Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

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Vic Dale
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Vic Dale »

To Karl.

Picking up your four points;

1. Hood has the best gunnery of the RN.
2. Hood stop firing on PE and aimed Bismarck
3. How PoW´s running away turns out to be a bold manouver to outsmart the Germans
4. Lutjens´ cunning 20° manouver and countermanouver and holding fire.

Point one was not a consideration in building the chart. I only referred to Hood in answer to RF. Hood's gunnery good or bad does not influence the chart by one iota.

Point two is documented in PG's War Diary - see gunnery officers' reports; shells landed ahead to port, close on the bow to port and to starboard in line with the mainmast (see NH69723). That btw is good gunnery. In Ted Brigg's testimony he refers to Holland ordering a shift of fire right and away from PG, after which Hood loosed off 6 more salvoes before the hit which started the fire on the boat deck at 0557. I believe he conferred with Midshipman Dundas on this later. If Hood was no longer firing at PG it is hard to imagine who she was firing at if not Bismarck.

There was no possibility of judging which ship scored as the shells could not be examined and the actual timing of the hits would not be possible, as they would not be likely to register in any recording centre. The hits on PoW testify to the difficulty of establishing exact times of impact.

Point three, PoW's movements are fully documented in Captain Leach's Battle Narrative. PoW carried the fight to the Germans until the decision made to pull out at 0605. That no salvoes were fired after 0601 makes no difference. The ship was still on an interception heading and her gunners had simply not been able to find target resolution, before the turn away. The heading from 0602 is well documented in the torpedo spread calculation of Lt Reimann and the fact that the hit from Bismarck came in at green 48, striking at 0602:30 shows that the ship had not turned away by that time. The hit definitely disrupted the ship's command as most of Leach's staff were killed or wounded. This hit would actually delay the turn away, because communications were wrecked. Only after Leach moved down to the armoured Upper Command position one deck below the compass platform would he be able to direct the action.

If retreat had been on Leach's mind at the time you suggest, he could have hidden in Hood's funeral shroud - there was plenty of smoke there - but we know full well that he didn't hide and at 0604 to 0606 PG's 105mm flak was still firing at him - they would have quickly lost the range had Leach turned away sooner. We also have the gunnery reports form Jasper and Schmalenbach detailing hits on PoW's port side. If Leach had not turned hard towards allowing PG to steam across his bow whilst avoiding Hood, this vision would not be possible.

Point four, Bismarck's turn toward enemy is indicated by the rate of closure of range and the way in which target bearing altered or did not alter in PoW. Without the turn it would be impossible for Bismarck to be in position for the straddle at salvo 6. The battle logic of waiting until the enemy has fired before making the turn to the course on which the battle will be fought is obvious.

If a British commander delayed opening fire he is credited with coolness in the face of the enemy, but if it is thought that Lutjens did the same, it automatically becomes vacillation and trepidation.

After the 20 degree turn which opened firing arcs in PoW, the target bearing was steady at 330 degrees for the next 8 salvoes. As Bismarck and PoW were making identical speed, this has to mean that Bismarck was either on the same course as PoW in which case the range would remain steady, or that Bismarck had chosen a converging course to keep target bearing steady for her gunners. Clearly Bismarck was on an aggressive approach to her target to close the range more rapidly and that course was adopted at about 0553-4. It explains the delay in opening fire - there really is no point wasting ammunition firing on a particular heading in the knowledge that you are about to change it.

As for who took the decision to make that turn, I would place my money on Lindemann. He was a gunnery expert himself and knew his ship better than Lutjens would. Also he is the one charged with tactical command of the ship, having worked with the gunnery team and built the ship into a fully effective fighting unit. Lutjens would need to stand off and consider how the squadron as a whole would fight and allow his captains to work out the best angles of fire themselves. He might intervene if he though Lindemann was making a mistake, but naval protocal dictated that linemenn could just as easily tell him to get lost, as Captain Topp did to Admiral Cilliax during a torpedo attack on Tirpitz.

It is a significant fact that Bismarck turned hard around to port to have another go at PoW at about 0609. Lutjens ordered Linedmann to cease fire and alter course toward the open Atlantic. If Lutjens himself had been directing the ship and her gunnery operations, the order would not have been necessary.

