This is actually a very good set of questions. I would add one other - how exactly do the Germans co-ordinate such an attack without breaking radio silence for forces operating out of sight of each other?lwd wrote:"Allow it to occur"? That rather implies the escort cooperates with the German plan doesn't it? And as I suggested long range gun engaments can be rather expensive in terms of ammunition expenditure. Furthermore if an old battle ships is heavily damaged or even sunk but the Bismarck sustains much damage that at best (from the German POV) ends the current sortie.
Bismarck commerce raiding
Moderator: Bill Jurens
Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
Remembering that the two immediate predecessors to Lutjens, Marschall and before him Boehm were both fired by Raeder for excercising a rather wider interpretation of SKL orders, I would imagine that Lutjens would display the rigidity to Raeder's wishes that he did display during the actual Rheinubung. Prinz Eugen is very much weaker than one of the twins - on its own it cannot menace a convoy with cruiser and destroyer escorts beyond acting as a decoy to draw them off.Dave Saxton wrote:What is interesting is that the SKL's orders leave some room for interputation and allow for more agressive tactics, while the detailed orders drawn up by the Fleet Command (Luetjens was the Fleet Commander) are more rigid.
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- Terje Langoy
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G´day all
From Raeder´s book I understood it such that Admiral Böhm was not fired, he asked to be relieved of his position since he disagreed with the reorganized command structure. Raeder granted his request.
It appears to have become an acknowledged fact that the motive for Admiral Marschall being fired was his display of fighting spirit facing H.M.S. Glorious and her destroyer escort going against SKL orders. Am I the only one to suspect there might be another motive just as plausible in the mere fact that under his command both battleships were also torpedoed, twelve days apart, and from there out of service for half a year? Could this not be the sort of thing that get you fired?
Lütjens had fighting spirit too. In the Renown duel he did permit Netzbandt to turn back on the enemy to keep the forward batteries firing. Not until a direct hit incapacitated her centralized fire did Lütjens order her to break off.
Concerning the Ramillies episode it should be noted that Lütjens was aware early on the convoy had battleship escort yet he still made arrangements for a pincer strike to commence at a set time. Unfortunately Hoffmann closed in on the convoy too early and revealed his own position ahead of Lütjens scheduled attack.
The initiative might not been well recieved by Lütjens but this is not neccesarily due to Hoffmann acting independently. It may also be due to Scharnhorst closing in on the battleship escort before Gneisenau was in position to move in on the convoy. Hoffman´s role as decoy relied on the flagship being able to move in on moments notice. She might not have been and if that is the case then Lütjens response seems justified.
Kind regards
From Raeder´s book I understood it such that Admiral Böhm was not fired, he asked to be relieved of his position since he disagreed with the reorganized command structure. Raeder granted his request.
It appears to have become an acknowledged fact that the motive for Admiral Marschall being fired was his display of fighting spirit facing H.M.S. Glorious and her destroyer escort going against SKL orders. Am I the only one to suspect there might be another motive just as plausible in the mere fact that under his command both battleships were also torpedoed, twelve days apart, and from there out of service for half a year? Could this not be the sort of thing that get you fired?
Lütjens had fighting spirit too. In the Renown duel he did permit Netzbandt to turn back on the enemy to keep the forward batteries firing. Not until a direct hit incapacitated her centralized fire did Lütjens order her to break off.
Concerning the Ramillies episode it should be noted that Lütjens was aware early on the convoy had battleship escort yet he still made arrangements for a pincer strike to commence at a set time. Unfortunately Hoffmann closed in on the convoy too early and revealed his own position ahead of Lütjens scheduled attack.
The initiative might not been well recieved by Lütjens but this is not neccesarily due to Hoffmann acting independently. It may also be due to Scharnhorst closing in on the battleship escort before Gneisenau was in position to move in on the convoy. Hoffman´s role as decoy relied on the flagship being able to move in on moments notice. She might not have been and if that is the case then Lütjens response seems justified.
