Tovey's decision

[Bgile]

The Baron refers to Hood as their arch nemsis in training exercises. I would expect them to target Hood. In fact, that is what they did. You can hypothesize that Hood doesn't get destroyed, and we have done that before with the actual engagement. You can hypothesize that the British ships don't try to close rapidly and operate independently, but if you do that one of them may get left out of the fight at long range. Any turn needed to significantly separate the two British ships would open the range for one of them. If you hypothesize that KGV was there on the fateful day, there is every indication Bismarck would have fired at Hood. If the luck was the same, Hood would have been lost and Bismarck would have been engaging KGV 1v1. I don't think KGV being there instead of PoW changes the historical situation much. Even if she shot better than PoW, she isn't likely to do enough damage to keep Hood from blowing up in the actual event. If Hood doesn't blow up, then Hood and PoW should have been sufficient to defeat Bismarck. Circular argument.

[tommy303]

German doctrine was usually to have the largest gunned friendly ship engage the enemy's largest gunned ship. The Germans seem to have fairly consistently followed this in their engagements. There is little reason to suppose it would have been any different had KGV been present instead of PoW. In fact, the Germans thought at the time that Hood's companion was KGV.

[Thorsten Wahl]

Hood has heavier guns and lighter armor
from the standpoint of the weapon Hood was the more dangerous target

[lwd]

German doctrine was usually to have the largest gunned friendly ship engage the enemy's largest gunned ship. The Germans seem to have fairly consistently followed this in their engagements. There is little reason to suppose it would have been any different had KGV been present instead of PoW. In fact, the Germans thought at the time that Hood's companion was KGV.

The question then is when did the German's correctly identified the British ships? I seem to recall reading that they identified them as cruisers until they opened fire. I would think in this situation the lead ship would be taken underfire first as indeed was the historical case. Would fire then have shifted to form KGV (or PoW) to Hood and when? In any case one British ship is left free.

[tommy303]

It appears from the Baron's narrative that Albrecht in the forward command post began to question the identity of the leading ship, disagreeing with Schneider in the foretop. He definitely stated that he thought closing vessels were battleships, at about the time Holland made his first course adjustment to begin the run in, but before he opened fire. Bismarck was fairly far astern of Prinz Eugen and so had a better perspective view than Prinz Eugen, which failed to ID Hood until she blew up. When Holland opened fire, that clinched the matter and at that moment Schneider announced it was the Hood in the lead. Presumably, Luetjens thought Prinz Eugen would make the same ID, and shift fire to what was thought to be KGV. When this did not happen, Luetjens was forced to signal Prinz Eugen to shift to the second in line leaving Bismarck to engage Hood.

At any rate, the Germans did not immediately open fire when the enemy did, and the delay, for whatever reason allowed Bismarck's gun crews to shift from base fuzed HE to AP in the ammunition supply so that when fire was opened, 38cm AP was used (except for the base fuzed HE which had already been loaded into the guns).

[dunmunro]

It was some luck involved, yes. But there were also a series of mistakes done by the British... As it was, Hood had no portion of it armored to withstand Bismarck's guns in normal battle obliquities below 20km. So it was a matter of time before a shell would hit a magazine. Hood fired badly anyway, and very badly after taking the first hit, or hits from PE and BS. PoW only damaged Bismarck while it was firing un-opposed. As soon as the big guns opened on her, the British BB did not hit at least once, nor did it straddle the enemy. It put up a smoke screen and ran away.

I don't share your perspective of "British victory", neither in tactical nor on the strategical plane. The "path to victory" only started after Bismarck's rudder was jamed.

Again, and I must emphasize this, PoW's gunnery fell off because she had to do abrupt manoeuvring to avoid the sinking Hood, not because she was engaged by Bismarck.

PoW withdrew because she outnumbered and engaged in a close range engagement with a BB and a CA and she could not effectively engage the CA. Bismarck was also turning away from PoW after Hood sank and this contributed to PoW's lack of hits after Hood blew up (this is pretty obvious from the salvo track chart). Both Bismarck and PE turned to open the range at the same time as PoW.

