-Boat it could easily have been one in difficulty and might have surfaced close too. You'd never find out unless you had a look see. At periscope depth in that heavy sea, with waves of 15 feet peak to trough or more, the tower of a stalking U-Boat should be consistently revealed by wash. The scope needs to be well above the tops of the highest waves to be able to see any distance. The scope can be raised and lowered - the boat cannot.
Let me remind everyone of Captain Martin's record as a fighting seaman, according to a fine old gentleman named "Walter G. Fudge" who served in Dorsetshire during the rescue on the 27th of May '41 and later when; "Off Freetown, Dorsetshire accounted for the sinking of two U-boats, one by the ship's depth charges, the second by our Walrus amphibian seaplane." You can read his whole story here; http://www.world-war.co.uk/dorset_fudge.php3
There were 35 U-Boats sunk in May of 1941. Prompt and decisive action on the 27th could have made it 36. The U-Boat story is water thin and simply will not hunt.
I believe Captain Martin took Dorsetshire into that rescue operation blind and with no idea of what he was going to face. Bismarck had been shelled for more than an hour and surely few of her crew could be left alive. Bismarck was a far more survivable ship than anyone could have known to that point and as Dorsetshire moved in and found herself surrounded by many hundreds of men struggling in the water, her crew was in danger of being physically and emotionally overwhelmed. We know of Joe Brooks and his heroic attempt to get at an injured man. What we do not know about is what other superhuman efforts were being strained on the main deck of Dorsetshire. From his vantage point, Captain Martin will have been able to see the chaos as his men struggled to get as many survivors aboard as possible and he will have known that at some point he would have to call a halt to the operation and, yes, leave men to drown. If his ship pulled away, there would be no hope of another vessel seamlessly taking her place and those around Dorsetshire would no doubt drown.
With such poor preparation, the rescue will have been going very inefficiently, and some of the men involved may have begun to direct their frustrations at their officers. Very possibly Martin will have seen how discipline could completely break down under such circumstances and very rapidly too. His dilemma would be; continue the rescue and take the risk or call a halt to get the ship and her company back to an even keel. Captain Martin's first priority was his ship and if he saw danger as outlined above, he was correct to pull out. Perhaps it was Joe Brooks' action which finally made up his mind. Who could say where it would all end if Brooks' example was to be emulated? How long before one of Dorsetshires own men killed themselves in their desperation? Things could easily get out of hand and may even have got that far before the suspicious sighting. If the above conditions did prevail, the U-Boat would be about the only way Martin could get his ship back under control, without turning out armed marines of course.
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MikeBrough
- Member
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- Location: Scotland
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
I'm sorry, Vic, but I'm starting to get a bit tired of the way you're interpreting every bit of evidence to support a theory you seem already to have decided is true.
'I believe Captain Martin took...', 'her crew was in danger of being physically and emotionally overwhelmed', 'Very possibly Martin will have seen how discipline could completely break down under such circumstances and very rapidly too', 'Who could say where it would all end if Brooks' example was to be emulated', blah blah.
Not one shred of actual evidence that contradicts the established history of a u-boat danger and a sensible decision (you say so, yourself) to abandon the rescue attempt because of the risk to his own ship.
If I had responsibility for the safety of 800 RN crewmen and an expensive war machine, I would not have taken any chances either. In fact, I'd expect any captain of a major warship who knowingly exposed his ship to a u-boat threat to be court-martialed.
Let the story, and the reputation of a good captain, rest, please.
'I believe Captain Martin took...', 'her crew was in danger of being physically and emotionally overwhelmed', 'Very possibly Martin will have seen how discipline could completely break down under such circumstances and very rapidly too', 'Who could say where it would all end if Brooks' example was to be emulated', blah blah.
Not one shred of actual evidence that contradicts the established history of a u-boat danger and a sensible decision (you say so, yourself) to abandon the rescue attempt because of the risk to his own ship.
