Stern section of the Bismarck - question

[George Elder]

Hi Bill:

Somewhere I suspect there is a viable rational other than expediency that can be employed for using the term sophmoric, but let us examine a few issues in detail. With regard to the framing plans, you write:

***Not in the form you are probably picturing them. I doubt if they exist in the form you imagine. There is, however, in my opinion, enough information already available to make a pretty clear judgement without them. The "aft framing plans", though probably interesting to look at, would probably not contain any significant new information. I've looked at a lot of Bismarck plans over the years, and might well have seen them.

I actually saw the framing plans in NA1. I saw them mangled by the copy machine in an attempt made to provide you and other researchers with some valuable data. It is my understanding that the framing plans have been repaired, but that pictures must be taken of them vs the copy machine. And although you might doubt the need to review them -- one strongly wonders why any scholar would take this position. You cannot characterize what you have never seen not containing any significant new information, and the fact that you would be rather dismissive of potential new knowledge is not encouraging.
You go on to note with regard to the evolution of the Bismarck design and the efficacy of examining the design team data:

"I'm confident that we've been able to piece together a fairly reasonable picture of the German designer's approaches to at least the broad issues of the design. As memories fade, and naval architects of the period die, the detail supporting some of these conclusions disappears. But the conclusions do not."

For heaven's sake, Dr. Rastelli's recent illumination of the Pugliese papers proves how important and little known design information can contribute greatly to our understanding of why certain design choices were made. As you should know, those design team notes lead to new insights into many fascinating and not previously researched areas -- many of which can inform our views and opinions. But if one already has his or her mind made up -- then why the heck do we even bother to try looking for the rationals of designers? Why not impose our views on history instead of letting the record speak for itself? The good thing about examining design notes is that the concepts are not subject to the vagaries of memory. They are part of the record, and it is part of a record we have yet to fully uncover in the case of the Bismarck.
With regard to your claim that, "Most of the 'revisionism' comes from people who began studying these subjects only a few years ago. I've been working on these issues for more than 40 years now." Well, for someone who has been working on these issues for so many years you didn't appear to know much about the plating plans untill we found them for you, nor much of the material Dave has dug up welding until he shared it. You may opine most that what can be discovered has already been discovered, but recent events clearly indicate that this isn't the case. As for how unusal the separation of the distal extremity of a warship is following torpedo damage, it seems like there are ample cases to study involving a number of ships from several nations. Perhaps they all used "sophmoric" welding techniques.
I also note that you maintain that, "Some things, like vibrations of large structures under irregular oscillating loads, are very difficult to predict even today. "Making a mistake" in the prediction of the vibration mode of a large warship with an unusual hull design and making a mistake in the design of a simple welded joint are, however, two different things." Here you claim that the attachment of the modular stern involved a simple weld joint, when we bloody well know it was a compound joint of revited and welded structures, the underlaying framing of which we know next to nothing about. So you blithly dismiss the complexities in one case and then use complexities to excuse negative effects of another case. Is there any wonder I am beginning to doubt your views as being dispassionate?
And when you claim that the torpedo bulkhead joint of the Iowa class "wasn't sophmoric. It worked. Who could ask for anything more?", I ponder on what body of evidence this opinion rests? Certainly, we see a number of caison tests that seem to indicate problems with the system. Moreover, not running the TBD all the way to the ship's bottom created a discontinuity -- at least as defined by some naval architecs I know who have examined the structure. Yet there you go again, defending one approach while castigating another.
As for the Iowa Turret disaster, I spoke with some fellows who did the actual clean up, and found where the body of the supposed bomber realley was. Did you ever examine that issue? I spoke with the people who cleaned the guns, and found out some of the chemicals that were were used. Did you examine any of that in depth? You did your bit with the USN people who some in congress claim were out to "justify and protect," so it is no wonder you walked in their shoes. And as for your characterization of the Sandia Lab report, I will stand by my statement that few sholars could interpret what was offered there in the fashion that you have.
Bill, there is to much hype and rah-rah jingoism in many approaches to naval history, and yes -- we can all be found guilty of that charge. And it pains me. I see Rich making efforts to move toward the middle, which gives him the ability to argue far more convincingly than was once the case. I see you use language that places you in the extrmemes, and simply put -- I do not believe much truth can be found in the extremes. And don't be talking to me about your years of experience. You once ripped Bob W. and new orafice regarding his placment of the aft torpedo hit on the wrong side of the ship. You used your vast experience as an argument to attack Rob. Yet in the end, he ended up being dead right. I think the point I am trying to make here is that a scholar is at his best when he strives to recognize how little we truely know about nearly everything. When we cast ourselves as experts who need no more data, etc., etc, then we are bound to fall on our pride -- and to harm both the truth and others in a futile quest to be right. That is enough said -- for I have been as guilty as yourself in all these matters -- and I am certainly more of a sinner than a saint.