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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Vic Dale »

JtD wrote:Vic, I have a question as well. You quote Mühlheim-Rechenberg as one of your sources. He states that the range at which Hood was destroyed to be 18000meters. In your chart it appears to be less. Why did you decide against M-R's number?

And for someone who's never paid much attention to the charts of this engagement, what would be the biggest differences to other charts? Is there something fundamentally new on your chart or is it just a summary of your opinion that differs in various details with various other charts?

Firstly, Mullenheim Rechberg was not directing fire at Bismarck as he had been ordered to keep watching for a torpedo attack from the shadowing cruisers astern. He snatched a quick glance at Hood when he heard she had blown up and has only his memory to rely on, as Bismarck's chart was lost with the ship. In any event he would have used the gunnery plot in his own ship to give the distance and why that should differ from the figures used in PoW is beyond me. The Admiralty concluded that the gun range was 17,000 yards at the time Hood blew up and that takes account of time of flight.

The Baron has clearly based himself on work produced by others for much of the detail. Whilst his personal recollections are fascinating and intriguing, he would not be an authority on much of what he has written about. The fuel issue for one is factually wrong on many counts, though that would be part of another discusssion and his perception of Admiral Lutjens lacks objectivity in certain respects and is clearly coloured by the defeat he feels him to be responsible for.

As for the charts. I believe mine is the first detailed attempt to combine the charts of PoW and PG which has actually worked and which also makes use of the salvo plot. All of the other charts were drawn up before information from both sides became available. Even Antonio Bonomi rejects the British charts and sticks to the German material. I believe he may have attempted a combination himself in the past, but found it too taxing and time consuming. I can tell you it has not been easy and during the 2 full years of solid work devoted to this one particular task I must have drawn and redrawn hundreds of times. I have certainly used more than 2 reams of paper on the drawings alone.

My chart is based on documented reports alone, reports which would have been kept as a matter of routine in the ships. I do not credit eye witness testimony with nearly as much accuracy as the gunnery reports and target information. I do not use photos for my analysis either, though I am not adverse to trying to place some of them on the established time line.

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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Bgile »

At what point on your chart does Bismarck interpose between PG and PoW, resulting in the order not to fire over the flagship?
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by JtD »

Thanks for the answers, Vic.
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Karl Heidenreich
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Karl Heidenreich »

Vic,

It seems that you work in a way and then contradicts yourself, because you are using the photographs you regards as worthless to point out arguments:
shells landed ahead to port, close on the bow to port and to starboard in line with the mainmast (see NH69723)
So, if you see fit to use the photographs, for instance, to test your afirmation that Hood was an excellent shooting ship then you do. But disregard the use of photos if they are to be interpret something contrary.

Also:
The Baron has clearly based himself on work produced by others for much of the detail. Whilst his personal recollections are fascinating and intriguing, he would not be an authority on much of what he has written about. The fuel issue for one is factually wrong on many counts, though that would be part of another discusssion and his perception of Admiral Lutjens lacks objectivity in certain respects and is clearly coloured by the defeat he feels him to be responsible for.
But, on the other hand you regards this as objective, even if it´s lacks, completely, of any support:
This explains the delay between Hood and PoW opening fire and Bismarck replying. It has nothing to do with a lack of nerve or hesitation on the part of Bismarck's command, but expresses a cool and deliberate attempt to gain the tactical advantage. Small wonder the gunners were getting impatient to cut loose at the enemy. They could no doubt have got quickly on target, but they could not anticipate that Lindemann or Lutjens would order an aggressive 20 degree turn towards the enemy, the quicker to close the range and put him under rapid and accurate fire.
If Mullenheim Rechberg´s account is, as you claim, product of not verifyable information, then your´s is science fiction, man.
Firstly, Bismarck was hit three times during this action and generally PoW is given credited for them. PoW managed to get off just 53 shells, so this would mean that she, an untried weapon just out of work-up, managed to outdo the best hit percentage of the Fleet which stood at around 2% strikes for total shells fired.
This is an opinion, maybe a good one, but hardly fact. If so, why the RN never corrected the official version?
Thirdly, Hood was the Fleet's best gunnery ship and it is unlikely in the extreme that the green PoW would be able to out do her, so gunnery results should in all probability be shared equally between the two ships, though as there were three hits, one ship will have scored higher than the other. This could just as easily be Hood as PoW.
Not even the people of the Hood website or Bruce Taylor would ever claim such a thing. How can you say such a thing if we know, for a fact, that Hood was equipped with a Dreyer table and that it didn´t work all that fine?