If I had responsibility for the safety of 800 RN crewmen and an expensive war machine, I would not have taken any chances either. In fact, I'd expect any captain of a major warship who knowingly exposed his ship to a u-boat threat to be court-martialed.
Let the story, and the reputation of a good captain, rest, please.
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phil gollin
- Member
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- Joined: Mon Oct 18, 2004 6:33 am
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
Lunacy.Vic Dale wrote:
....... There were 35 U-Boats sunk in May of 1941. Prompt and decisive action on the 27th could have made it 36. ...........
There was 1 ( one ) U-boat lost in May 1941, the "35" figure is for the WHOLE of 1941.
The turning point moth ( May 1943 ) only managed 40 I-boat losses.
.
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Herr Nilsson
- Senior Member
- Posts: 1585
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- Location: Germany
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
Vic, what are the operation conditions of Asdic?
And if we talk about personal recollections, there is another:
And if we talk about personal recollections, there is another:
After the Bismarck disappeared our immediate task was to rescue survivors. The very rough sea was littered with hundreds of bobbing heads. The sea was so rough that it was impossible for us to launch any life boats. The only way rescuing them was to throw life-lines and scrambling nets over the side. The waves were so large that at one moment the men in the water would be level with our upper deck and then way down in a very deep trough. There must have been a fair amount of of oil in the water because the ropes became very slippery and many lost their grip agonisingly short of our upper deck, only to fail back into the water.
I clearly recall Captain Martin shouting at us from the bridge through a loud hailer, "Get those men out of the water. You never know when you may be in their position!"
Regards
Marc
"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
Marc
"Thank God we blow up and sink more easily." (unknown officer from HMS Norfolk)
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
Agreed, this thread is getting quite unseemly now. perhaps a good time to let it rest.MikeBrough wrote:Let the story, and the reputation of a good captain, rest, please.
In the Highest Tradition of the Royal Navy - Captain John Leach MVO DSO
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
Yes dead right. My mistake. An attack on that sighting could have resulted in Dorsetshire's doubling the score on the same day that she put her torpedoes into Bismarck.phil gollin wrote:Lunacy.Vic Dale wrote:
....... There were 35 U-Boats sunk in May of 1941. Prompt and decisive action on the 27th could have made it 36. ...........
There was 1 ( one ) U-boat lost in May 1941, the "35" figure is for the WHOLE of 1941.
The turning point moth ( May 1943 ) only managed 40 I-boat losses.
.
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
There are far to many inconsistencies in that U-Boat story to just let it go. That day represented one of the great sea battles and also one of the worst naval tragedies. To skip over it does no justice to those left behind.
However distasteful a subject may be it is the duty of anyone engaging in the study to keep an open mind and assess and weigh whatever information may come to hand and to share it. There is never a time at which the history book is closed. There is no definitive history, since not all of the information is open to public view at any given time. There are authoritative books, but no one is accorded the last word.
Since opening this thread, a lot of information has been gathered, which has certainly enlightened the writer of these lines, but each additional piece of information has asked new questions.
There has also been a lot of personalising, bitching and preaching about this thread. What those who engage in this sort of thing may not realise is; that far from enlightening anyone here, they are telling us a lot about themselves. This thread isn't about them, but about more than one thousand men of the Bismarck who were abandoned to the chill of the Atlantic, when they might otherwise have been rescued.
We are all very well aware that the demands of war may over ride humanitarian considerations from time to time - we are not children here - but if there is any doubt about intentions and actions on the part of individuals or sections of the armed forces themselves, they need to be looked into and the truth, or as close to it as we can get at this time, should be revealed, however ugly that may or may not be.
We have more than one thousand men struggling to survive in heavy seas. We have a British cruiser moving slowly among them attempting to rescue as many as possible. We have single lines deployed - some without bowlines - when scrambling nets would have been a far more efficient means of getting those men aboard. We have a suspicious sighting - on which quadrant and by whom? The sighting is taken as a U-Boat, yet no enemy sighting report is made. No attack plan is developed, despite sufficient weapons being available aboard the cruiser herself in the form of depth charges and a depth charge carrying Walrus and among the ships remaining in the battle area.