George

[Randy Stone]

Hello Mr. Roumbos:

I want to thank you for bringing Mr. Pagotsis’ monograph, “Battleship Bismarck -- The Nine Day Epic,” to our attention. Based on the limited quotations you have posted, this appears to be a very interesting and concise book. I appreciate Bill’s comments which support my instincts on this issue. Assuming this book required translation, I would be interested in knowing whether some of the more technical terms or concepts may have been ‘corrupted’ in translation. I know that personally I have to be careful not only with German but especially with Japanese terms where translations are necessary; this may explain some of the curious statements which people have questioned. Do you have any take on this with regard to the monograph by Mr. Pagotsis ?

Allow me an example:

“The ship sunk before the stern broke away, which was also caused due to additional hits on the area, combined with low quality welding and structural planning of not expanding the hull-long torpedo bulkheads aft of the rudder compartment..."

As Javier pointed out, the extension of the torpedo bulkheads would be a rather dubious proposition. Of course, it may be that the author either was not aware of the proper terminology or had actually written something which was incorrectly translated. Certainly, given his bibliography, Mr. Pagotsis must be aware of the shafting arrangements of Lutzow. In any event, we certainly understand the point that the strength of the stern section was demonstrably found wanting. Where I agree with Tiornu – in large part – is that structural discontinuity played a major role in the damage. It may prove, however, that additional stress was placed upon Bismarck’s structure by the nature of her design when compared with the stern section of Lutzow.

Randy

[Tiornu]

I have a dream....
A Bismarck board free of sermons.

[Bill Jurens]

I will reply only briefly to what I see as a rather agressive and invective-filled memo.

a) If the 'aft framing plans' are indeed in the National Archives, I have almost certainly seen them, and quite probably have copies on microfilm. You must remember that this "Bismarck stuff" is really just a sort of diversion for me, and I haven't spent a great deal of time properly cataloging all of the material I have accumulated over the years. At any rate, if the drawings were in the NA, then they hardly constitute a 'discovery'. My film reels of German documents on the design of Bismarck and other ships date from c. 1978, and probably contain the very drawing(s) you are talking about. It would take me hours to go through them. Please don't get me wrong, I want to tell you very clearly that I AM grateful for you sharing the plans you provided, but this was primarily because they were much easier to work with that the other copies that may (or may not) have already been in my collection.

b) So far as the recollections and statements of the designers is concerned, I do have a great deal of additional information which I don't believe that you have yet accessed. Much of this is in the National Archives, but a good deal of it is elsewhere and has not been widely circulated. My biggest disadvantage in this regard, is an admitted inability to read German. Still, I'll stand by my statements.

c) I feel very confident in my data regarding the South Dakota/Iowa protective system tests. I won't, however, discuss the issue further.

d) I cannot -- perhaps a better term is WILL not -- speak at length about the Iowa explosion on a forum of this type. I can assure you that I have reviewed the information to which you alluded and much much more. I will, once again, stand on my statements.

e) I did initially make a mistake about the torpedo hit. As soon as I realized I had made that mistake, I corrected it and took full responsibility for making it. It was a good learning experience.

