Norfolk & Suffolk - Engage ?

[30knots]

Hi folks (excuse the pun),

When first sighted, why didn't Bismarck & PG just immediately engage the two British cruisers, a battle with the odds in their favour ?

Thanks for any replies.

[Olaf]

BS fired five (?) salvoes at Norfolk around 20:30 on May 23rd when Norfolk came out of a rain cloud (?) at quite a close distance to the German formation. PG did not open fire.

The mission was to reach the Atlantic, not to get damaged by a lucky hit when fighting down enemy warships. I think visibility was poor and a longer fight would just have been a great waste of ammunition. Ever wondered why BS was able to sank Hood with a few salvoes but did not score one hit on Norfolk, with I think the same amount of salvoes, fired at a shorter distance?

Happy discussing ~ Olaf!

[paulcadogan]

Conditions of visibility kept the British cruisers out of sight at the outset. When Suffolk made first contact, she quickly retreated into fog before the Germans could open fire. Norfolk, racing to the scene, emerged from the fog to find the Germans only 6 miles away and WAS engaged as she ran back into the fog - with Bismarck's forward radar being knocked out by the concussion of the guns.

Once the two British cruisers, concealed in fog, positioned themselves on either quarter on the German ships, the latter had a hard time getting at them. According to the Baron, if they turned around to attack them, they'd simply run away, then resume their shadowing once the Bismarck resumed her original course. Remember both cruisers could outrun Bismarck.

German intelligence services were still placing the British Home Fleet at Scapa Flow, hence Lutjens probably thought he had plenty of time to shake off the shadowers, like he did with the Twins in February in his abortive attempt at the Iceland Faeroes gap. So why waste precious fuel running them down (especially for the Prinz).

Paul

[Bgile]

From his previous experience I think Lutjens thought he could lose the British shadowers in the fog. Their radar had improved since he last encountered them, or maybe they had it now and didn't before.

[RF]

Lutjens would also be mindful of the torpedo threat to both his ships if he engaged the British cruisers hiding in fogbanks at close range. Prinz Eugen could be particulary vulnerable in that respect.

[hammy]

A somewhat sharper question to ask would be why the two British Heavy cruisers did so little exept " observe " their enemy throughout the Whole Denmark Strait engagement , especially immediately following the sinking of HMS Hood .
The Battle of the River Plate ( Graf Spee vs Exeter/Ajax/Achilles ) showed how a force of weaker cruisers , even when not ideally disposed , can engage and carry out a sustained attack on an enemy that should nominally blow them out of the water .
Instead , the british cruisers in the Denmark Strait seem to have repeated the failings of Admiral Troubridge in WW1 , when his Mediterranean cruiser squadron ineffectually chased the Goeben from the entrance to the Adriatic all the way to the Dardanelles . He was sacked for his failure to engage .
The reasons for Norfolk and Suffolk not getting " stuck in " are probably
1) Not My Job , ie we are here to guide the battlewagons onto the target , not risk our tin-clad hulls in punch-ups with battleships
2)We cant even take on Prinz Eugen because we are built to the 10,000 ton washington treaty limit whereas P E was not and therefore is an armoured target 3)No orders to engage were received from the senior British officer present , ( granted , but whatever happened to the " Nelson " touch ? )
4)Simple shock at the sudden demise of Hood , and virtually immediately afterwards Bismark landing another 15 inch brick right on the bridge of Prince of Wales .

Whatever the reasons , we see at the battle of North cape ( Scharnhorst sinking ) that there are no qualms there about putting Norfolk in against a capital ship opponent , and the cruiser's guns acheiving results .
The British 8inch gun fired a 260 pound round to a fair long range , at about four shots per minute per gun indicating the two british cruisers could have got better than fifty shots per minute away . Had the two cruisers seperated and then dodged in and out of range of their opponents they should have been able to acheive something more positive than a set of enemy position reports .
In a sense , this illustrates the poor value represented by cruisers built to the washington treaty maxima , for the scouting job they did could have been done just as well by the " babies " of the Arethusa class , half of their size .