:negative:
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Antonio Bonomi
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Antonio Bonomi »

Ciao all,

being the author of the last re-construction of this battle based on the available evidences and accounts, I think that many are expecting me to answer to this thread.

So here I am with my personal opinion about it.

First let me say that I do not want to enter again into a never ending debate like the one I had to suffer with Mr. Robert Winklareth for the Bismarck reversal photo invented theory.

This said I invite everybody to read on the HMS Hood website the long series of post I had to write to try to convince Mr. Vic Dale about how wrong his new theory is, unfortunately with no luck as Vic decided to post it even here now confirming that he still believes on what he is doing.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... p=931#p931

In summary here is what I think about the major points :

1 - On my work the Prinz Eugen, Hood and PoW tracks ( plus Norfolk and Suffolk too ) are all taken from their original battle maps. No modifications were needed as obvious.
On Mr. Dale work there is an intentional modification of PoW track in order to fit his pre-conceived idea about what PoW should have done. Both the PoW track showed and the process used are historically false. PoW battle maps are official RN Admiralty historical references.
There are also some photos/film showing what PoW did matching with her own official battle maps and accounts and of course Mr. Dale would like to read them on his personal wrong way too.

2 – Bismarck track which should have been the only difficult about this battle map can be made by referencing the many photos, film, battle reports and other evidences like paint made by eyewitnesses that thru the years provided us the information about what happened.
I have used all the above to re-construct the best I could the Bismarck track, keeping in consideration that while wordings can be interpreted differently, surely historical photos and film cannot as those are irrefutable evidences well visible and everything realized must match with them.
In any current court process in fact photos and video are considered very important proof of evidence of a fact happened, they are very strong evidences.

Mr. Vic Dale in order to support his tracks invention (both PoW and Bismarck) had to try to eliminate some evidences of the opposite ( and this tells the whole story about the approach used ) so he started an intentional de-qualification process trial of several photos demonstrating something different of what he would like to have happened during this battle.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... p=924#p924

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... p=930#p930

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... p=913#p913

But this cannot be done of course so his work cannot and will never stand on his feet.

Not only, of course on his work also many reported facts obviously do not match anymore, and I have already read about a couple of them (like Adm Schmundt report, or PG firing over the Bismarck before the battle end) that are not at all reflected into his work.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... p=885#p885

But the errors and the wrong statements are dozens, it will take a long thread to explain all the mismatches, so for the moment I think this is enough to provide an overall base idea.

If anybody wants to better understand how impossible, invented and historically false Mr. Dale work is one should only take 15 minutes and read the available works and make an easy comparison.

Bottom line Mr. Dale with this work would like to rewrite history, and with this invented map he would like to try to demonstrate that PoW forced Bismarck to turn away from the battle after Hood was sunk :shock: :negative: .
In his mind courageously PoW sailed toward the enemy for 5 more minutes after Hood exploded forcing Bismarck to turn away after Hood exploded sailing immediately on the opposite direction for 8 minutes before even trying to catch up on Prinz Eugen :negative: .

Lucky us, there are way too many evidences of the opposite and what both PoW and the German squadron did.

Somebody as already done a detailed work years ago that is more than enough to prevent history to be re-written on such a false way.

I had enough discussion about this battle with Mr. Winklareth, surely I was not missing another one now about another impossible theory, ... but very evidently this battle is so attractive than one cannot resist to it, .... and here I am again defending my properly researched work from those inventions.

