Tommy303. You keep on surprising me with all your very detailed knowledge of the ships of the Bismarck class and sheer logic of all your comments insofar.
It seems to me that you are THE expert on this matter and easily can write your own book about the Bismarck.
As a young boy this type of ship impressed my most because the Bismarck has sharp but graceful lines (design) and because of those "domes" made a very sophisticated impression on me. The many details of its superstructure made the ship particularly inetersting. Models of the Yamato or Iowa showed less gracefullness (more functionality), however the Yamato also has an almost perfect hull and if seen from the front or back the lines of its superstructure (main mast) are enormous impressive.
If reading all those many detailed articles on this Forum the whole picture of the Bismarck slowly becomes very clear to me and most of the mystification around the Bismarck, a "first class battleship which was unsinkable" is taken away. I can clearly see now all defiencies in its design and the mistakes made during its single operation. I also valuate the British with their persistence and sound techniques. Detected for short that those "outdated" Swordfishes were very dangerous and effeictive.
Still (after all) rate the Bismarck as my most favourite Battleship, and that has mostly to do with its appearance.
Some questions: did you ever made a detailed model of the ship?
What is your personal evaluation of the Bismarck class? Was it a beautiful and powerful state-of-the-art ship? Was it poorly deployed? Or did the Germans what they could and was the ship simply overwhelmed by superior forces?
Domed covers on funnel searchlights
Moderator: Bill Jurens
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VeenenbergR
- Senior Member
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- Joined: Mon Oct 18, 2004 5:52 pm
- Location: Vinkeveen
Hi VeenenbergR,
Well, thankyou for the praise and compliments, although I think there are many others more knowlegible than myself on the subject of the Bismarck, both on this board and others, as well as professional shipwrights and constructors. Still, Thankyou anyways.
As to your questions, yes I have built several models of the Bismarck, though I hesitate to claim they are anything more than run of the mill hobby sort of models. Certainly others on this board are far better than I. Still the models are useful in giving a nice three dimensional appreciation of the ship which even highly detailed plans cannot give.
As to my personal evaluation of the Bismarck class: on the whole the Bismarck and Tirpitz certainly had a stately beauty to them, although I do not consider warships to be particularly beautiful in an aesthitic sense. To me classic sailing ships are beautiful--yachts, frigates like Constituion, Warrior, china tea clippers like Cutty Sark---those are truly beautiful ships. Still, Bismarck and Tirpitz had nice lines to them and one could consider them to be appealing and impressive to look upon.
When it comes down to how good they were, not just how nice they looked, that is a difficult question. Certainly they were an impressive achievement on the part of the Germans and both ships had some good points in their favor. Still they had their flaws, many of them the results of compromises imposed by physical limitations necessary to allow them to navigate in home waters; other flaws were the result of the rapid rearmament program that saw them designed and built--in particular there were several changes in proposed armament during their design stages, and the final one came into effect only after the basic hull design and armour had been adopted and manufacturing had begun. One can also say with confindence that the rush to get the ship's built and in service once the war began may have contributed to certain quesionable construcion practices or oversights which might not have been made had the completion not been so rushed. One can see, for instance changes made in Tirpitz based on experiences with Bismarck, which shows that many of the faults were recognized and changes made to her sister during final fitting out.
Finally, and perhaps as important as anything else, German naval planning was flawed in so far as a navy was being built up rapidly but its purpose and employment was only vaguely outlined. This allowed too many conflicting demands. In the Tirpitz-Era under the Kaiser, objectives were much clearer--the naval planning staff simply said here is what we want to achieve, and the civilian naval architects and constructors were left in peace to produce the best designs possible to meet the navy's stated objectives with the technology available at the time. The result were ships on the cutting edge of technology. In the Third Reich, the designers were career officers in the Navy who all too frequently bowed to pressure from superiors in the naval high command to make endless alterations. That is no way to foster excellence, but that said, Bismarck class was an improvement on the Scharnhorst class in many respects. This at least shows the designers were on a learning curve, and if the H-class had been built, one would expect the resulting ships to be an improvement on the Bismarcks.