Kind regards
Re:
The view taken by Barrie Pitt in ''Hitlers High Seas Fleet'' is that the disagreement amounted to being fired, after an early sortie led by Boehm in the Skaggerack yielded no results, because in the view of Boehm his orders were ambiguous and the interpretation placed on them by Raeder was so resrictive that there was no chance of achieving anything.Terje Langoy wrote:G´day all
From Raeder´s book I understood it such that Admiral Böhm was not fired, he asked to be relieved of his position since he disagreed with the reorganized command structure. Raeder granted his request.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Re:
Raeder's book, published in 1960, has been criticised for somewhat placing the blame for command failures and wrong decisions on his subordinates rather than take full blame himself.Terje Langoy wrote:G´day all
From Raeder´s book I understood it such that Admiral Böhm was not fired, he asked to be relieved of his position since he disagreed with the reorganized command structure. Raeder granted his request.
It appears to have become an acknowledged fact that the motive for Admiral Marschall being fired was his display of fighting spirit facing H.M.S. Glorious and her destroyer escort going against SKL orders. Am I the only one to suspect there might be another motive just as plausible in the mere fact that under his command both battleships were also torpedoed, twelve days apart, and from there out of service for half a year? Could this not be the sort of thing that get you fired?
Kind regards
My view of Scharnhorst being torpedoed by a destroyer during Operation Juno has already been expressed. Marschall wasn't even on board Scharnhorst, it was Hoffmann (a good commander incidentally) who misjudged the torpedo tracks and turned Scharnhorst off its combing course too early. Hoffmann wasn't sacked.
And Gneisenau being torpedoed by a submarine - and only one hit - is a misfortune that can befall almost any commander in any navy.
No, I am inclined to think these were used as excuses for the removal of a loose cannon.
Compare this with Thunderbolt-Cerebus and its immediate aftermath. Scharnhorst almost sank due to two mine hits, Gneisenau then knocked out in port by a bombing raid which hit gas vapour filled empty fuel bunkers. Was Ciliax blamed and sacked by Raeder for these mishaps? No, he was packed off to Norway to take Tirpitz under his command.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Re:
Doesn't this highlight the problem of communication between the two German ships when out of sight with each other? And would it have been any different for Bismarck and Prinz Eugen in conducting a pincer move on a convoy?Terje Langoy wrote: The initiative might not been well recieved by Lütjens but this is not neccesarily due to Hoffmann acting independently. It may also be due to Scharnhorst closing in on the battleship escort before Gneisenau was in position to move in on the convoy. Hoffman´s role as decoy relied on the flagship being able to move in on moments notice. She might not have been and if that is the case then Lütjens response seems justified.
Hoffmann is taking the blame for acting on his initative without knowing the precise moment to strike, and getting the timing not quite right.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
Terje,
Excuse me but I think this is incorrect:
Lutjens was in command when Gneisenau went out with Hipper to create a diversion so Scharnhorst could get home, Marschall had already been replaced. For not "Obeying Orders". Had Lutjens instituted suitable evasive maneouvres when operating in the British submarines' playground? Who knows?
As for long range pummelling, the only known naval gun hits on anything that wasn't a land mass (or tied to a land mass Massachusetts fans) over 26,000 yds total two. Two hits only.
Lutjens was a stolid, uninspiring "Yes" Man who replaced a dangerously effective Admiral in the Kriegsmarine, one whose talents were subsequently supressed elsewhere. Good News for Democracy and Posterity I'd say!
Bismarck would have wandered aimlessly about wasting fuel, and running away from shadows like the Twins did, until it was time to go home. A nuisance, not a danger. And subsequently a bigger, fatter target for the RAF in Brest or St Nazaire.
All the best
wadinga
Excuse me but I think this is incorrect:
As has already been pointed out it was Hoffman's decision to turn which put Scharnhorst into danger, not Marschall's. BTW the KTB quoted in Koop & Schmolke has lots of stuff about GHG hydrophones detecting torpedoes, all over the place during the action, just not the one that hitAm I the only one to suspect there might be another motive just as plausible in the mere fact that under his command both battleships were also torpedoed, twelve days apart, and from there out of service for half a year?
Lutjens was in command when Gneisenau went out with Hipper to create a diversion so Scharnhorst could get home, Marschall had already been replaced. For not "Obeying Orders". Had Lutjens instituted suitable evasive maneouvres when operating in the British submarines' playground? Who knows?