[dunmunro]

German doctrine was usually to have the largest gunned friendly ship engage the enemy's largest gunned ship. The Germans seem to have fairly consistently followed this in their engagements. There is little reason to suppose it would have been any different had KGV been present instead of PoW. In fact, the Germans thought at the time that Hood's companion was KGV.

So if Tovey used Holland's tactics (or we give Holland both KGV and Hood) but KGV was in the van, then KGV would have been pumping salvo, after radar ranged, salvo into Bismarck at an even closer range than PoW. The net result would have been many more 14" hits on Bismarck and this accurate fire would not have fallen off even if Hood was destroyed. At the same time KGV's 5.25" guns would have been engaging PE. This transforms the tactical situation, and from extensively wargaming this scenario, even placing PoW in the van almost always results in an RN victory.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

@ Dunmunro,

you wrote :

Bismarck was also turning away from PoW after Hood sank and this contributed to PoW's lack of hits after Hood blew up (this is pretty obvious from the salvo track chart). Both Bismarck and PE turned to open the range at the same time as PoW.

This is incorrect, as Bismarck and Prinz Eugen turned away well after Prince of Wales did, as both photo nh69731 and film evidence clearly demonstrate together with the PoW and PG official battle tracks; PoW turned away around a minute earlier than the German squadron.

The reason of some written statements that tried to sell the version of a simultaneous turn away from both sides are obvious, as there was a potential court martial to be avoided ( ref. RN Articles of War – 1757 point 12 still active on 1941 during WW2 )

http://www.hmsrichmond.org/rnarticles.htm

The reality was different and as stated above is well proved by maps, photos and film.
I have re-constructed that timeframe time ago on HMS Hood website:

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... ?f=9&t=136

In order NOT to be misunderstood here, I make clear that I am in agreement and approve Capt. J.C. Leach decision, it was the right thing to do under those circumstances, but he surely thought he had to justify something to his Admiralty, as he did starting almost immediately with is first radio message sent at 8am that day.

PoW was firing in a very brilliant and effective way, C. McMullen was at same if not better level of Schneider and Jasper that day.
I doubt looking at May 27th real KG V results that she could have done any better that her sister ship up until PoW was on her undisturbed initial action.

Everything changed when she was alone and hit 7 times within 2 minutes by 2 enemy warships firing at her.
Meanwhile she had to turn on an avoidance manoeuvre first to avoid Hood wreck sinking and after been badly hit as said she had to turn definitively away with a 160 degrees turn.
This last turn away caused the awful designed forward quadruple turret to go out of action, just like happened to the KGV on May 27 th, 1941.
So, were was the difference on the quadruple turrets real performances between PoW and KGV on May 1941 ?

Talking PoW can anybody explain to me why she was commissioned on January 19, 1941 but declared being completed only on March 31, 1941 ?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_Georg ... hip_(1939)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Prince_of_Wales_(53)

It would be really an interesting exercise to compare the commissioning versus completion date of PoW and Bismarck and see how efficient they were compared each others.
How many trials executed and gunnery exercises done, etc, etc, …
Bismarck was commissioned largely incomplete on August 24, 1940 and completed on late april 1941 when she finally received the forward rangefinder.

Since this thread is about Adm Tovey decisions, I suggest an easy exercise using the real 1941 battleships ranking Tovey had at Scapa Flow :

1) King George V – 2) PoW – 3) Hood – 4) Repulse

He decided to send the 2nd and 3rd and kept the 1st and the 4th with him in case of need.

2 against one battleships, and 2 against one heavy cruisers, and supported by 6 destroyers.
Were was the error ? I cannot see it, it was going to be a victory no matter what in my opinion.

But as somebody said, everything that could go bad that day, simply went worst for the British and Holland plus Lutjens decisions determined the result in favor of the Germans at Denmark Strait.

Bye Antonio

[dunmunro]

1) PoW turned away around a minute earlier than the German squadron.

2) ( ref. RN Articles of War – 1757 point 12 still active on 1941 during WW2 )


2a) PoW was firing in a very brilliant and effective way, C. McMullen was at same if not better level of Schneider and Jasper that day.
I doubt looking at May 27th real KG V results that she could have done any better that her sister ship up until PoW was on her undisturbed initial action.