Once the war started, naval planning improved somewhat of necessity. The fleet was in its infancy and was not likely to mature, so plans were made to use what was at hand. One of the guiding rules should be make plans which your navy can hope to achieve, and the surface fleet was far too small to engage in any grand battles against the Royal Navy, a campaign aimed at disrupting Britain's supply line was adopted. One can argue that a battleship is too expensive to risk on such a mission, but still one uses what one has. The operation in the winter of 1940-41 showed that it could be done if one was careful. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did well enough, but they were not carrying the fight to the enemy alone. Besides those two ships, Hipper, Scheer, and the first wave of auxiliary cruisers were also at sea on raiding missions. finally, the Uboat force was also gaining in strength. The net result was the Royal Navy could not concentrate an overwhelming force to meet the multiple threats in the Atlantic.
The overall operation was successful, but when Operation Rhine unfolded, the naval planning staff lost sight of the rule to task available ships only with missions they could reasonably expect to achieve. Once Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were out of the operation, only Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were left to carry on the offensive. It should have been forseen that the Royal Navy could and would concentrate all its forces to deal with this single squadron. Luetjens advised against sending the squadron out until Tirpitz was ready or until Scharnhorst and Gneisenau could sortie from France. It's much less difficult to parry a single sword thrust than it is to defend against several at the same time. A delay would also allow Bismarck to fully complete and be brought to a state of full combat readiness--in particular work out problems with her main and secondary armament, finish the Flak control system, and get some more training in as recommended by the AVKS.
Unfortunately, orders came down from the highest levels of the naval high command for Operation Rhine to begin. The ultimate loss of the Bismarck lies most clearly on the shoulders of Raeder and the Naval War Directorate for insisting the operation begin at once over the sound advice of the Fleet Commander. The sinking of the Bismarck has less to do with her preceived faults, real or otherwise, or the decisions made by Luetjens, than it does with the faulty reasoning on the part of those whose job it was to insure giving Luetjens and his tiny froce a mission with a reasonable chance of success. without other forces at sea to distract the Royal Navy and stretch its assets to the limit, it was almost certain that if Bismarck was located while trying to break out into the Atlantic, she would be hunted to her doom.
Of course, with hindsight, one can point out that had the OKM waited for Tirpitz to be ready or for the twins in France to be repaired, the loss of the supply ship network in the summer would have made it impossible to implement the operation at all. However, Raeder and the other top admirals could not have predicted that in any event, and waiting at least would have prevented Bismarck and her crew from being thrown to the wolves.
Well, thankyou for the praise and compliments, although I think there are many others more knowlegible than myself on the subject of the Bismarck, both on this board and others, as well as professional shipwrights and constructors. Still, Thankyou anyways.
As to your questions, yes I have built several models of the Bismarck, though I hesitate to claim they are anything more than run of the mill hobby sort of models. Certainly others on this board are far better than I. Still the models are useful in giving a nice three dimensional appreciation of the ship which even highly detailed plans cannot give.
As to my personal evaluation of the Bismarck class: on the whole the Bismarck and Tirpitz certainly had a stately beauty to them, although I do not consider warships to be particularly beautiful in an aesthitic sense. To me classic sailing ships are beautiful--yachts, frigates like Constituion, Warrior, china tea clippers like Cutty Sark---those are truly beautiful ships. Still, Bismarck and Tirpitz had nice lines to them and one could consider them to be appealing and impressive to look upon.
When it comes down to how good they were, not just how nice they looked, that is a difficult question. Certainly they were an impressive achievement on the part of the Germans and both ships had some good points in their favor. Still they had their flaws, many of them the results of compromises imposed by physical limitations necessary to allow them to navigate in home waters; other flaws were the result of the rapid rearmament program that saw them designed and built--in particular there were several changes in proposed armament during their design stages, and the final one came into effect only after the basic hull design and armour had been adopted and manufacturing had begun. One can also say with confindence that the rush to get the ship's built and in service once the war began may have contributed to certain quesionable construcion practices or oversights which might not have been made had the completion not been so rushed. One can see, for instance changes made in Tirpitz based on experiences with Bismarck, which shows that many of the faults were recognized and changes made to her sister during final fitting out.
