Bismarck commerce raiding

[paulcadogan]

My bad ... I didn't realize all the QE class weren't rebuilt.

Actually they all WERE refitted in the mid 1920's when the twin funnels were trunked into one, extra protection & bulges fitted, and additional platforms worked in to the foremast between the bridge and the spotting top - maybe that's what you were thinking about. But...the gun elevation remained the same. Only Warspite, Valiant & Queen Elizabeth underwent major reconstruction in the 30's with Warspite serving as a prototype of sorts (1934-37) retaining 8 of her 6-inch casemate guns with 8 twin 4-inch AA. Valiant & QE were rebuilt 1937-39 and 1937-41 respectively with bridge structures more similar to the KGV class, all casemate guns removed and a DP secondary armament of 20 4.5-inch. It was in this rebuild that the gun elevation was increased.

Renown, which remained largely unmodified since the early 20's, was rebuilt along the same lines between 1937-39 (Repulse having had a major refit in 1933-36 in which the catapult and hangar and extra deck armour were added so was lower on the priority list).

So for operations in the Atlantic with Bismarck and the Prinz on the loose, I'd think the close convoy escorts would have been the R's, Malaya, Nelson & Rodney (the other 4 QE's would stay in the Med) as their slow top speed would make them less suitable for pursuit. They'd need to put at least one cruiser (preferably a County, Town or Colony) with the close escort as well to counter the Prinz. Could they manage all this this at the time?

The 'hunters"? I'd think they'd have alternating patrols in BB/BC pairings of KGV & Repulse, PoW & Hood with Victorious and maybe Furious giving air support. No doubt Force H would be doing a lot of Atlantic sorties to cover incoming convoys too. The RN would be working very hard.....but then that's what they were doing all along!

[wadinga]

Hello Terje,

I have Cajus Bekker's Hitler's Naval War saying there was a 10th June deployment commanded by Marschall, but says the 20th June deployment was commanded by Lutjens. He spends quite a time discussing Marschall's unfair dismissal which suggests he had a long interview with the Admiral and was well informed about the circumstances.

Koop & Schmolke Battleships of the Scharnhorst Class agree with the change of commander between the two missions. They say Acting Fleet Commander Vice-Admiral Lutjens did two periods in charge during Marschall's tenure as actual Fleet Commander. The second was 19/6/40 to 7/7/40 when he replaced Marschall and became actual Fleet Commander on the 8/7/40.

The first mission was anti-convoy in the Norwegian Sea but put off by air recon results the ships were back in by 11th. They say the 20th June mission was indeed a planned sweep against the Northern Patrol, but since Scharnhorst sailed an hour before Gneisenau and Hipper, it was also a diversion to cover her escape. However the raiding mission itself was a risky concept since in June in high latitudes there would be no darkness to hide the breakout. With only one destroyer, Karl Galster, left after the rest were sent off with the damaged Scharnhorst, and one seaplane as escort, it was easier for HMS Clyde to score the hit on the Flaghip, which scuppered the mission.

I don't know whether Lutjens was in command on the 26th July when damaged Gneisenau, Nurnberg and escorts leaving Norway ran into yet another British submarine HMS Thames which took out the Luchs.

[Terje Langoy]

G´day all

Wadinga

I have the book you refer to, written by Cajus Bekker. It is a very good account, no doubt. I questioned Bekker since Kähler had the benefit of serving aboard Gneisenau at that time thus he ought to be a primary source ... he said 8th July.

For the sake of clarity I decided to consult the heavy books in my library, this being "Die Deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935 - 1945" by Michael Salewski. The first of his three volumes makes a reference to the matter in question here and he could tell that after Gneisenau returned to Trondheim 11th June Admiral Marschall had called for sick leave. Salewski also hints to a quarrel between Fleet and Group commander, (Saalwächter) where the latter had been very critical of Marschall´s ability. I can not go into further details since my abilities in the German language only permit me to read context.

It does undeniably seem like Admiral Lütjens was in command 20th June. So forth Kähler must have got it wrong. And that of course change my position concerning Marschall´s dismissal.

Best regards

[RF]

Renown, which remained largely unmodified since the early 20's, was rebuilt along the same lines between 1937-39 (Repulse having had a major refit in 1933-36 in which the catapult and hangar and extra deck armour were added so was lower on the priority list).

As an aside here it does make the fact that Hood never got its armour strengthening at about this time rather surprising.

[RF]

So for operations in the Atlantic with Bismarck and the Prinz on the loose, I'd think the close convoy escorts would have been the R's, Malaya, Nelson & Rodney (the other 4 QE's would stay in the Med) as their slow top speed would make them less suitable for pursuit. They'd need to put at least one cruiser (preferably a County, Town or Colony) with the close escort as well to counter the Prinz. Could they manage all this this at the time?

Basically yes. This would be a deterent to close attack by Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. However if the twins were added in then it wouldn't be sufficient.