[tommy303]

Essentially, the battle ended rather too soon for Wake-Walker's cruisers to close the range to engage Bismarck. Some time was probably lost when Holland failed to order Wake-Walker to close and attack from the stern quarters. Hood was sunk in only five minutes and Prince of Wales forced to retire after another ten or so. The battle ended after only seventeen minutes; as the cruisers had been keeping well out of accurate gun range from Bismarck up until the action began, a closing speed of only about 3 nm/hour (if the Germans were steaming at 29kts) allowed them to shorten range only about 3000 yards before the battle ended. Suffolk did fire some salvos at extreme range, but with no success.

[paulcadogan]

It was Norfolk that opened fire at about the time PoW was turning away. Still her salvoes fell well short, suggesting she was still at a pretty good distance.

Suffolk did not open fire until (IIRC) about 10 minutes after the battle ended when her radar suggested Prinz Eugen had doubled back on her (in fact it was picking up the Sunderland aircraft). In actual fact she was still well out of range for her guns. Bismarck actually swung around to engage, training her guns on her but did not open fire. Suffolk turned away making a full circle when it was realized the Germans had resumed their course. Some of the post action pictures show Bismarck with her fwd guns trained to starboard - probably taken at about that time.

Many people erroneously think Suffolk & Norfolk were somehow negligent in not taking part at the DS. They could do no better in the short action as Tommy explained. Had the action lasted longer or if Holland's initial interception plan (from ahead) had succeeded, they would certainly have done their part.

Norfolk certainly did hers a few days later - hanging doggedly on Bismarck's tail until the very end and putting some shells into the mighty battleship whose first shots fired in anger had been directed at her.

Paul

[Dave Saxton]

What were the maximum practical ranges of N&S's guns?

[tommy303]

What were the maximum practical ranges of N&S's guns?

Well, the guns could shoot to a little over 30,000 at 45*, so practical range, dependent on visibility, possible radar direction, gun wear, etc, would be something like about 18,000 to 20,000 yards against a battleship maneuvering normally. Much beyond that in 1941 and spotting fall of shot would be difficult due to the fairly small splashes made by 8-inch shells.

[Dave Saxton]

So if they fired a few salvoes and the salvoes fell well short, they were probably still beyond 30k distance. I don't think I would want to get within 20k of the Bismarck that day.

[paulcadogan]

There was some discussion in the old Hood forum (which unfortunately no longer exists except in memory) about the actual range of Bismarck from Norfolk when the latter opened fire. Norfolk fired three salvoes at Bismarck just after Hood was sunk, from a supposed range of just over 20,000 yards and all fell well short. It was suggested that because her guns should have been capable of shooting further than this distance, she may have been much further away in actuality and grossly underestimated the range. IIRC this was put forward by Wadinga - and he was suggesting it was closer to 30,000 - as you have concluded Dave.

Paul

[hammy]

Well , Dave , you do it as a bullfighter does , by dodging about , ie closing the range while steering with minor erratic and unpredictable variations to your approach course with both N and S doing this independently , and preferably widely seperated from your enemy's view .
While running in under your opponents fire , you also start to "Steer for the last burst" , i e if the last salvo landed "short" from you , you make a deviation in course towards him , if the last burst was "over" you you turn a bit away , if it was a perfect straddle then you make a sharp deviation in either direction .
If you cant shake the fire off you , then you turn sharp away and zig-zag unpredictably for a bit using smoke to help screen you , while your consort continues to come on in . Eventually your enemy will cease to fire at you and shift to your consort , at which point you swing back in again while your consort withdraws .

This messes up his fire control computers which , you have to remember , are trying to predict where you will be when his next salvo lands , in at least 40 seconds time . Say you are one of the many guys taking a gunnery control observation . The lag between adjusting your particular scope to the latest accurate observation , feeding that factor to the control computer , the computer achieving it's solution , sending that to the turrets as a value for elevation and training angle is such that the big guns cant adjust fast enough to track a target that is deviating from a predictable track . the enemys fire control computers "best guess" of where you are going to be next cannot by definition be correct , so your chance of being hit is reduced to shots dispersed from that point , and if your enemy's accuracy is generally good , so then your chances become better .