Finally, and perhaps as important as anything else, German naval planning was flawed in so far as a navy was being built up rapidly but its purpose and employment was only vaguely outlined. This allowed too many conflicting demands. In the Tirpitz-Era under the Kaiser, objectives were much clearer--the naval planning staff simply said here is what we want to achieve, and the civilian naval architects and constructors were left in peace to produce the best designs possible to meet the navy's stated objectives with the technology available at the time. The result were ships on the cutting edge of technology. In the Third Reich, the designers were career officers in the Navy who all too frequently bowed to pressure from superiors in the naval high command to make endless alterations. That is no way to foster excellence, but that said, Bismarck class was an improvement on the Scharnhorst class in many respects. This at least shows the designers were on a learning curve, and if the H-class had been built, one would expect the resulting ships to be an improvement on the Bismarcks.
Once the war started, naval planning improved somewhat of necessity. The fleet was in its infancy and was not likely to mature, so plans were made to use what was at hand. One of the guiding rules should be make plans which your navy can hope to achieve, and the surface fleet was far too small to engage in any grand battles against the Royal Navy, a campaign aimed at disrupting Britain's supply line was adopted. One can argue that a battleship is too expensive to risk on such a mission, but still one uses what one has. The operation in the winter of 1940-41 showed that it could be done if one was careful. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did well enough, but they were not carrying the fight to the enemy alone. Besides those two ships, Hipper, Scheer, and the first wave of auxiliary cruisers were also at sea on raiding missions. finally, the Uboat force was also gaining in strength. The net result was the Royal Navy could not concentrate an overwhelming force to meet the multiple threats in the Atlantic.
The overall operation was successful, but when Operation Rhine unfolded, the naval planning staff lost sight of the rule to task available ships only with missions they could reasonably expect to achieve. Once Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were out of the operation, only Bismarck and Prinz Eugen were left to carry on the offensive. It should have been forseen that the Royal Navy could and would concentrate all its forces to deal with this single squadron. Luetjens advised against sending the squadron out until Tirpitz was ready or until Scharnhorst and Gneisenau could sortie from France. It's much less difficult to parry a single sword thrust than it is to defend against several at the same time. A delay would also allow Bismarck to fully complete and be brought to a state of full combat readiness--in particular work out problems with her main and secondary armament, finish the Flak control system, and get some more training in as recommended by the AVKS.
Unfortunately, orders came down from the highest levels of the naval high command for Operation Rhine to begin. The ultimate loss of the Bismarck lies most clearly on the shoulders of Raeder and the Naval War Directorate for insisting the operation begin at once over the sound advice of the Fleet Commander. The sinking of the Bismarck has less to do with her preceived faults, real or otherwise, or the decisions made by Luetjens, than it does with the faulty reasoning on the part of those whose job it was to insure giving Luetjens and his tiny froce a mission with a reasonable chance of success. without other forces at sea to distract the Royal Navy and stretch its assets to the limit, it was almost certain that if Bismarck was located while trying to break out into the Atlantic, she would be hunted to her doom.
Of course, with hindsight, one can point out that had the OKM waited for Tirpitz to be ready or for the twins in France to be repaired, the loss of the supply ship network in the summer would have made it impossible to implement the operation at all. However, Raeder and the other top admirals could not have predicted that in any event, and waiting at least would have prevented Bismarck and her crew from being thrown to the wolves.
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood and Earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned these defended;
And saved the sum of things for pay.
Really good summary, which helps put the end product in perspective.
It is my belief that the different makup of the naval architect establishment resulted in the Germain heavy ships being incremental improvements over the Bayern class. I think that is why they had 3 screws, split secondary armament, and a similar armor scheme. It's possible they'd have ended up with that anyway, but I believe it was almost certain with the staff they had after WWI. It was what they knew and what worked well before. They were risk averse.
In any case, I don't think it would have made any difference in the outcome. As Tommy says, Bismarck had all the odds against her because the British were able to concentrate their navy against her.
Unfortunately my theory can't explain the Panzerschiff, which were revolutionary and were IMO a good attempt to offset British numerical superiority.