Ciao Antonio :D
In order to honor a soldier, we have to tell the truth about what happened over there. The whole, hard, cold truth. And until we do that, we dishonor her and every soldier who died, who gave their life for their country. ( Courage Under Fire )
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Karl Heidenreich
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Karl Heidenreich »

Antonio,

After reading your work and Vic´s attempt, some of the internet available sources (I don´t have my books with we with exception of José Rico´s one and your article and map), the posted links and using my memory as hard as I can there is no doubt that your is the verifyiable account. It stands the scientific rigor of a proper research.

Vic´s chart are like his posts: fanciful and complicated but, at the end, utterly wrong. No need to convice me.

Best regards,

Karl
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Vic Dale
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Vic Dale »

I stand by my chart and am prepared to discuss all aspects. Blanket dismissal will not work in this case as there is too much hard evidence to support my findings - ten well documented observations at the last count. I am not surprised to learn that my chart has earned disapproval, but at least it is mine and nobody else can lay claim to any part of it, except those who wrote the reports at the time and who drew similar conclusions in the ships themselves and at the post operational washups at the Admiralty and SKL.

My discovery of details which disqualify NH69722 and Nh69730 is purely incidental and has had no bearing whatever on how my chart was drawn from beginning to end. Both could be placed on my time line without dispute, so there is simply nothing to be gained by my making so called "false declarations" about them. Any allusion to such a thing is a smoke screen intended to draw attention away from the hard facts and the big picture.

In fact, if NH69722 was authentic it would confirm the startpoint on my chart exactly, with Bismarck 3000m astern and slightly to port of PG's track, so there really is nothing to be gained there.

It is very rare to find any timeline which is confirmed by so many documented accounts which were being recorded as a matter of battle practice in the ships at the time the battle unfolded.

The plot I have drawn for PoW after 0600 is dictated by events preceding the strike on the compass platform and subsequent observations in PG, plus Captain Leach's battle narrative. The Chart produced in PoW after 0600 is not the hard navigational representation it should have been, due to the original chart being ruined and the battle narrative with it. It is an approximation drawn from memory by the Navigating Officer who was wounded. It omits the sharpness of the turn out from Hood which was observed and clearly documented in PG.

There are two charts produced and neither one matches the other for the period 0555 to 0609. Lt Cdr. Rowell admist that his timings could be out by as much as 2 minutes due to the chart being lost.

Descriptions of Hood passing astern of PoW having blown up are aslo proof that the turn out was a hard one as Hood is described as being left astern during the turn. If that turn had been toward Hood as is suggested by some, it would have kept Hood on the port beam and not disappearing astern.

PoW's Navigating Officer was nto himslef involved in plotting the ship's course. His job was as an active participant preparing interception and tactical courses for the captain and acting as pilot. The battle's history was being kept by a subordinate in the chartroom below.

PoW did not enter Hood's smoke, that much is clear and given that the smoke cloud from the stricken ship would extend 500 yards in any direction and was then blown 350 yards each minute by the wind along the squadron's original course, PoW could not have turned to port before 0605 without being smothered by the smoke cloud. Even if she had managed to get ahead of it, it would still have closed over her as she turned to port and crossed Hood's track, bearing in mind that Hood was still moving ahead after she blew up.

The Hit at 0602:30 coming in from green 48 and with the range between PoW and PG recorded in PG'sWar Diary at 14000m (15300 yards) between 0602 to 0604, confirms that PoW did not turn away early, but stayed in the battle taking further hits. The angle of strike of those hits, the last of which came in just before 0605, confirms that PoW was still on a converging course with PG's original course of 220 degrees and as can been on my chart parralel to that of Bismarck. PoW was possibly opening the range, but the turn away was not started until 0605 and this is a matter of record in Captain Leach's Battle narrative.

To their shame, some have even tried to discredit Captain Leach's and Captain Brinkmann's battle reports in order to get their theories to work. Mine works without detracting by one iota from the fighting skills of the men on either side or the veracity of their battle reports.

If history is being rewritten it is not being re written by me. I base myself on known facts, Battle reports, British and German charts and precise gunnery figures.

Vic Dale
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by tnemelckram »

Hi All!

Here's my thoughts.

1. Vic, Andrew and even Rob Winkelareth should be commended for the hard work they put in, regardless of its merit. They all advanced our understanding of something that is probably impossible to pin down exactly at this late date.