This last turn away caused the awful designed forward quadruple turret to go out of action, just like happened to the KGV on May 27 th, 1941.
So, were was the difference on the quadruple turrets real performances between PoW and KGV on May 1941 ?

3)Talking PoW can anybody explain to me why she was commissioned on January 19, 1941 but declared being completed only on March 31, 1941 ?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King_Georg ... hip_(1939)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_Prince_of_Wales_(53)

It would be really an interesting exercise to compare the commissioning versus completion date of PoW and Bismarck and see how efficient they were compared each others.
How many trials executed and gunnery exercises done, etc, etc, …
Bismarck was commissioned largely incomplete on August 24, 1940 and completed on late april 1941 when she finally received the forward rangefinder.

1) A whole minute later...excuse me...

2) Leach's actions were determined (and judged) more by the Fighting Instructions than the Articles of War:
http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/ ... _Intro.php
and this section particularly, IMHO:
http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/ ... VI.php#266
and ADM 239/268: C.B.04039, ARMOUR PROTECTION (1939) which provided Leach with information as to the ranges he could expect PoW to be immune from Bismarck's guns:
http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/ ... 39-268.php
Leach's statement regarding the decision to disengage can be read here:
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... #P391Leach

It seems likely that Leach intended to open the range and then resume the action but Wake-Walker then assumed command and ordered him to disengage. The problems with Y turret may have influenced Leach and Wake Walker, but of course this occurred after Leach turned away. There may not be any connection between the fact that PoW, with an only partially completed main armament installation, suffered a turret feed jam, with KGV suffering an apparently similar fault after 32 minutes action in heavy seas. The loss of turrets due to factors other than enemy action occurred in other navies as well... S&G and Massachusetts being prime examples.

2a) KGV achieved 14 straddles from her first 34 salvos, or one straddle per 2.4 salvos. PoW achieved 3 straddles with 18 salvos, or 1 in 6. KGV was obtaining Type 284 radar ranges beyond the probable initial open fire range for PoW at DS, and it seems likely that Hood was also obtaining radar ranges from her type 284 at similar ranges. KGV was probably achieving a gunnery output of 90% or better and this combined with radar ranging would probably have translated into 7 - 10 hits during the same time frame that saw PoW score 3 hits.

3) PoW, like Bismarck was commissioned prior to completion. This would allow the RN to man the ship and begin working up on those systems which were completed. Also in wartime, when the ship was subject to enemy attack, it was necessary to have a navy crew aboard even during the builders trials, before the RN had accepted the ship from the builders. Some info on the timeline can be found here:
http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono ... 0Wales.htm
According to Tarrant, when PoW was commissioned for trials in January , only about 1/2 the crew had joined her and only two of her 4 props had been fitted, so the ship was was in no sense ready for action.

[Bgile]

How long did KGV take to obtain hits on Bismarck?

[dunmunro]

How long did KGV take to obtain hits on Bismarck?

The first hits recorded by KGV occurred at 8:53, about 5 minutes after opening fire. It seems likely that KGV initially spotted on Rodney's shell splashes as the two ships were in open order it was harder for each to distinguish the other's shell splashes especially as the visibility appears to have been somewhat worse than at DS. The first hits from either ship were recorded by Norfolk as being at 8:48 and these are generally attributed to Rodney's 3rd or 4th salvos, but it is possible that they could have been fired by KGV.

You can see starting at about 3:35 on this film clip, that conditions were less than ideal:
http://www.itnsource.com/shotlist//BHC_ ... U408110017

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

@ Dunmunro,

I fully agree with you and thanks for the links.

The third one about Capt. J.C. Leach decision is basically why I am in agreement with him, but as you can read those and only those were the reasons and there was no correlation with the German squadron action at that stage of the battle, as he was probably expecting them to pursue his battleship, but it did not happen and we know why.

I wrote .... a "minute" ... just to make it clear that the PoW turn away of 160 degrees was a decision taken on his own without any real correlation with the enemy action at that point into the battle. It was taken well earlier, and if you carefully analyze what I have put on my map/chart you can see the minutes were almost 2 depending on where you start measuring the time.

What is really important is the event logical sequence into the battle, as "seconds" were like "hours" on that crucial moment .....
But thanking also many PoW survivor memories we have all the scenario pretty clear now.