It is my belief that the different makup of the naval architect establishment resulted in the Germain heavy ships being incremental improvements over the Bayern class. I think that is why they had 3 screws, split secondary armament, and a similar armor scheme. It's possible they'd have ended up with that anyway, but I believe it was almost certain with the staff they had after WWI. It was what they knew and what worked well before. They were risk averse.
In any case, I don't think it would have made any difference in the outcome. As Tommy says, Bismarck had all the odds against her because the British were able to concentrate their navy against her.
Unfortunately my theory can't explain the Panzerschiff, which were revolutionary and were IMO a good attempt to offset British numerical superiority.
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VeenenbergR
- Senior Member
- Posts: 273
- Joined: Mon Oct 18, 2004 5:52 pm
- Location: Vinkeveen
Beautiful words and valuable analysis!!
Tommy303.
You even surpassed your well balanced evaluations insofar with your last comment. This give me finally some comfort, which haunted me for so long: Bismarck was in a sense sacrified by the high command of the Kriegsmarine. Time was not on Germany's side but throwing the precious Bismarck too soon in the battle would risk her existence. A better trained Bismarck (especially in AA) and a better coordinated operation with more could have prevented her loss.
Still Grossadmiral Raeder did suggest very sound strategic manoevres after the fall of France with a 2 pronged attack towards Gibraltar and Malta before going for a major offensive in North Africa towards Egypt and Iraq (oil) not hindered by the 2 strongpoints. Rommel would have had than at least 3 Army Corps instaed of only one and Luftwaffe would be present with many formations instead of 2 small formations. Reader thought this maneuvre was the better of 2 possiblities (Russia or the Middle East). Germany would tahn have at least 100 ground divisisons to defend the Eastern borders. If looking back this strategy was the best Germany could have followed in 1940/41.
You even surpassed your well balanced evaluations insofar with your last comment. This give me finally some comfort, which haunted me for so long: Bismarck was in a sense sacrified by the high command of the Kriegsmarine. Time was not on Germany's side but throwing the precious Bismarck too soon in the battle would risk her existence. A better trained Bismarck (especially in AA) and a better coordinated operation with more could have prevented her loss.
Still Grossadmiral Raeder did suggest very sound strategic manoevres after the fall of France with a 2 pronged attack towards Gibraltar and Malta before going for a major offensive in North Africa towards Egypt and Iraq (oil) not hindered by the 2 strongpoints. Rommel would have had than at least 3 Army Corps instaed of only one and Luftwaffe would be present with many formations instead of 2 small formations. Reader thought this maneuvre was the better of 2 possiblities (Russia or the Middle East). Germany would tahn have at least 100 ground divisisons to defend the Eastern borders. If looking back this strategy was the best Germany could have followed in 1940/41.
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hellomartin
- Member
- Posts: 41
- Joined: Sun Dec 23, 2007 11:29 am
- Location: London
OK, I've found something new to toss into the domed searchlight saga....
Here is an image of the H-39 class that never got built,
http://www.steelnavy.com/images/NNTHCla ... 129p&p.JPG
As Tommy points out, this designers used lessons from Bismarck for an improved (and enlarged) version. They clearly liked their domed searchlights!
I have to say I have come round to the crane damage protection theory, but does the H-39 design support this.....?
Here is an image of the H-39 class that never got built,
http://www.steelnavy.com/images/NNTHCla ... 129p&p.JPG
As Tommy points out, this designers used lessons from Bismarck for an improved (and enlarged) version. They clearly liked their domed searchlights!
I have to say I have come round to the crane damage protection theory, but does the H-39 design support this.....?
Concerning the domed covers for the H-class:
In my opinion, such as it is, the domed covers put on the Bismarck class and Prinz Eugen A (and projected for Seydlitz) may have been installed as an experiment and applied only to those lights most likely to be in danger of damage from boat handling equipment, assuming that the funnel lights were just as likely to be damaged in combat as any other on the ship. The covers and their respective machinery were quite bulky and it is possible that reasons of space, weight, and possible conflict with other equipment might have limited installations to just the ones on the funnel. H-class presumably was designed from the start to have them and all save the tower mast search light appear to have protective domes included. If this is the case, then the Germans appear to have been satisfied with both the concept of protected searchlights and the application on Bismarck, Tirpitz and Prinz Eugen, enough at any rate for them to become a standard feature on projected major units.