2. All three men deserve credit for having the balls to put their work out on the public line for all of us to sharp-shoot at.

3. Theories are not first advanced as something that is right, but instead as something to be tested to see whether it is right or wrong. The key to the scientific method is whether a sound method of testing is advanced along with the theory that will produce meaningful results and can be duplicated by others. The idea is not to prove your theory is correct, only whether it is right or wrong. In this regard,sound testing by others has shown that it is highly likely that Winkelareth's theory was wrong.

4. I don't think Andrew's photos are very convincing evidence in this case nd certainly not the best evidence.

a. Is there a documented chain of custody for the photos we are looking at that rules out the possibility of tampering and establishes that they are the same ones taken during the battle? After all, these are 70 years old and have been reproduced many times through many different media, including electronic formats such as photoshop that make alteration easy.

b. These photos were taken with 10-20,000 yards between opponents and a couple of thousand yards between the German ships. At these distances it's tough to tell what distance and course they depict. Nor do we know whether the photographer took all the photos from the same position so that we have at least that benchmark to relatively compare them. Due to the distance to the British ships, it's hard to tell what they depict at all with regard to those ships. You have to strain your eye just to get some idea of what British ship is shown.

c. Karl makes much of how photos have been used in courts of law to convict people and others follow along about how photos are strong evidence. Well, you can't admit a photo into evidence until you establish as foundational facts a chain of custody that rules out tampering and that they accurately and meaningfully depict what you say they depict. Finally, you can't use a duplicate as evidence unless you establish that the original is unavailable. And I'm sure that adulterated or incorrectly interpreted photos have been used in courts of law to railroad innocent people.

d. In this regard, Winkelareth may have been half onto something but he never articulated it properly. His first mistake was to insist on winning the point that the photos were reversed instead of contenting himself with the observation that questions about the chain of custody, authenticity and reduplication process made that a possibility, along with many other possible problems with the photos.

5. Vic's gunnery tables and records don't seem to have any special advantages either for determining distance,course or speed.

a. My doubts about their accuracy aren't based on the esoteric details of gunnery practice. Quite simply, more than 95% of the shots missed, either too long, too short, wide left or wide right. 100% of the shots were aimed at where the gunnery tables and records say the target was.

b. On the other hand, the gunnery tables and records come from official archives and that tends to rule out the above foundational problems and make them better evidence than the photos.

6.Andrew is critical of Vic's conclusion that the PoW compass platform was hit at 6:02:30. However, in his article he says this:
. . . at 06:02, the Bismarck fired her eighth complete salvo from
14,000 meters and hit the British battleship on the command tower
(compass platform),. . .
Assuming 30 seconds travel time, Andrew's article puts that hit just about right when Vic says it happened.

7.Both men make the mistake of harping on one thing; Vic his tables and Andrew his photos. The truth is that both made able use of many other good sources, most of the from official archives, and judicious use of eyewitness testimony. They seem to be in general agreement on what a good source is and how much weight to put on various types of evidence, and I think that they have this right.

8. I think that Andrew would be able to put together a reasonable foundation for his photos. Then, to arrive at the best possible explanation, someone has take the photos, tables and all the other evidence that both men used,and synthesize and coorelate all of the evidence using their same good methods.

9. If that is done, despite their opposing viewpoints, both men deserve credit for advancing the inquiry.
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by dunmunro »

PoW never lost director control of her 14" guns, yet for some reason you have Y turret as engaging Bismarck in local control after 6:02. Why wouldn't PoW continue to engage Bismarck using Director control of her 3 main armament turrets? Why do A and B turret go silent after 6:02 when they have a clear view to the target? Clearly this doesn't fit the facts as outlined in PoW's gunnery aspects report:

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm
and
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... encIVa.gif

If Vic's chart is correct then PoW would have fired another ~12 salvos under director control.
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paulcadogan
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by paulcadogan »

Exactly Duncan!

The table in McMullen's gunnery aspects report precisely states the length of time in which PoW fired in central control....to the second...so it clearly is not guess work or estimation by those involved in other duties.