PoW started turning away at around 06.01 and 30 seconds, .... Bismarck turned to starboard some seconds after 06.03 ...... Prinz Eugen turned to starboard after Bismarck at 06.03 and 45 seconds ...just when PoW second Y turret salvo of one shell landed close to Bismarck stern while the German battleship had already completed her 50 degrees turn to starboard from 220 to 270 course west,.. it is all well visible on PG Rheinubung film,... as it is the exact moment Prinz Eugen starts her turn of 50 degrees to starboard too.

Moving on PoW versus KG V performances, you will agree with me that one thing is to engage a fully efficient battleship running 30 knots and another story is to fire at a " sitting duck " target like into a firing training exercise, .. just as Bismarck was on the morning of May 27th, 1941.

My only point is that single guns " teething problems " were common on PoW, on KG V, as well as on DoY when she sunk the Scharnhorst, and it was common to all battleships as even Bismarck had lost of output that day due to single guns failures.
When PoW turned away she had 3 out of 4 A Turret quadruple guns firing, plus 2 out of 2 of the B turret firing and 2 out of 4 of the Y turret firing.
So 7 out of 10 guns were working properly when she first turned away, than down to 4 as A turret was blocked and than to only 2 as B turret would not bear anymore, so only Y turret was firing on local control, one salvo at 06.03 and 25 seconds landing short at 06.03 and 45 seconds ( photo Nh 69731 ), than one gun only and shell on Bismarck stern, and last single shell on Bismarck bow, ... and that was it for the battle action from PoW.

What makes PoW and KG V common was the fact that while turning heavily and loading the quadruple turret, something happened that blocked that quadruple turret mechanism and it happened on PoW on May 24th, as well as on KG V on May 27th.
That quadruple turret was an awful design and it is not my analysis, it is enough to read main guns dedicated books discussing guns and turrets loading mechanism to realize it.

I see your link on PoW history key dates ( with PoW turning away time listed at 06.05 ), and I know perfectly the Bismarck ones, my point here is that everybody keep on writing that PoW was an incomplete warship on training while Bismarck was a fully efficient well trained battleship.

If we analyze a little more the key dates and the real installation dates of the equipment, radar, gun training etc, etc, .. we may end up putting the 2 battleships close to the same readiness status, and surely not so different as everybody like to think.

For example how many realized that Bismarck forward rangefinder and radar were installed only on late April 1941 on Bismarck while at Gotenhafen ?

Ciao Antonio

[Herr Nilsson]

For example how many realized that Bismarck forward rangefinder and radar were installed only on late April 1941 on Bismarck while at Gotenhafen ?

AFAIK the forward rangefinder was installed at the Deutsche Werke Kiel between March 9th and March 13th 1941.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

@ Herr Nilsson,

my personal congratulations Marc , .. I knew somebody was going to make this precise point, ... that confirms my observation, .. as Bismarck was NOT such an " efficient and fully trained/worked up " battleship as somebody like to sell.

The forward radar was installed and tuned during April, ... of course after the forward rangefinder was installed as you precisely mentioned in march at Kiel .... so very close to the Op. Rheinubung starting date.

More, ... B-Dienst technicians were on board too on Bismarck working on the radar, .. as well as on board Prinz Eugen were also gun technicians were helping the officers too.

So, I suggest everybody to be careful on defining Bismarck and Prinz Eugen as 2 fully efficient units ... while Prince of Wales was still on training/debug.

The reality is somewhat in the middle of both definitions, .... but both sides .

Hood, Norfolk and Suffolk were fully efficient units,.. while Bismarck, Prinz Eugen and Prince of Wales were new units at their first mission, ... completed in a hurry for the war going on,.. and the destiny decided they had to meet on that morning at Denmark Strait.

Bye Antonio

[Thorsten Wahl]

Additional B never conduct heavy battery firings prior to the DS.

The work on the radar-controlled part of fire control lasted shortly until sortie to Bergen.
Im sure that some of the recommended work according AVKS report on the fire control equipment was not completed.

So the "exercise" at denmarkstrait shows the potential of the weapon system Bismarck, but its high likely that the ship did not achieve its possible maximum efficiency even the shooting was comparatively good.

And you can see similar problems in the preparation of AA defense.