Bismarck construction flaws

[alecsandros]

SD space was extremely cramped, as written by Friedman. The ship was to short to accomodate more space for men and equipment.

The point of which is... what?
Have you ever been aboard Massachusetts or Alabama?

Just what it says...
The crew certainly did not appreciate being on a crowded ship.
Also, this complicates things when the ship runs into trouble. Smoke isn't vented as fast as it should, people can't get fast enough from point A to point B, etc.

[ede144]

And of course, development of high powered diesel engines for battleships.

Ok, which Navy except KM had Plans for Diesel battleships?
Why are tripple turrets better than double?
Should the Km use a similar Dp gun like the USNavy which was working properly after the war only?
I wonder why nobody questioned my argument regarding PG
Regards
Ede

[Karl Heidenreich]

Friedman is quite critical on the South Dakota design in both books: Battleship Design and US Battleships. Also Raven, Garzke agreed in several of these points. The interesting part is WHY many considered this heretical?
Easy: the South Dakota platform is the same that was used later in the Iowa Class battleships.
Of course, those defending this scheme fall mute when we bring on the case of the Montana Class battleships and the important design departure from the previous two designs.
Also, in order to deflect critiscm we have arguments as the one USS Washington would have been alone at Guadalcanal. But Alex made his point there very good and without coming to unconfortable details as how and why South Dakota's circuitry failed so miserably under fire.
Regards,

[alecsandros]

Hi Karl,
I guess South Dakota is so over rated because of G&D book. Allthough they pointed several problems, overall they named the class "best treaty batleship" or something like that, and in other places mentioned they were "much better than larger and more expensive designs of other countries".

What I've seen on other forums is a wide debate over USS Massachussets (a South Dakota class ship) during the battle of Casablanca, 1942.
People get easily enthusiastic about claims of destroyers sunk at 27km distance by 16" gunfire, and by the 25km hits obtained on Jean Bart.

While my opinion is that Massachussets performed formidably well that day, there is no way I'm buying all those "beliefs" about the way the battle was fought that day.

Recent studies indicate that the 2 destroyers sunk by gunfire were hit by 2 US heavy cruisers, while Massachussets obtained near-misses on them, but the range is unknown.
Jean Bart, or Jim Bean how I like to call her, was hit at 20-22km distance by 5 x 16" AP superheavy shells.

[yellowtail3]

SD space was extremely cramped, as written by Friedman. The ship was to short to accomodate more space for men and equipment.

The point of which is... what? Have you ever been aboard Massachusetts or Alabama?

Just what it says...
The crew certainly did not appreciate being on a crowded ship.

There's a lot more room on a South Dakota than on a destroyer, even a Adams built in the early sixties.

...but if this is a 'flaw' that makes Karl feel better, let's let him have it.

Why are tripple turrets better than double?[/quote]more bang for your tonnage/space buck
[/quote]Should the Km use a similar Dp gun like the USNavy which was working properly after the war only?
Regards
Ede[/quote](shrug) I suppose they could have, if they could have found an example to build from. 5"/38 was pretty reliable during wartime, I think. Good gun.

Friedman is quite critical on the South Dakota design in both books: Battleship Design and US Battleships. Also Raven, Garzke agreed in several of these points. The interesting part is WHY many considered this heretical?
Easy: the South Dakota platform is the same that was used later in the Iowa Class battleships.
Regards,

Karl, do you know what a 'strawman' is? And do you know the meaning of 'paranoia'?

[Byron Angel]

Hi Karl,
I guess South Dakota is so over rated because of G&D book. Allthough they pointed several problems, overall they named the class "best treaty batleship" or something like that, and in other places mentioned they were "much better than larger and more expensive designs of other countries".

What I've seen on other forums is a wide debate over USS Massachussets (a South Dakota class ship) during the battle of Casablanca, 1942.
People get easily enthusiastic about claims of destroyers sunk at 27km distance by 16" gunfire, and by the 25km hits obtained on Jean Bart.

While my opinion is that Massachussets performed formidably well that day, there is no way I'm buying all those "beliefs" about the way the battle was fought that day.

Recent studies indicate that the 2 destroyers sunk by gunfire were hit by 2 US heavy cruisers, while Massachussets obtained near-misses on them, but the range is unknown.
Jean Bart, or Jim Bean how I like to call her, was hit at 20-22km distance by 5 x 16" AP superheavy shells.