If you wish to continue these discussions, I would suggest that you phrase your comments in a more professional manner.

Bill Jurens.

[Randy Stone]

Hi Tiornu:

I’m not certain some folks are singling out Bismarck as being behind the times. It could be that others are giving Bismarck more credit than is her due. As for granting the Americans the crown for reading the tea leaves correctly, why not ? It is – after all – a historical fact.

I’m also not certain we are making completely valid comparisons by simply asking which vessels shipped dual purpose batteries prior to 1939. After all, rearmament prior to war involved all aspects of the Royal Navy – it was not a matter of simply seeing to it merely that the battleships were the best equipped. How many other Royal Navy vessels were slated for construction or modernization ? Not only that, with Renown herself was taken in hand for reconstruction in late 1936, a date which compares favorably with the beginning of Bismarck’s construction in mid-1936, haven’t we an indication of the importance attached by others regarding DP armament ? Additionally, since there was a demonstrable shortage of LA and DP mountings for all classes of vessels prior to the outbreak of war in Britain, isn’t it wise to think about priorities. Ironically, Hood herself surrendered her original secondary armament in favor of strictly DP secondaries the year before her loss. So why was Bismarck left behind in all this tumult for some four years ?

Back to the United States Navy, we would find that it considered DP batteries as early as 1928, so far as I can tell. True, the Americans were far more air minded than the Kriegsmarine, which – as I will note in another post – had no suitable DP weapon until 1941 or so. And perhaps retrograde is too harsh a comment although this particular term may suffer in the translation. Regardless, the lack of a substantial DP armament is one of several reasons I consider Bismarck a rather average design for the time. In many ways she had as much in common with her international compatriots; and in that sense – looking back on your initial comment – all navies did fall short by comparison with the USN.

Randy

[George Elder]

Hi Bill:

This all began over the use of a connotative term that has no place in professional discussions, so there is no need for lectures on what constitutes proper discourse. It seems to me that the needed points have been made, and if you feel a bit put-upon -- than I strongly suggest that all concerned seek to avoid tossing rhetorical handgranades. As for your refusal to discuss specifics, that is perfectly acceptable, and we will leave it at that.

George

[George Elder]

Randy:

"And in that sense – looking back on your initial comment – all navies did fall short by comparison with the USN."

In what sense is this an established fact?

George

[Tiornu]

The author described Bismarck as retrogressive regarding its split battery, which implies that the DP battery was the current norm, and that is inaccurate. I noted the ships that had DP batteries, and it's clear that the feature was not established as a norm. If we look at the new designs developing at the same time as Bismarck, we see American ships with genuine DP batteries, along with Dutch ships. And these are the ONLY ones that had practical DP weaponry. The French liked the idea, but found their technology could not match the aspiration. The British were caught in buyer's remorse over allowing a secondary battery that was small by Iron Duke standards, and this led them to the 5.25in gun which was a two-way disappointment--again, the technology wasn't there. Then there are the Italians and Japanese and Soviets, who all opted for split batteries. In my view, it was not the split battery that was old-fashioned; it was the DP battery that was avant-garde. If we want a regressive BB feature, I'd point to the submerged torpedoes in "H."

[Tiornu]

"so there is no need for lectures on what constitutes proper discourse."
I could have told you that yesterday before you started into one.
Isn't this an obvious irony, that the man complaining about "rhetorical hand grenades" is individually responsible, more than anyone else I know, for giving the Bismarck topic an emotional charge? I describe it as ironic, but others may choose a different adjective.

[George Elder]

... but I respect your sermon. I also agree with your points on a DP battery as being rather out of the main stream given the time the Bismarck was designed. Moreover, DP batteries didn't realley become viable AA tools until the fuzing issue was addressed -- to which, I think, we may owe some thanks to the British.

