Stern section of the Bismarck - question

Discussions about the history of the ship, technical details, etc.

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ontheslipway
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Post by ontheslipway »

I can image that the peak-loading due to slamming in heavy weather would be of importance in crack-propagation in early welds. Bismarck may also have lost her stern as a result of stern-slamming after her torpedo hit. I doubt green water would damage the bow much, I think it's more a problem for the superstructure?!
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Green water

Post by Bill Jurens »

I would concur entirely with your observation. I might not have made myself entirely clear. My reference to green water was intended to refer to aircraft carriers only, where overhanging flight decks forward were in some cases pushed well out of alignment due to green water coming over the bows. Collapse of a relatively flimsy flight deck, which could arguably actually BE considered part of the superstructure, was not, so far as I know, associated with collapse or damage to the bow structure of the hull. So far as I know, in these green water incidents, the bow structure per se remained essentially intact.

I would also tend to agree that repeated slamming might have been a problem. I thought of this, and this was the source of my allusion to 'resonances' with waves etc. that might have put some ships in rather unpleasant situations whilst others (perhaps those occupied by senior officers) continued to ride relatively well. I don't know how much slamming a captain of, say, a cruiser, might be willing to tolerate before he was willing to request a change in course or speed etc. in order to allow his ship to ride out the storm more effectively. In the case of Pittsburgh, the forward sections of the ship were evacuated (and the ship placed in condition Z) before the bow separated; it may have been that the bow had by then became uninhabitable due to vibration and impact, etc., or people might have begun to notice early failures in shell and stringers.

There was, as one might expect, a rather complete investigation into the Pittsburgh failure conducted, and although I do not have all of the relevant documentation at hand, I think that the materials I do have preserve the general gist of the findings.

Bill Jurens
Randy Stone
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Bill...

Post by Randy Stone »

...I certainly understood your particular reference to 'green water' for good reason.

Been there, done that.

About the slamming, I was thinking -- perhaps along the same lines -- about the wave length and amplitude. What sort of hogging and sagging was going on would be interesting to ascertain. It is not like this was a normal oceanic condition to be tolerated if at all possible to avoid. I fully concur with the comparison to the working of Bismarck's stern under similar conditions.

In addition, what factors could be considered by the winds involved in terms of 'sail area,' and the like ? Perhaps inconsequential compared to the sea, but a factor nevertheless.

When I think of the Pittsburgh incident I recall hangared test aircraft being subjected to stress testing. I am not surprised by a failure in this setting.

Randy
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A few more points...

Post by George Elder »

Once again, I must point out that the Pittsburgh is not an isolated example, for this was not the only US cruiser to suffer bow damage during a storm. We cannot ignore the Duluth and Baltimore -- both of which had to go be repaired following damage during the same storm. I believe I can find more examples, but the point is that these bow structures all failed to one extent or another -- and the failure mechanism is what needs to concern us. Some have mentioned a causal mechanism being repeated wave action, but it is an action that is directed against a weakness. I suggest that this weakness be examined in detail. It appears that Bill does not have the needed documents, so it seems to me that we should find them.
Randy, you tend to beat a dead horse and not answer questions that are put to you, as in, for the third time, a view on the varacity of the following statement:

"The loss of Pittsburgh's bow, as well as less severe structural damage suffered by the heavy cruiser Baltimore and the light cruiser Duluth, dramatically demonstrated both the power of nature and the sometimes unreliable strength of contemporary welding. The latter problem, which resulted from both a not-completely-mature technology and the pressures of wartime production, was one that reared its ugly head from time to time on other war-built ships, both during and after the conflict."

As for "viable," you seem to have found a better definition than the one you first offered -- which was a hoot. But look at the definition's last clause, examine the early war view of the USN regarding its pessamistic assessment of AA capacity, and then see the comparitive wonders wrought by the VT fuze. Yes, I would say that the VT fuze made AA protection viable -- although I seem to recall a late war report lamenting the fact that aircraft would still get through. So it appears we have degrees of viability. But these are wasted words when compared with what will be gained for an examination of why and how US cruiser bows failed. And that is what we will do.