..... Before someone pops up to breathlessly point out that JEAN BART was helplessly moored to a dock at the time she was under fire by MASSACHUSETTS, it is necessary to also point out that JEAN BART was not visible to MASSACHUSETTS for almost the entire time of the bombardment due to intervening smoke screens and smoke from fires burning in the surrounding port facility. In addition, JEAN BART's end-on aspect to the line of fire of MASSACHUSETTS made her a very difficult target in deflection, despite the fact that she was motionless. MASSACHUSETTS essentially was conducting blind/indirect fire under the control of a spotter aircraft while underway and also maneuvering to evade fire from El Hank battery.

Apart from JEAN BART, Vincent O'Hara's article in Warship 2011 - 'The Battle of Casasblanca" The Marine Nationale versus the U.S. Navy" - relates the following with respect to the gunnery of MASSACHUSETTS against other targets -
0736 hrs - passenger ship PORTHOS (at dock) hit by 16in shell and capsized.
0752 hrs - passenger ship SAVOIE hit by two 16in shells.
0758 hrs - passenger ship IL d'OUESSANT hit by two 16in shells and capsized.
0800 hrs - merchant vessel FAUZON hit by 16in shell.
0800+ hrs - MALIN (at dock) hit by 16in dud in No. 2 boiler room.
0810 hrs - ILE de NIRMOUTIER hit by 16in shell.
0815 hrs - merchant vessel FAUZON hit by 16in shell.
0940 hrs - destroyer FOUGUEUX hit by 16in shell.
1000- hrs - destroyer MILAN hit by three 16in shells
O'Hara, in his summary, also credits a hit upon PRIMAGUET, but appears to give no details in the text (or else I missed it in my quick reading).

This was accomplished by a rookie ship in her first action, without the aid of FC radar (both out for various reasons) under very difficult visual conditions (extensive French use of smoke screens plus drifting smoke from land fires) against aggressively maneuvering light forces, while under fire from coastal batteries.

I recommend Mr O'Hara's article as worth a read - well researched and IMO quite objective.

B

[alecsandros]

Hello Byron,
Again, I think Mass fired formidably well that day.

There are at least 2 newer French books which cover the matter. Both present the sinking of the French destroyers that day.
Massachussets fired 23 salvos, and obtained several near misses. The explosions aboard the French DDs mentioned in all American sources are most likely HE hits from the several US cruisers forming the rest of the task force [AP hits do not behave that way against non-armored targets]

Jim Bean was a sitting duck, and was hit by 5 shells out of at least 200 fired during 2 distinct intervals.

OVerall however, Mass fired allmost 800 AP shells that day, silencing battery El Hank, disabling Jim Bean, causing damage in the harbor and probably damaging 2 of the French destroyers which attempted torpedo-strikes against the US taks force.
Firing was very good, salvos had 2-300y spread at 20km, and this without radar.

Firing output was ~ 85%, remarkable for such a long battle (over 4 hours of shooting)

[compare this to the 66% obtained by Duke of York during North Cape, albeit in other weather conditions, and the 70% obtained by USS Idaho while in practice fire in 1942, in a 80 minutes shoot-out]

[Dave Saxton]

And of course, development of high powered diesel engines for battleships.

Ok, which Navy except KM had Plans for Diesel battleships?
Why are tripple turrets better than double?
Should the Km use a similar Dp gun like the USNavy which was working properly after the war only?
I wonder why nobody questioned my argument regarding PG
Regards
Ede

Hi Ede,
As Tommy pointed out the main advantage of using 3 triples is a shorter citadel and the weight savings gained there from. This was important in a treaty battleship design. The Germans however, did not consider a shorter citadel as desirable and that protected length was also important. The German had already been there and done that regarding triples though. Scharnhorst had 3 x triples.They decided they liked twin turrets better.

Regarding armament weights its interesting what happened after the USN started construction of Iowa. It was found that there was a mess up of great proportions. The largest barbets and support structures they could use on the displacement limits, could only support 16"/45 guns instead of the 16"/50 planned for. BuShips therefore designed the hull for mounting 16"/45 guns. BuOrd improvised and designed special lighter weight 16"/50 guns, at high costs over runs, that weighed the same as the 16"/45 guns. As it was the Iowas were over weight coming in at 48,500 tons standard displacement. The German 15"/52 weighs about the same the or more as the 16"/45. It is clear that they could not mount 16"/52 guns on a Bismarck even if they used triples. If they designed a 16"/45 gun for Bismarck using triples or twins they would have no more power and possibly less compared to the 15"/52.