As for long range pummelling, the only known naval gun hits on anything that wasn't a land mass (or tied to a land mass Massachusetts fans) over 26,000 yds total two. Two hits only.
Lutjens was a stolid, uninspiring "Yes" Man who replaced a dangerously effective Admiral in the Kriegsmarine, one whose talents were subsequently supressed elsewhere. Good News for Democracy and Posterity I'd say!
Bismarck would have wandered aimlessly about wasting fuel, and running away from shadows like the Twins did, until it was time to go home. A nuisance, not a danger. And subsequently a bigger, fatter target for the RAF in Brest or St Nazaire.
All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
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Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
Dave Saxton wrote:
Once again thanks for your replies. I believe that later on the older Battleships had, in Churchills words "their guns cocked up" to increase their range. We discussed Ramillies and know the proven power of Rodney so presumably Lutjens would use his speed to disapear over the horizon, but how about Malaya or for that matter any other QE class (I know they were mainly based in the Med so probably would never have met)?
Gentlemen,Old R class battleships and such really represented not much more than a bluff in the face of modern battleships or battlecruisers, because something like the Bismarck or Gneiesnau can just stand off at a longer range and pummel one of these old unmodernized battleships.
Once again thanks for your replies. I believe that later on the older Battleships had, in Churchills words "their guns cocked up" to increase their range. We discussed Ramillies and know the proven power of Rodney so presumably Lutjens would use his speed to disapear over the horizon, but how about Malaya or for that matter any other QE class (I know they were mainly based in the Med so probably would never have met)?
Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
I believe the QE class ships all had their elevation increased to 30 degrees.
- paulcadogan
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Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
Of the British ships older than Hood, only the thoroughly reconstructed ones had their gun elevation raised to 30 deg - Warspite, QE, Valiant and Renown.Bgile wrote:I believe the QE class ships all had their elevation increased to 30 degrees.
The R's, Malaya, Barham and Repulse remained at 20 deg with a 23,000 yard max range.
Qui invidet minor est - He who envies is the lesser man
Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
Which is what I said, right? The QE class had elevation increased.paulcadogan wrote:Of the British ships older than Hood, only the thoroughly reconstructed ones had their gun elevation raised to 30 deg - Warspite, QE, Valiant and Renown.Bgile wrote:I believe the QE class ships all had their elevation increased to 30 degrees.
The R's, Malaya, Barham and Repulse remained at 20 deg with a 23,000 yard max range.
Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
I have said previously in other threads that I think Marschall would have been a better choice for Rheinubung than Lutjens.wadinga wrote: Lutjens was a stolid, uninspiring "Yes" Man
That doesn't mean Lutjens didn't have ability, and describing him as quoted above is I think rather uncharitable.
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- paulcadogan
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Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
Oh yeah...but the operative word was "all".....but don't be sad....cuz 3/5 ain't bad!Bgile wrote:Which is what I said, right? The QE class had elevation increased.
Qui invidet minor est - He who envies is the lesser man
Re: Bismarck commerce raiding
My bad ... I didn't realize all the QE class weren't rebuilt.paulcadogan wrote:Oh yeah...but the operative word was "all".....but don't be sad....cuz 3/5 ain't bad!Bgile wrote:Which is what I said, right? The QE class had elevation increased.
- Terje Langoy
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G´day all
RF
I´ve never seen it clarified anywhere the exact mission of the October foray. But I´ve seen it suggested its mere purpose was to lure the Home Fleet out of Scapa Flow. It has also been my understanding it was the insertion of a Group commander between Fleet and SKL that fueled the conflict between Raeder and Böhm.
Though Marschall was not aboard the Scharnhorst when she was torpedoed it was nonetheless him to order the attack. Nor he or Hoffmann was sacked after the incident. Marchall was still in command of the next sortie to follow the Juno event, being this a sortie with Gneisenau and Hipper against the British patrol in the GIUK-gap.
When Gneisenau was torpedoed she had barely left Frohavet. Though it is a mishap, as the previous incident with Scharnhorst also was, it did nonetheless put both of the German capital ships out of service for a long time; the last being mission-killed shortly after leaving port. Unfortunate as it may be this is the cruel nature of being in command. Responsibility rest on his shoulders.