George

[Javier L.]

I think the cases of Bismarck and Lützow are not comparable. Not only was Bismarck a larger ship designed with 3 shafts instead of only 2, but the place where they were torpedoed was different. Bismarck only lost about 10 meters of stern, the damage of Lützow was more severe because she broke where the ship's main belt-transverse bulkhead ended just aft of the main turret.

I think there are more similarities between Bismarck and Prinz Eugen's cases. The stern of the Prinz Eugen broke away following a hit by a submarine 21 inch (is this correct?) torpedo in about the same area that Bismarck was hit. The Prinz Eugen lost the rudder, but unlike the Bismarck, she entered port on her own using propellers only.

[Randy Stone]

Hi Tiornu:

"...so there is no need for lectures on what constitutes proper discourse."

I could have told you that yesterday before you started into one. Isn't this an obvious irony, that the man complaining about "rhetorical hand grenades" is individually responsible, more than anyone else I know, for giving the Bismarck topic an emotional charge? I describe it as ironic, but others may choose a different adjective.

This is as eloquent as it is true; nor are you the only one to so notice.

When Bill made the comment that he felt like he was being cross examined, I was reminded of the lawyer's old adage that "...when you don't have the facts, argue the law; when you don't have the law, argue the facts, and; when you don't have the law or the facts -- attack the opposing counsel.

Bill was being attacked, plain and simple.

Randy

[Randy Stone]

George:

Here is the quote in question:

"Back to the United States Navy, we would find that it considered DP batteries as early as 1928, so far as I can tell. True, the Americans were far more air minded than the Kriegsmarine, which – as I will note in another post – had no suitable DP weapon until 1941 or so. And perhaps retrograde is too harsh a comment although this particular term may suffer in the translation. Regardless, the lack of a substantial DP armament is one of several reasons I consider Bismarck a rather average design for the time. In many ways she had as much in common with her international compatriots; and in that sense – looking back on your initial comment – all navies did fall short by comparison with the USN."

Let's restate what I wrote:

I mentioned as how I felt “...retrograde (may be) too harsh a (term)...” Perhaps too, Mr. Pagotsis’ work suffered from translation errors. In any event, I noted the obvious similarity between Bismarck and her international compatriots in one sense that – aside from the United States Navy – they lacked a substantial DP armament. The fact is a trifle self evident as Tiornu’s posts makes rather clear.

As for your statement that “...DP batteries didn't really become viable AA tools until the fuzing issue was addressed...” it is obvious that USN experience in the Pacific in 1942 clearly refutes this assertion.

Randy

[George Roumbos]

Hello Mr. Stone

I only did an exact translation of a few points I thought needed some attention, especially about the conclusions of the book.
The rest is well written with an acurate acount on the events, a good and thorough study, as good as it can be covered in only 80 pages.
I'll contact the author for some questions and if you and the rest of our Bismarck forum community are interested, I can ask him to translate the whole book in English.
Maybe make it available thrugh this site as a e-book, that's for the author and Jose to decide.

All the Best,

George

[George Elder]

Randy:

I know a very high ranking naval officer who used that term to scornfully describe some of your discursive antics on the old Warship1 Board. As I recall, some of your "attacks" used terms such as Nazi and the like, which is hardly arguing the law or facts. And while you ride bravely to Bill's aid, I think he can carry his own water quite well.
With respect to substance, you seem to be saying that the USN 1942-era AA "clearly" refutes the notion that early war AA was found wanting -- at least as it relates to the comparitive effectiveness wrought by the VT fuze. How does one back up that view? Should we consider total rounds fired per kill in the comparison? Just a bit more info needed, and we all know how much you like to share information. As for arguing the facts -- here is your chance to shine. Then again, perhaps I have misinterpreted you answer.

George