George
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Another case to examine: USS Miami

Post by George Elder »

After participating in carrier strikes on the Philippines during November, Miami encountered a typhoon while operating east of Luzon 18 December. During the morning one of the ship's aircraft was carried away, and in the afternoon her hull was damaged by buckling. As the storm abated the next day, she searched for survivors of damaged and lost ships.

I will look into this deeper. There are more examples.

George
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Another eample -- in a BB

Post by George Elder »

The first was in early November. On 7 November 1944, the Battleship NORTH CAROLINA, having just returned from her overhaul in Bremerton, Washington, was proceeding to join TG38.3 under the command of RADM Forrest Sherman off the coast of Luzon, Philippines where they were supporting the troops on the ground on Leyte. The typhoon was about 450 nautical miles to the south southeast. Fortunately, the task group which included aircraft carriers ESSEX (CV 9), TICONDEROGA (CV 14), and LANGLEY (CVL 27); battleships NORTH CAROLINA (BB 55), WASHINGTON (BB 56), and SOUTH DAKOTA (BB 57); cruisers SANTA FE (CL 60), MOBILE (CL 63), and BILOXI (CL 80); and fifteen screening destroyers had just completed refueling. By late afternoon the seas were growing steadily and continued to grow through the next morning. Despite a northeasterly course in an attempt to escape the wrath of the storm, the typhoon center's closest point of approach to the task group on 8 November was 200 degrees at 45 nautical miles. Heavy seas breaking over the Battleship's main deck flooded an air supply vent to #3 and #4 diesel turbo-generators, damaging the generators and the associated electrical switchboard. Even a ship the size of the 45,000 ton Battleship was required to reduce speed to minimize damage topside. Imagine what it must have been like for 2,000 ton destroyers.

While the center of the typhoon had passed and winds had somewhat abated, the seas remained heavy as the task group slowly proceeded back westerly to the vicinity of Leyte on 9 November. On the 10th seas were still so heavy that it carried away one of the gun shields on Turret I, partially flooding inside the turret. The battleship WASHINGTON developed leaks in her bow area due to the pounding into the heavy seas and was required to slow her speed. NORTH CAROLINA's #3 main condenser started leaking which caused the ship to have to slow with WASHINGTON. Several destroyers had to slow down as well.

I'm not sure what is up with this. Much more to learn.

George
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Another famous example...

Post by George Elder »

Friedman (page 183)

“In their design the Brooklyns differed sharply from the preceding series of heavy cruiser cruisers. They incorporated the aft aviation feature… as well as longitudinal framing, intended to reduce hull weight. The latter appears to have gone too far in the direction of economy, as the Savannah incident, which will be narrated below, showed.”

(Continued on page 10 in relationship to a gale encountered in 1938)

“The Savannah’s captain considered her, then, a good gun platform… He continued, however, that “in view of the structural damage sustained, without having had to make a forced beat to windward, as would be the case in war, the CO believes it may be necessary to reinforce the ship forward…”
This suggestion received embarrassing confirmation the following year. In a gale at San Pedro on 24 September 1939, she ran over her anchor chain, which sliced through her bow, causing such severe damage that she had to be dry-docked. The natural conclusion was was that the Brooklyns were too lightly built, that to much structural integrity had been sacrificed to save treaty-mandated weight…. Admiral Kimmel… pointed out that if a vessel of this class could be so easily damaged by the forces of nature when it was at anchor, it could not be expected to maintain its position in the battle line. The storm had not, after all, been exceptionally severe.”

George
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Here is a neat bit on US welding of the 1940 era...

Post by George Elder »

The Ship Structure Committee was formed nearly 53 years ago at the recommendation of the Board of Investigation whose charter was to determine the causes of the brittle fracture experienced by welded merchant ships during World War II.