The question has been asked about how Asdic might perform in heavy weather. The big problem for Asdic is cavitation which will begin to blot out returning echoes at about 18 knots or more, hence the maximum attack speed of 15 knots. In heavy weather cavitation will become a problem at lower speeds, though if a ship is hove to or proceeding slowly, it should be possible to get returning echoes as if the ship were moving at higher speed in clam waters. As far as I am aware, it was possible to use Asdic in all weathers and very accurately at convoy speed of 8 knots.
It took Dorsteshire about one hour to get into position for the rescue and considering that she had fired torpedoes at the Bismarck and was probably the closest too at that time, it indicates that time was set aside to deploy the Asdic dome, which would be withdrawn into the hull for when the ship was working at high speed. In fact, moving below 20 knots would be asking for trouble if Asdic were not deployed, as U-Boats were known to be operating in those waters. The ship was hove too for about 40 minutes and the most alert and experienced Asdic operators and technicians should be working the set.
However distasteful a subject may be it is the duty of anyone engaging in the study to keep an open mind and assess and weigh whatever information may come to hand and to share it. There is never a time at which the history book is closed. There is no definitive history, since not all of the information is open to public view at any given time. There are authoritative books, but no one is accorded the last word.
Since opening this thread, a lot of information has been gathered, which has certainly enlightened the writer of these lines, but each additional piece of information has asked new questions.
There has also been a lot of personalising, bitching and preaching about this thread. What those who engage in this sort of thing may not realise is; that far from enlightening anyone here, they are telling us a lot about themselves. This thread isn't about them, but about more than one thousand men of the Bismarck who were abandoned to the chill of the Atlantic, when they might otherwise have been rescued.
We are all very well aware that the demands of war may over ride humanitarian considerations from time to time - we are not children here - but if there is any doubt about intentions and actions on the part of individuals or sections of the armed forces themselves, they need to be looked into and the truth, or as close to it as we can get at this time, should be revealed, however ugly that may or may not be.
We have more than one thousand men struggling to survive in heavy seas. We have a British cruiser moving slowly among them attempting to rescue as many as possible. We have single lines deployed - some without bowlines - when scrambling nets would have been a far more efficient means of getting those men aboard. We have a suspicious sighting - on which quadrant and by whom? The sighting is taken as a U-Boat, yet no enemy sighting report is made. No attack plan is developed, despite sufficient weapons being available aboard the cruiser herself in the form of depth charges and a depth charge carrying Walrus and among the ships remaining in the battle area.
The question has been asked about how Asdic might perform in heavy weather. The big problem for Asdic is cavitation which will begin to blot out returning echoes at about 18 knots or more, hence the maximum attack speed of 15 knots. In heavy weather cavitation will become a problem at lower speeds, though if a ship is hove to or proceeding slowly, it should be possible to get returning echoes as if the ship were moving at higher speed in clam waters. As far as I am aware, it was possible to use Asdic in all weathers and very accurately at convoy speed of 8 knots.
It took Dorsteshire about one hour to get into position for the rescue and considering that she had fired torpedoes at the Bismarck and was probably the closest too at that time, it indicates that time was set aside to deploy the Asdic dome, which would be withdrawn into the hull for when the ship was working at high speed. In fact, moving below 20 knots would be asking for trouble if Asdic were not deployed, as U-Boats were known to be operating in those waters. The ship was hove too for about 40 minutes and the most alert and experienced Asdic operators and technicians should be working the set.
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phil gollin
- Member
- Posts: 167
- Joined: Mon Oct 18, 2004 6:33 am
Re: Rescue Operations After Bismarck's Sinking
You're just trolling -Vic Dale wrote:
Yes dead right. My mistake. An attack on that sighting could have resulted in Dorsetshire's doubling the score on the same day that she put her torpedoes into Bismarck.
As for your second post - pure fantasy, no evidence and in reality just more trolling.
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