Hoffmann did have a time specified for Lütjens pincer strike but unfortunately he also got a wrong enemy position. This resulted in Scharnhorst closing in on the convoy ahead of time, finding it in another position than given in Lütjens attack orders. However the dillemma concerned Hoffmann´s maneuver after spotting the enemy. Lütjens meant he should have reversed his course immediately, something he did not do. The reason for this could be that the Ramillies discovered Scharnhorst at the same time Scharnhorst made contact thus leaving Hoffmann with a very difficult decision. He could retreat knowing fully well the air was out of the ballon ... or he could initiate the attack ahead of schedule hoping that Gneisenau was ready to play along. I do not know his exact motives but I am inclined to believe Hoffmann had good reasons for doing what he did. But I can at the same time also appreciate Lütjens reaction. He must be allowed to express dissatisfaction when plans go sideways.
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen did make it back to Germany, despite their mishaps while transitting the Channel. It was a very hazardous stretch of water for any German ship and does not really compare with the Norwegian coast in June 1940. By the time Gneisenau entered dry dock in Kiel she was not flying the pennant of Cilliax. She would be under the command of Heimatstab.
Wadinga
I have the book Schlachtschiff Gneisenau by Wolfgang Kähler, an artillery officer to serve aboard the ship in the actual time period. He states the Gneisenau did not leave Trondheim 20th June with the intent to create a diversion for the Scharnhorst but that she had been deployed for a sortie similar to that of November 1939, this time accompanied by the Hipper. Further he also state that Admiral Lütjens departed Berlin and arrived at Trondheim on 8th July. He could so forth not possibly be aboard Gneisenau eighteen days earlier.
Kind regards
RF
I´ve never seen it clarified anywhere the exact mission of the October foray. But I´ve seen it suggested its mere purpose was to lure the Home Fleet out of Scapa Flow. It has also been my understanding it was the insertion of a Group commander between Fleet and SKL that fueled the conflict between Raeder and Böhm.
Though Marschall was not aboard the Scharnhorst when she was torpedoed it was nonetheless him to order the attack. Nor he or Hoffmann was sacked after the incident. Marchall was still in command of the next sortie to follow the Juno event, being this a sortie with Gneisenau and Hipper against the British patrol in the GIUK-gap.
When Gneisenau was torpedoed she had barely left Frohavet. Though it is a mishap, as the previous incident with Scharnhorst also was, it did nonetheless put both of the German capital ships out of service for a long time; the last being mission-killed shortly after leaving port. Unfortunate as it may be this is the cruel nature of being in command. Responsibility rest on his shoulders.
Hoffmann did have a time specified for Lütjens pincer strike but unfortunately he also got a wrong enemy position. This resulted in Scharnhorst closing in on the convoy ahead of time, finding it in another position than given in Lütjens attack orders. However the dillemma concerned Hoffmann´s maneuver after spotting the enemy. Lütjens meant he should have reversed his course immediately, something he did not do. The reason for this could be that the Ramillies discovered Scharnhorst at the same time Scharnhorst made contact thus leaving Hoffmann with a very difficult decision. He could retreat knowing fully well the air was out of the ballon ... or he could initiate the attack ahead of schedule hoping that Gneisenau was ready to play along. I do not know his exact motives but I am inclined to believe Hoffmann had good reasons for doing what he did. But I can at the same time also appreciate Lütjens reaction. He must be allowed to express dissatisfaction when plans go sideways.
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen did make it back to Germany, despite their mishaps while transitting the Channel. It was a very hazardous stretch of water for any German ship and does not really compare with the Norwegian coast in June 1940. By the time Gneisenau entered dry dock in Kiel she was not flying the pennant of Cilliax. She would be under the command of Heimatstab.
Wadinga
I have the book Schlachtschiff Gneisenau by Wolfgang Kähler, an artillery officer to serve aboard the ship in the actual time period. He states the Gneisenau did not leave Trondheim 20th June with the intent to create a diversion for the Scharnhorst but that she had been deployed for a sortie similar to that of November 1939, this time accompanied by the Hipper. Further he also state that Admiral Lütjens departed Berlin and arrived at Trondheim on 8th July. He could so forth not possibly be aboard Gneisenau eighteen days earlier.
Kind regards