"Early in the war, welded merchant vessels experienced difficulties in the form of fractures which could not be explained. The fractures, in many cases, manifested themselves with explosive suddenness and exhibited a quality of brittleness which was not ordinarily associated with the behavior of a normally ductile material such as ship steel. It was evident that the implications of these failures on welded ships might be far-reaching and have a significant effect upon the war effort. In 1943, the Secretary of the Navy - James Forrestal, pursuant to his responsibility through the Coast Guard for certificating vessels in accordance with the Marine Inspection Laws of the United States, established a Board of Investigation to Inquire into the Design and Methods of Construction of Welded Steel Merchant Vessels." (footnote above) The Board was composed of the Engineer-in-Chief, United States Coast Guard - Rear Admiral Harvey Johnson; the Chief of the Bureau of Ships, United States Navy - Vice Admiral E. L. Cochrane; the Vice Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission - Captain T. L. Schumacher; and the Chief Surveyor of the American Bureau of Shipping - Mr. David Arnott.

Some interesting findings of the Board:

4,694 welded steel merchant vessels were built by the Maritime Commission in the United

States and considered in this investigation;

970 of these vessels suffered casualties involving fractures;

24 vessels sustained a complete fracture of the strength deck;

1 vessel sustained a complete fracture of the bottom;

8 vessels were lost, 4 broke in two and 4 were abandoned after fracture occurred, 4 additional vessels broke in two, but were not lost;

the highest incidence of fracture occurred under the combination of low temperatures and heavy seas;

every fracture examined started in a geometrical discontinuity or notch resulting from unsuitable design or poor workmanship.

As a result of these findings, there were a number of recommendations related to overcoming this brittle fracture phenomena which were "successfully" incorporated into the design and construction methodologies of these merchant steel vessels. However, the final recommendation of the Board was the impetus for this Committee and it reads as follows: "It is hereby recommended that an organization be established to formulate and coordinate research in matters pertaining to ship structure in the same manner as has been the practice during the tenure of the Board."(same footnote) Therefore the Ship Structure Committee was born in 1946.

Since its inception, the Ship Structure Committee has worked diligently to sponsor and coordinate research and development projects and to provide industry with useable tools to improve ship design, construction, operation, inspection, maintenance and repair methodologies. The Committee membership has changed somewhat over the years. Initially composed of the USCG, ABS, USN, MARAD and the Military Sealift Command only a few years later, it has included the U. S. Army, Minerals Management Service, and Geological Survey. Currently, the Committee is composed of seven member agencies; ABS, MARAD, Military Sealift Command, NAVSEA Structures, Canadian Defense Research Establishment Atlantic (since 1994), Transport Canada (since 1993) and the U. S. Coast Guard (Chair).

Much to consider here...
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This might have some relevance...

Post by Randy Stone »

...if merchant vessels were built to the same standards as warships, however...

Randy
George Elder
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A few more examples...

Post by George Elder »

5 June -- Typhoon Damage
Name Damage Sustained
Salamaua (CVE 96) Flight deck out. Catapult supports ruptured.
Considerable minor damage.
Windham Bay (CVE 92)Fwd 20 ft. flight deck collapsed on forecastle.
Catapult damaged. 2 40MM mounts lost. Fwd
elevator temporarily out.
Bougainville (CVE 100)Flight deck supports dam. Considerable superficial
damage.
Hilbert (DE 742) Small crack in hull.
Pittsburgh (CA 72) Lost Bow frame #26.
Hornet (CV 12) 25 ft. flight deck carried away. 25 ft. too weak to
support aircraft. Catapult inoperational.
Bennington (CV 20) 25 ft. flight deck carried away. 25 ft. too weak to
support aircraft. Catapult inoperational.
Belleau Wood (CVL 24)Extensive superficial damage.
Duluth (CL 87) Bow buckled upward at frame #21. Shell plating &
several 2nd deck longitudinal stringers ruptured.
Maximum calm sea speed 25 knots.
Conklin (DE 439) Heavy damage one engine and one boiler available.
No communications, no chronometers.
Baltimore (CA 68) Bow structure damaged.
San Juan (CL 54) Minor electrical damage, minor cracks in deck
plating.
Maddox (DD 731) Break in shell plating.
McKee (DD 575) Twist in bow between frame 29 & 30 and wrinkle
port side main deck between frames 38 & 39.
Damage to Antennas.
Schroeder (DD 501) Slight buckle main deck from #30.
Brush (DD 745) Port bulwark main deck between frames 81 & 100
carried away.