A DP secondary gun wouldn't be a bad idea for Bismarck if weight needed to found for other needs. But what caliber? The Germans had 5" guns of course, but were they suitable for the tasks? The USN's 5"/38 was a good AA gun but the USN never really considered it a good anti- surface gun. Hence the problematic and extended development of the 5"/54. The 5"/38 was mainly an AA gun that could also be used for other purposes. Bismarck had that capability in the 10.5cm battery.

The French went with a DP design on Dunkerque and considered it a failure. Hence Rich had split caliber secondary armament of 15.2cm and 10cm.

[Dave Saxton]

I wonder why nobody questioned my argument regarding PG
Regards
Ede

I don't think theres any thing to question. There's no question that it proved late war German firecontrol and radar as good as late war USN systems. Schmalenbach alludes to these excercises in both Unter Drie Flaggen and in Die Geschichte der duetschen Schiffsartillerie. It was USS Houston not a Baltimore, although the Houston was from the follow on class to the outstanding Brooklyn class and equipped with the latest equipment.

[Byron Angel]

Hello Byron,
Again, I think Mass fired formidably well that day.

There are at least 2 newer French books which cover the matter. Both present the sinking of the French destroyers that day.
Massachussets fired 23 salvos, and obtained several near misses. The explosions aboard the French DDs mentioned in all American sources are most likely HE hits from the several US cruisers forming the rest of the task force [AP hits do not behave that way against non-armored targets]

Jim Bean was a sitting duck, and was hit by 5 shells out of at least 200 fired during 2 distinct intervals.

OVerall however, Mass fired allmost 800 AP shells that day, silencing battery El Hank, disabling Jim Bean, causing damage in the harbor and probably damaging 2 of the French destroyers which attempted torpedo-strikes against the US taks force.
Firing was very good, salvos had 2-300y spread at 20km, and this without radar.

Firing output was ~ 85%, remarkable for such a long battle (over 4 hours of shooting)

[compare this to the 66% obtained by Duke of York during North Cape, albeit in other weather conditions, and the 70% obtained by USS Idaho while in practice fire in 1942, in a 80 minutes shoot-out]

Hi Alecs,

Not sure to what new French souces you refer (but would like to know!).

I checked O'Hara's footnote citations for his French sources. He mentions -
M Caroff, "Les debarquements allies en Afrique du Nord", 1960.
Jean-Jacques Antier, "Les grandes batailles navales de la Seconde Guerre modiale: Le drame de la Marine francaise", 2000.
Darrieus & Queguiner, "Historique de la Marine francaise 1922-1942", 1996.
Jordan & Dumas, "French Battleships 1922-1956", 2009
Jacques Mordal, "La Bataille de Casablanca 8-9-10 novembre 1942", 1952


B

[alecsandros]

Hello Byron,

Here's a legthier discussion:

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.c ... 9OBYFJ5F_Y

Most of it simply goes on and on about 30000 yards hits and kills.

Delycros and a few others though bring new info on the matter...

From their messages:

Timetable from french sources:
French flotilla leader Milan sortied with destroyers Fougueux and Boulonnais.
At 09:20, the French squadron was strafed by fighter planes from Ranger. Milan beached after being damaged by gunfire from Wilkes, Wichita, and Tuscaloosa. Massachusetts and Tuscaloosa engaged the French destroyers Fougueux at 10:00 and Boulonnais at 10:12. Fougueux sank at 10:40.

Boulonnais sunk at noon from gunfire of a cruiser. Fougueux sunk 40 minutes after Massachusetts and Tuscaloosa opened fire on her.
compare
Brown, Warship losses of World War 2, 1995, p.71
Auphan&Mordal, The french Navy in world War 2, 1976, p.233

and

"My earlier statement is not changed by anything in that article. There are newer French references with more detail (like Marc Saibene's book on "Les Torpilleurs de 1500 Tonnes du Type L'Adroit"), older ones too (like Mordal's own book "Bataille de Casblanca") but the main point is that thorough 'homework' would be to get the reports of the US cruisers. Per Saibene's book, p. 140, the telling hits on Fougeux were by 8" shells at 0946 (US), though damaging near misses of both 16" and 8" were suffered just prior to that."