Of course If you are dodging about while YOU are trying to shoot then it makes your own gunnery teams job much harder , which is why Hood and PoW were running in on steady headings ( as well as trying to close as fast as possible ) . But as the attacker YOU have the advantage of knowing when you are going to stop dodging and steer steady for a minute to get your own aimed salvos away .

Bearing in mind that in this hypothetical D S situation you would be aiming to distract , bother and annoy your much bigger enemies , rather than come to anything like grips with them , and you can see how the game could have been played all that day long .
Dont forget that to "defeat" your enemy's purpose ( in this case , getting out to disrupt the convoys ) you can use the orthodox tactic of delay,distraction and confusion to prevent him carrying out his plan , I e while he is trying to chase you off , he cant get on .
The British must have been very sure that they could achieve their "concentration" plans , in spite of having undergone the shocking setback of losing the Hood , to have settled down to passive tracking for the time being .

[Bgile]

So if they fired a few salvoes and the salvoes fell well short, they were probably still beyond 30k distance. I don't think I would want to get within 20k of the Bismarck that day.

The clear implication being that it was ok for PG to do that, but not the British cruisers. Why is that?

[paulcadogan]

The British must have been very sure that they could achieve their "concentration" plans , in spite of having undergone the shocking setback of losing the Hood , to have settled down to passive tracking for the time being .

Now what if... for example, in playing cat and mouse trying to delay, distract and confuse Bismarck, Suffolk gets clobbered by a 15-inch salvo that at best knocks out her radar and at worst blows her out of the water. The British lose their greatest asset in keeping track of Bismarck (Norfolk's radar was much less capable and could only work dead ahead). The Germans then shake off Norfolk.... How then would the big ships intercept?

At the North Cape, there was a convoy under immediate threat. Belfast, Norfolk & Sheffield took on the Scharnhorst because they were the best immediate defence the convoy had. Once it was clear Scharnhorst was withdrawing the cruisers took up their shadowing role with the purpose of guiding Duke of York in, which they did successfully. Had they continued to harrass Scharnhorst and been disabled, Duke of York would probably never have caught her. Once the Duke arrived and Scharnhorst was slowed, the cruisers again closed and did their part, just as S&N would have at the DS if they had had the time to catch up.

The clear implication being that it was ok for PG to do that, but not the British cruisers. Why is that?

But according to German policy it wasn't. Lutjens and Brinkmann came under criticism for allowing the Prinz to remain in line under fire from Hood. Here's the quote from Admiral Schmundt's commentary;

Although the conduct of "Prinz Eugen" during the battle against 2 heavy enemy ships is indeed very courageous, it does not meet the common [tactical] views presently in force, according to which, already during the assembly for battle, the cruisers and torpedo boats are to post themselves in the fire-lee of the main body – here undoubtedly "Bismarck".


Although the cruiser had an armament of 20cm guns, with which the artillery officer fired remarkably well and also achieved damaging the opponent, this ship is so poorly armored that it belongs to the light units despite its designation as "heavy cruiser". Every 35 cm or 38 cm hit would have made this ship probably a prize of the pursuing English units or would have forced "Bismarck" to assume extremely unwanted responsibilities for protecting the heavily damaged ship.

In fact, the ship fired a closed salvo, which according to the commander would have hit without fail, but the ship had to maneuver coincidentally to avoid a torpedo from "Hood". Although the ship did not receive an order from the chief of fleet to position itself into the lee side of fire [of "Bismarck"], he should have and must have done this on his own, according to the valid tactical procedures in force, by reporting his intention to the chief of fleet, since at this stage there was no battle and the cruiser had not been fully engaged.

I do not know the thought processes of the chief of fleet here either for holding the cruiser in the line of battle, not only to engage "Hood" but also against the "Prince of Wales".

(http://www.kbismarck.com/archives/pg003.html)

Paul