Many, many, many more examples....
George Elder
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A storm damaging a BB shaft...

Post by George Elder »

No idea about what caused fault here with Iowa:

December 17-18 At Ulithi for replenishment and maintenance. Lost plane - washed over the side during typhoon. Damage to shaft caused by storm required USS IOWA to return to the United States for overhaul at Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco.  As one crew member recounts, "It was a very scary night, the Iowa rolled to about a 45 degree angle at one point and we all held our breaths that it wouldn't happen again. As our luck went, it happened at meal time so you can imagine the condition of the deck in the mess hall."
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More storm damage reports.

Post by George Elder »

There are numerous documents here...

On 17 December 1944, the ships of Task Force 38, seven fleet and six light carriers, eight battleships, 15 cruisers, and about 50 destroyers were operating about 300 miles east of Luzon in the Philippine Sea. The carriers had just completed three days of heavy raids against Japanese airfields, suppressing enemy aircraft during the American amphibious operations against Mindoro in the Philippines. Although the sea had been becoming rougher all day, the nearby cyclonic disturbance gave relatively little warning of its approach. On 18 December, the small but violent typhoon overtook the Task Force while many of the ships were attempting to refuel. Many of the ships were caught near the center of the storm and buffeted by extreme seas and hurricane force winds. Three destroyers, USS Hull, USS Spence, and USS Monaghan, capsized and went down with practically all hands, while a cruiser, five aircraft carriers, and three destroyers suffered serious damage. Approximately 790 officers and men were lost or killed, with another 80 injured. Fires occurred in three carriers when planes broke loose in their hangars and some 146 planes on various ships were lost or damaged beyond economical repair by fires, impact damage, or by being swept overboard. This storm inflicted more damage on the Navy than any storm since the hurricane at Apia, Samoa in 1889. In the aftermath of this deadly storm, the Pacific Fleet established new weather stations in the Caroline Islands and, as they were secured, Manila, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. In addition, new weather central offices (for coordinating data) were established at Guam and Leyte.

Well, this could be a gold mine with regards to structural and welding considerations. Much to do... much to do.

George, a happy hunter
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Re: More storm damage reports.

Post by Tiornu »

This is strong evidence that there was no systemic problem with USN hulls.
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Re: A storm damaging a BB shaft...

Post by Dave Saxton »

George Elder wrote:No idea about what caused fault here with Iowa:

December 17-18 At Ulithi for replenishment and maintenance. Lost plane - washed over the side during typhoon. Damage to shaft caused by storm required USS IOWA to return to the United States for overhaul at Hunters Point Shipyard, San Francisco.  As one crew member recounts, "It was a very scary night, the Iowa rolled to about a 45 degree angle at one point and we all held our breaths that it wouldn't happen again. As our luck went, it happened at meal time so you can imagine the condition of the deck in the mess hall."
I believe Iowa had a problem involving a bad carrier bearing near the terminis of the shaft. The bearing burned up and it took out the the gland and the support structure at the terminis. The shaft was left unstable, and could not be rotated. See Muir's Iowa class book, as he provide some few details on the failed bearing and the shaft tunnel damage. This was a mechanical problem related to vibration resonance that had been developing for a long period of time, and as it turned out, it was not caused specifically by the storm, although the storm may have aggravated the problem. Or was this another shaft problem from a previous time?
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Dave Saxton
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Re: More storm damage reports.

Post by Dave Saxton »

Tiornu wrote:This is strong evidence that there was no systemic problem with USN hulls.
Does this imply that the problems encountered by others were systemic?
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