It is possible, that had the ships been built, the number of search lights would have been reduced and the saved space taken by increased medium or light Flak.
In my opinion, such as it is, the domed covers put on the Bismarck class and Prinz Eugen A (and projected for Seydlitz) may have been installed as an experiment and applied only to those lights most likely to be in danger of damage from boat handling equipment, assuming that the funnel lights were just as likely to be damaged in combat as any other on the ship. The covers and their respective machinery were quite bulky and it is possible that reasons of space, weight, and possible conflict with other equipment might have limited installations to just the ones on the funnel. H-class presumably was designed from the start to have them and all save the tower mast search light appear to have protective domes included. If this is the case, then the Germans appear to have been satisfied with both the concept of protected searchlights and the application on Bismarck, Tirpitz and Prinz Eugen, enough at any rate for them to become a standard feature on projected major units.
It is possible, that had the ships been built, the number of search lights would have been reduced and the saved space taken by increased medium or light Flak.
Their shoulders held the sky suspended;
They stood and Earth's foundations stay;
What God abandoned these defended;
And saved the sum of things for pay.
Many Thanks to all
I'm of the opinion now that these domed covers were almost certainly to do with the cranes, even considering the H-class plans that hellomartin highlighted.
Can we say "the purpose of the domed covers was to protect the searchlights within from the potential damage from multiple and varying crane lifting operations in the immediate vicinity"
I'm of the opinion now that these domed covers were almost certainly to do with the cranes, even considering the H-class plans that hellomartin highlighted.
Can we say "the purpose of the domed covers was to protect the searchlights within from the potential damage from multiple and varying crane lifting operations in the immediate vicinity"
Re: Beautiful words and valuable analysis!!
I don't feel that the loss of the Bismarck was a deliberate sacrifice born of the inception of Rheinubung.VeenenbergR wrote:
Bismarck was in a sense sacrified by the high command of the Kriegsmarine. Time was not on Germany's side but throwing the precious Bismarck too soon in the battle would risk her existence. A better trained Bismarck (especially in AA) and a better coordinated operation with more could have prevented her loss.
Certainly after the fatal torpedo hit the ship was effectively abandoned by Raeder and Hitler; but prior to that there was no certainty the ship would be lost.
As planned I think Rheinubung was sound, given the situation Raeder was in - one aspect not mentioned in the posts above was that Raeder knew that a few weeks onward from Rheinubung Operation Barbarossa would command all of Hitler's attention and the Kriegsmarine would be out of the picture.
I would appraise Rheinubung as a mission with a calculated risk and not a kamikaze operation.
Lutjens did indeed recommend postponing the mission, but given his fatalistic atitude I would question whether he was the right man to be Fleet Commander. On balance, if I was in Raeder's shoes in early May 1941 I would have given Rheinubung the go ahead, but with one difference - I would have Marschall, not Lutjens, as Fleet Commander.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Re: Beautiful words and valuable analysis!!
I agree completely with the last sentence. But it was a non-starter because in August 1940 Hitler decided he would attack Russia that Autumn.VeenenbergR wrote:Tommy303.
Still Grossadmiral Raeder did suggest very sound strategic manoevres after the fall of France with a 2 pronged attack towards Gibraltar and Malta before going for a major offensive in North Africa towards Egypt and Iraq (oil) not hindered by the 2 strongpoints. Rommel would have had than at least 3 Army Corps instaed of only one and Luftwaffe would be present with many formations instead of 2 small formations. Reader thought this maneuvre was the better of 2 possiblities (Russia or the Middle East). Germany would tahn have at least 100 ground divisisons to defend the Eastern borders. If looking back this strategy was the best Germany could have followed in 1940/41.
Simple logistics made such an early assault impossible, which even Hitler recognised - but from that moment on Russia was the focus of the Fuhrer's attention, the war against Britain was a sideshow and Raeder's strategy simply got in the way of Hitler's thinking.
As an aside - if Italy had been properly prepared and motivated to fight an aggressive war they could have carried out Raeder's proposed strategy on their own.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.