[Djoser]

Setting aside politics I think Karl has a point about South Dakota being in a bad way. This was the consensus of the US command on the scene, especially Admiral Lee. Karl is right about the SD being probably sunk if not for an undamaged and untargeted BB56 being there to bail it out, by the simple fact that Kondo still had more than enough Long Lances left over to do the job. BB57 was quite uncapable of defending itself at that point; being "deaf, dumb, blind,"- and as it turns out toothless.

This tangent to the thread stems from the fact that it was pointed out that modern fire control with radar in a brand new ship still didn't provide hits for Gatch and his crew during the entire battle, despite what they thought they saw, just as the Bismarck's modern firecontrol in a brand new, albeit crippled ship with a spent crew, didn't score any direct hits from straddles in its last battle, before being overhwelmed by the combined firepower of four enemy heavy ships. SD didn't hit anything in the entire GC II battle, even before it was overwhelmed by the problems of its own making and early hits by Kirishima and company.

What can be drawn from the facts of equally fully modern battleships having a bad time? Nothing, except that sometimes you score straddles without scoring hits, and lady luck among the circumstances isn't yours, just as if a sports team wins one day and looses the next day.

Thanks for yet another well-written and enlightening post.

Putting politics aside, the Japanese BBs had neither the fuel nor the air support to go toe to toe with USN BBs, even if they could have arranged a nearly equal duel in terms of numbers somehow. Obviously the air support would have been required to protect them against the rapidly multiplying numbers of US carriers, not in any hypothetical gunnery duel.

As to the effectiveness of USN gunnery, it probably depended far more on the specific ships and period of the war. Obviously the South Dakota was worthless save as a collection point for Japanese shells on the night of Second Guadalcanal. But equally obviously, the Washington's gunnery was quite good, which considering the emphasis placed on gunnery by 'Ching' Lee and her capable gunnery officer, shouldn't come as much of a surprise.

You'd be a fool to miss the blatant propaganda concerning the apparent invincibility of the US armed forces in television and cinematic portrayals from the late 1940s to the present. If anything it's getting worse--with notable exceptions like James Cameron's Bismarck going to the opposite extreme.

But a telling view as to the general effectiveness of US radar-directed gunnery later in the war can be found in Tameichi Hara's 'Japanese Destroyer Captain'. In his mind it was quite a one-sided affair after RD gunnery became more prevalent. Not that every US ship would be able to kick the ass of every Japanese equivalent, necessarily. But the USN clearly wasn't deficient in this respect, overall.

In terms of relative effectiveness of Axis vs. Allied armed forces, I think the casualty ratios for ground combat in the European theatre are quite telling. The German army was vastly outnumbered in men and materiel, yet managed to inflict more casualties than it received. For an opponent so heavily outnumbered, this is very difficult to achieve.

I haven't seen the Tuskeegee Airmen movie yet--I am afraid to, after seeing the movie poster showing a Mustang shooting down a Me-262. Maybe the movie isn't yet more jingoistic propaganda, but I am not hopeful...

[Karl Heidenreich]