The ship opened fire at 0553 and fired in central control for eight minutes and fifty eight seconds so she fired her last centrally controlled salvo - her 18th - at approximately 0602 at which point she was already turning away to port. McMullen says the last two salvoes were "ragged" because of the turn. After that control was passed to the aft DCT, but this could not direct due to the smoke screen, hence the Y-turret officer fired three times in local control - a two-shell salvo seen falling horribly short in NH69731, and two single-shell shots seen in the film footage and associated stills falling near Bismarck.

As far as I can tell, the 0605 turnaway time posited by Vic has no basis in any document that has been brought to light. It is not mentioned in Captain Leach's narrative. I've asked him in the past for his reference for it and to this day there is no answer. My conclusion is that it is a time that he has fixed based on his assessment of the event and what he is trying to portray.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but Vic has used PoW's salvo plot as the basis for his plot of Bismarck's course, yet at the same time he rejects PoW's course as shown on the plot and the bearings noted there by McMullen for her salvoes - particularly those fired as she navigated around the sinking Hood.

In support of Vic though, there are British witnesses, McMullen included, who state that they saw Bismarck turn away at around 0600. This should not be dismissed outright as I'm sure the Germans did not expect Hood to blow up, and Bismarck may have taken her third hit from PoW through the service boat - which was plain for all to see - and an evasive turn vs. the next salvo would have been prudent. However Vic's chart of her position so far away on the Prinz's port quarter is a big ????. This is why he has had to try to de-authenticate so many of the photos as they don't fit with his chart.

On Hood's shooting: Although Hood was "Cock of the Fleet" on many occasions - this had more to do with sporting activities and general smartness rather than gunnery efficiency.

Here are some quotes from Bruce Taylor's Hood bio (my italics):

"As Lt. (E.) Geoffrey Wells noted in his diary after an atrocious 15-inch shoot during the World Cruise, "gunnery efficiency without practice is unknown". As the glistening showpiece of the interwar navy this was perhaps more true of her than of other capital ships, but even so it has to be admitted that gunnery was rarely the strong suit of HM Battlecruiser Hood." P. 54

In the period after the Invergordon Mutiny when efficiency was brought to a great height:

"Within the space of a year the Hood, showing unusual proficiency in gunnery had demolished a battle practice target..." P. 156

WW2 with Force H after Mers-el-Kebir:

"Practice shoots with the main armament were characterized by ineffectual drill, control failures and poor accuracy..." P.205

Hardly descriptions of the "crack gunnery ship" of the British fleet.
That is not to say that Hood did not perform well at DS in the opening phases before deadly accurate German gunfire took effect. She bracketed the Prinz with successive salvoes when PoW was struggling to down-ladder her 1500 yard initial overshoot. Had the shells that fell off the Prinz' starboard beam in NH69723 been a tad lower the ship might have lost both after turrets and after control superstructure! Lucky Prinz! But...incorrect target selection and failure to shift target when ordered....aren't those "control failures"?

Well time for me to :silenced: This is too long anyway...

Paul
Qui invidet minor est - He who envies is the lesser man
Vic Dale
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Vic Dale »

dunmunro wrote:PoW never lost director control of her 14" guns, yet for some reason you have Y turret as engaging Bismarck in local control after 6:02. Why wouldn't PoW continue to engage Bismarck using Director control of her 3 main armament turrets? Why do A and B turret go silent after 6:02 when they have a clear view to the target? Clearly this doesn't fit the facts as outlined in PoW's gunnery aspects report:

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm
and
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... encIVa.gif

If Vic's chart is correct then PoW would have fired another ~12 salvos under director control.
PoW could not use the long base range finders in her forward turrets from the start due to water breaking over the fo'csle, so they could not have fired in local control at any time.

"Y" turret way down aft would not be influenced by the sea state and had the advantage of clear optics for local control.

The heavy turns enforced after Hood blew up, lost the target prediction and the heel of the ship duringing those turns expanded the salvo spread to as much as 2000 yards, according to observation in Norfolk. For centrally directer FC they would need a good view of the target and I do not believe they had it in PoW after Bismarck turned away. Certainly Captain Leach's Battle Narrative indicates uncertainty about the target during this time.

Vic Dale
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Vic Dale »

To Paul Cadogan.