[RF]

The 'hunters"? I'd think they'd have alternating patrols in BB/BC pairings of KGV & Repulse, PoW & Hood with Victorious and maybe Furious giving air support. No doubt Force H would be doing a lot of Atlantic sorties to cover incoming convoys too. The RN would be working very hard.....but then that's what they were doing all along!

There is actually a much more straightforward solution. Use cruisers to intercept and eliminate the German supply ships and tankers.

[Bgile]

The 'hunters"? I'd think they'd have alternating patrols in BB/BC pairings of KGV & Repulse, PoW & Hood with Victorious and maybe Furious giving air support. No doubt Force H would be doing a lot of Atlantic sorties to cover incoming convoys too. The RN would be working very hard.....but then that's what they were doing all along!

There is actually a much more straightforward solution. Use cruisers to intercept and eliminate the German supply ships and tankers.

If so, that pretty much puts paid to your idea of Yamato operating off the west coast of the USA, doesn't it?

[paulcadogan]

There is actually a much more straightforward solution. Use cruisers to intercept and eliminate the German supply ships and tankers.

Excellent point! This is what they did after Bismarck was sunk anyway - but it took them six weeks - 7 ships caught by June 21 and another 7 by July 11. They apparently used Enigma decrypts to help track them down. With the Germans reluctant to believe their codes had been broken, might not this have helped with the warships as well?

[wadinga]

Hello Terje,

Excellent further research and valuable information, it seems Marschall got time for just one more abortive mission before getting the boot. Ewart Brookes' Prologue to a War says he was "ordered to sea" in order to intercept Allied convoys but, perhaps on his own responsibility, came back in the following day as air recon said there was nothing to chase. Exercising his authority as Fleet Commander was obviously not a good idea. Then the mysterious illness, and sick leave. There was no "Russian Front to be packed off to yet and his misdemeanours did not warrant a bullet in the back of the head or a trip to a concentration camp. Bekker is very good in describing the hopelessly confused and conflicting instructions given to Marschall before his first mission by various factions in the Nazi High Command, which were rendered obsolete by circumstances. The Fleet Commander took the initiative, with new objectives based on new intelligence and destroyed several valuable units. Saalwachter didn't like this and commenced a vendetta which saw Marschall beached.


So Lutjens' track record in contrast was:
Get the Narvik force to location, but then run away from Renown to Iceland, leaving the British to slaughter Bonte's destroyers and a free hand to convoy and land a force to take Narvik.
Later, take command from Marschall and steam Gneisenau straight into a torpedo.
Then take the damaged Gneisenau out and narrowly escape getting hit again, with Luchs taking the bullet instead. Get back to Germany with no Battle Fleet left to command.
Next year,during the Atlantic Raiding mission, he turns away when faced with Naiad and later runs away from Ramillies, then Malaya and finally Rodney before entering Brest. His vessels have considerable speed advantage over his targets meaning minor mispositioning of attacks can easily be overcome. However his orders are specific and he is unwilling to over-ride them to take advantage of technologically inferior opponents. Only 115,622 tons of helpless merchant ships sunk in 60 days by the two most powerful German ships in service. Sixty days at sea had been too much for Scharnhorst, she needed a major refit.
Switching to commanding from Bismarck, he fails to convince Raeder that the inability of the Twins to join the mission makes it too risky and having fatalistically told friends he will not be returning from this mission, sets off to his doom. His shortcomings are further highlighted when Lindemann and Schneider win the Battle of the Denmark Straits for him.

Why would anybody imagine he could turn into a firebrand if he had got loose again in the Atlantic? His orders constrained him and he was no man to override them as Marschall was.

All the best

wadinga

[RF]

There is actually a much more straightforward solution. Use cruisers to intercept and eliminate the German supply ships and tankers.

If so, that pretty much puts paid to your idea of Yamato operating off the west coast of the USA, doesn't it?[/quote]

Different navy, different ocean and basically a different war.

[RF]

they did after Bismarck was sunk anyway - but it took them six weeks - 7 ships caught by June 21 and another 7 by July 11. They apparently used Enigma decrypts to help track them down. With the Germans reluctant to believe their codes had been broken, might not this have helped with the warships as well?

The warships operated to different enigma codes which were not broken at that time.

[Bgile]

There is actually a much more straightforward solution. Use cruisers to intercept and eliminate the German supply ships and tankers.

If so, that pretty much puts paid to your idea of Yamato operating off the west coast of the USA, doesn't it?

Different navy, different ocean and basically a different war.[/quote]

Yes, but my point is still valid. The US destroys the IJN supply ships and Yamato is doomed. The logistic problem of sending Yamato to the US West Coast is simply unmanageable in the face of opposition, particularly from long range air attack. Heavy bombers weren't terribly effective against warships, but they destroyed a lot of transports. And then there are the US cruisers and carriers. Noone has to attack Yamato itself.