I concur with Djoser on Dave Saxton’s comment because it is enlightening. An interesting aspect of this Guadalcanal action is that it is historical evidence that it was USS South Dakota, and not Bismarck, the battleship that presented flaws in it’s electrical circuit lines and breakers. A lot has been said over the internet (not so much on books though) about Bismarck’s Baden-Bayern inheritance which resulted in a flawed light protection of important conducts and lines placed above the main armored deck. However during Bismarck’s combats this flaw (if such ever existed) never showed up as critical as the detractors point out. However South Dakota at II Guadalcanal did suffer, in a critical way, of such a problem.
On Nov. 14th 1942, 11:33 pm the crew of South Dakota was patching some 5” holes from Ayanami’s fire that required some work to be done at the circuits. Others claim that this problem do not have anything to do with enemy fire but with the concussion from South Dakota’s own guns. Either way the circuits were exposed to light damage which was why the chief engineer performed an inconvenient patch and sent the whole ship into darkness. If South Dakota would have been alone this would have been fatal because the fire control radars needed 45 minutes to re boot and warm up. And this happened after both of them, USS Washington and South Dakota, opened radar directed fire against numerous close targets and getting reports of false destruction of those, because then those targets wiped out the totality of US destroyers and only good luck protected South Dakota of being hit by several Long Lance torpedoes. Returning to South Dakota’s ordeal on the night of Nov. 14-15th then she did not follow her flagship and turned to port but continued her path and with partial energy restored fired against the Nagara but putting on fire her own Kingfisher planes attracting Kondo’s attention. This moment is important because it is the first time the Japanese realize they were fighting battleships instead of what they original thought were just cruisers. Kirishima, the only battleship the Japanese had on the place was armed with 14” guns (as her secondary ones) but the munition was all Type 3 ideal for shelling land positions (Kirishima’s original plan) and not for a surface action against an enemy battleship. Which is why luck came to aid South Dakota a second time and when Kirishima landed her shells on the US vessel it cannot defeat the armor as an AP shell would have done easily. Let’s remember also that South Dakota, as the Iowas after her, had a very thin pre fuzing or yaw inductive deck of only 38 mm (Bismarck’s one was 50 mm and the space in between decks longer) which would not have performed that good against an AP round. Good luck then that Kirishima’s rounds were for land shelling. But again these hits, plus somw 26 lesser calibre ones from Japanese small vessels, have hammered the superstructure and put out some putting South Dak’s radar completely out of action as four out of six fire control positions. A 14” round jammed number three turret (in reality it hit number 3 barbette) leaving South Dakota blind, dumb, deaf and toothless.
This terrible situation is what Bismarck experienced in some 30 minutes during her final battle against two fully operational british battleships during broad daylight and with her rudder damaged, incapable of steering (and as such incapable of producing fire solutions against her hunters) and starting the combat doing only 6 or 7 knots. Bismarck was doomed because she was alone. South Dakota, after the heavy battering the night of Nov 14-15 was in no better shape but only in 15 minutes of combat. But South Dakota’s had friendly help in the form of USS Washington which the Japanese ignore was near. USS Washington could bear her guns now not only with what resulted in a quite ineffective radar control but also with the flashes of Kirishima against South Dakota (basically the Washington used, non intentionally, the South Dakota as bait) and then lit her own searchlights shedding doom on the aging Japanese ex-battlecruiser converted in a battleship.
South Dakota was able to escape and during daylight she was protected by the air power of the US CVs. At her return to the US for repairs she was ironically welcomed as the II Naval Battle of Guadalcanal’s victor (because Kirishima was badly damaged that night by USS Washington and finnaly sunk after 9 hits of 16” AP rounds plus 40 secondary ones, twice as much as South Dakota received) something that produced that when both ships, Washington and South Dakota, found themselves at port together the crews engaged in bar fighting and havoc.
In summary: not only both US battleships poor gunnery at the start of II Guadalcanal, even using radar, but South Dakota’s design flaws could have produced a tragedy of great proportions (such as Arizona or Indianapolis level) but it was luck, pure and simple, that saved South Dakota where Bismarck was doomed.
Only to put Bismarck’s sinking in proper context: her foes fired 2,876 shells of several calibers against her including 14” and 16” AP rounds.
Very best regards,

Bibliography:
David H. Lippman’s article Fork in the Roads
Wikipedia articles on II Guadalacanal and USS South Dakota and IJN KIrishima
Antonio Bonomi’s article on DS battle
Karl Heidenreich’s article (in Spanish) article on DS battle
Kbismarck’s site
Combinedfleet’s site

[Karl Heidenreich]

Djoser:

In terms of relative effectiveness of Axis vs. Allied armed forces, I think the casualty ratios for ground combat in the European theatre are quite telling. The German army was vastly outnumbered in men and materiel, yet managed to inflict more casualties than it received. For an opponent so heavily outnumbered, this is very difficult to achieve.

Correct. You may find several post I made at the WWII threads in the bitter days of debate against lwd, Bgile and mkenny, in which I brought up the information of the main combats from Kursk to Cobra as well as David Glantz' articles regarding this numerical disparity.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Djoser:

I haven't seen the Tuskeegee Airmen movie yet--I am afraid to, after seeing the movie poster showing a Mustang shooting down a Me-262. Maybe the movie isn't yet more jingoistic propaganda, but I am not hopeful...

It's no better than Pearl Harbor, U-571 or Unglorious Bastards: is just junk. If you search the internet there are several articles regarding the historical flaws starting for the fact that the movie clearly states that no B-17 was lost while escorted by these Tuskagee airmen while the truth is that a significant number of B-17s were downed while escorted by them. There is no evidence that they shot down an Me-262 at all. No Tuskagee airmen ever came as an air ace (5 or more kills). Of course the merit of these brave african american men was not their fight against the nazis but against the prejudices of it's own "democratic" countrymen.
But the movie is worthless for any persons that knows a little bit of History. Another Luca's failed science fiction B movie.