I resent this implication;

"However Vic's chart of her position so far away on the Prinz's port quarter is a big ????. This is why he has had to try to de-authenticate so many of the photos as they don't fit with his chart."

There are only two photos set within the time frame of the battle which I have cited as non-authentic (NH69722 and NH69730)and they both fit my chart, so I have nothing to gain. If NH69722 is authentic then it supoports my assessment of separation at 0555 precisely.

If you are going to make points to dicredit me make sure they are accurate and be precise about what exactly you are saying. The fact that you try to discredit me in this way indicates that you feel you are losing ground in terms of evidence to fault my work. I have been entirely honest about what I have presented and I expect the same degree of honesty from those with whom I am discussing.

Vic Dale
dunmunro
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by dunmunro »

Vic Dale wrote:
dunmunro wrote:PoW never lost director control of her 14" guns, yet for some reason you have Y turret as engaging Bismarck in local control after 6:02. Why wouldn't PoW continue to engage Bismarck using Director control of her 3 main armament turrets? Why do A and B turret go silent after 6:02 when they have a clear view to the target? Clearly this doesn't fit the facts as outlined in PoW's gunnery aspects report:

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm
and
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... encIVa.gif

If Vic's chart is correct then PoW would have fired another ~12 salvos under director control.
PoW could not use the long base range finders in her forward turrets from the start due to water breaking over the fo'csle, so they could not have fired in local control at any time.

"Y" turret way down aft would not be influenced by the sea state and had the advantage of clear optics for local control.

The heavy turns enforced after Hood blew up, lost the target prediction and the heel of the ship duringing those turns expanded the salvo spread to as much as 2000 yards, according to observation in Norfolk. For centrally directer FC they would need a good view of the target and I do not believe they had it in PoW after Bismarck turned away. Certainly Captain Leach's Battle Narrative indicates uncertainty about the target during this time.

Vic Dale
Vic, PoW's Gunnery Aspects Report makes no mention of what you are claiming. Even if the forward turrets and director were blinded by spray, then PoW would have shifted to after director control and carried on. The report makes it quite clear that PoW had turned away and her forward director was wooded, and the after director blinded by PoW's smoke screen. Y turret fired in local control because it could see under the smoke:

"When the Fore Director was wooded during the turn away after salvo 18, the main switch in the T.S. was put over to after director. This director was also unable to see the enemy due to the ship's smoke screen, and the Officer of "Y" turret, using his own initiative, went into local control and fired three salvoes as he was able to see under the smoke."

from
http://www.hmshood.org.uk/reference/off ... 09guns.htm
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Karl Heidenreich
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Re: Battle Tracks at Denmark Strait

Post by Karl Heidenreich »

tnemelckram
c. Karl makes much of how photos have been used in courts of law to convict people and others follow along about how photos are strong evidence. Well, you can't admit a photo into evidence until you establish as foundational facts a chain of custody that rules out tampering and that they accurately and meaningfully depict what you say they depict. Finally, you can't use a duplicate as evidence unless you establish that the original is unavailable. And I'm sure that adulterated or incorrectly interpreted photos have been used in courts of law to railroad innocent people.
I´m not implicating that photos, per se, are the sole source of evidence but that they are a source of evidence, obviosly after a carefull examination. Which is the particular case of Bismarck´s victory at Denmarck Straits.
2. All three men deserve credit for having the balls to put their work out on the public line for all of us to sharp-shoot at.
Well, there have been also men that has brought to public line theories as Holocaust Denial, which can hardly be catalogued as "brave". I agree that if some evidence arises in such a way that "oficial" or "recognized" History has to be analysed or corrected we can recognize the people who work this out. But if the idea is to prove a pre determined criteria on some personal agenda basis then it´s not.
Anyway all these points only seem to refer to the photos vs other evidence issue. What about the categoric "matter of fact" comments as:

Lutjens decision or actions that no one ever witness nor the factss supports?

Hood´s gunnery proficiency in spite of evidence she wasn´t such a good shooter?

PoW´s manouvers that, against existing evidence, never happened as despicted?

None of these afirmations regard to photos nor any other source which are sole build up as a misleading effort.

Best regards,

Karl
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill
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