Prince of Wales damage

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Karl and all,

not a problem, I knew that many persons would have just read and stopped were they first saw and get the article, now everybody knows it and they can take what they want, free of charge

You ask me an opinion on Adalbert Schneider, the first artillery officer on board Bismarck, well too easy to judge him from Denmark Strait, as he put together an excellent performance, but he was not the only one.

If you make a fair comparison, than also Paulus Jasper did excellent on Prinz Eugen and Colin McMullen was excellent as well on board the Prince of Wales.

Now please evaluate the conditions they fired their guns and you will see that Bismarck and Prinz Eugen had very reliable guns and a straigth 220 degree course run ( after the starboard turn they did not get anymore the target ), while McMullen had a very though job as his ship turned a lot more and he was forced to adjust the fire several times, loosing the target at the end as well after been hit and going on local control with Y turret only ( 2 guns and after only 1 out of 4 ).
Not to talk about the PoW quadruple turrets ( A and Y ) design mechanical problems ( present on all KG V class ships ) he had that forced him to loose some guns and even turrets while firing.
To complete the picture I like to mention also the Hood first artillery officer that had basically an impossible job, fire while been hit several times, with the ship on fire, hit on the spotting top, probably going on local control with A and B turrets only,...that is why from PoW they noticed ... '' Hood out of action at 05.57 ''.

So a complete different scenario for the 4 artillery Officers, but Schneider did well and sunk the Hood, thanking also some good orders Adm Lutjens delivered to establish the engagement scenario at the beginning.

I think we can also say that he was going to hit a lot more PoW as well, and from very close, ... but than the Prinz Eugen GHG heard something, .. Kpt Brinkmann went out with his binocular on the Prinz Eugen bridge,... saw 2 torpedo lanes,... raised the torpedo alarm,... Lindemann turned fast the Bismarck outside out of the torpedo range,...and it was all over for Schneider, ...... and for Adm Lutjens,......

Ciao Antonio

[Karl Heidenreich]

Antonio:

Thanks for your reply, that goes beyond what I first asked.
And because of that I´m interested in the following: PE did hit Hood at the base of the bridge tower at 5:56 and a minute later (5:57) Bismarck hit the spotting top (which means that both German ships had straddled the British Squadron early in the combat, thing that hasn´t been discussed enough in this forum). I recognize that these both hits must had affected the Fire Direction Hood had until as far as 5:57. But what before that?
Hood was leading the British Squadron and had a better position than that of PoW, but she was unable to score while PoW did score. Why? I suspect it must have something to do with the Dreyer Fire Calculator in Hood because PoW had a much better machine. What do you think of that?
About Bismarck and PoW, both of them did hit the other one more than once, being the hit that PoW gave to her enemy´s bow of far more relevance... after the combat because it did not handicapped the combat performance of Bismarck at DS, while the hits that Bismarck gave to PoW were of inmediate consequences at the combat but that were repaired after the action. The damage at PoW´s bridge has been treated by some as nonexistent or irrelevant because PoW later help to hunt Bismarck with Norfolk and Suffolk (but maintaining a great distance to flee again if needed which means the British didn´t considered PoW in conditions to fight and win on a one vs. one basis) but I positioned that damage in the combat context which means it was very heavy in that moment: there was not even fifteen minutes left to repair it because Bismarck and PE were over her.
I do believe that Adalbert Schneider performance was superb that morning and that Bismarck was a heavier contender than what is granted by many.
Best regards.

[paulcadogan]

Hi Karl, Antonio & all,

I have a few comments on what you have said....

First...the hit at the base of Hood's bridge structure came AFTER the boat deck hit. It apparently killed scores of men who had gone there to take cover from the fire and exploding ammunition. It probably came at the same time as the spotting top hit (which is the topic of a rather lively debate in the Hood forum). These hits both probably came with Bismarck's third salvo which, by all accounts, straddled. This also would have occured AFTER the Prinz's second salvo which caused the boat deck fire.

Next - and Antonio this is specially for you - Hood's guns NEVER had to go into local control . Despite the spotting top hit which would have killed her type 284 radar as well as her main spotters, and may or may not have killed her chief gunnery officer Moultrie (see the Hood forum debate), her main gunnery director on the conning tower in front of the bridge was never damaged! It was fully capable of directing her gunnery optically throughout. The loss of the spotting top and radar would have affected her accuracy given the difficult optical conditions caused by sea spray at the lower level of the conning tower. This is clearly what happened - as Hood's opening salvoes at the Prinz, despite being from only two guns at a time, were very well placed and certainly caused Captain Brinkmann some very nervous moments. He comments in his War Diary that he thought the British salvoes were radar directed because of their accuracy. So Moultrie deserves some kudos as well, drenching the Prinz with water from close splashes despite Hood's old Dreyer Table, though he was thwarted very quickly by the blistering accuracy of his two foes - under the guidance of Schneider and Jasper!

And Karl, I don't agree that Prince of Wales damage impaired her fighting ability, except with the bridge hit affecting her command structure. Her defective turrets were the main reason for her breaking off, though a stunned Captain Leach havng just seen his flagship vapourized must have helped a bit! If the ship had been developing full gun power and fully worked up I have no doubt that the battle would have continued despite the hits she had taken.

And PoW certainly wasn't shadowing in order to be able to "flee" again. Her presence gave support and a certain level of security to Suffolk and Norfolk. When the Prinz was being detached and Bismarck attacked Suffolk, PoW was there and took on the Bismarck again, hammering away for twelve minutes until BISMARCK turned away, the Prinz having successfully made off. The two ships exchanged fire again some time later at extreme range without effect.

Given her defective condition (NOT her battle damage), it made no sense for PoW to force a re-engagement until re-inforcements arrived. But IMHO she performed her role admirably until Bismarck's escape.

Bismarck's battle damage, though it did not affect her gunnery ability, certainly affected her sea keeping ability due to the flooding caused by the bow hit when she steamed at high speed. Ending the Denmark Strait battle 3 degrees down by the bow with a 9 degree list to port was not insignificant - hence the need for her to head for a friendly port. (In a way, isn't this so similar to Graf Spee's situation!!)

Best regards !

Paul

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Paul, Karl and all,

well I see that obviously now the discussion has been enlarged a bit, and that is ok.
We can jointly fairly analyze the available evidences and maybe have some new opinions .

Please keep in mind that on some statements as I did, we must use the definition 'probably' simply because we do not have the 100 % confidence on them, just like I did for Hood forward turrets going in 'local control' or for the Hood received hits correlation with Bismarck or Prinz Eugen salvoes.
Of course each statement has is own confidence level, been high, medium or low, but still.........

@ Paul,

YES, I see what you are saying and probably it is true, still the Hood fire direction was a lot affected by the hit on the spotting top, that was mainly what I wanted to clearly explain as a concept.
As you said, probably Moultrie died because of that hit, surely some consequences on the Hood fire direction occurred, time was lost, communications interrupted for a while, we can imagine.
Please remember that the order to switch target from Prinz Eugen to Bismarck was never executed by Hood turrets, so some difficulties have been experienced on board Hood and that is what I wanted to explain.

The more evident confirmation of that is what was written on PoW salvoes map available : ' Hood out of action at 05.57' , so they noticed something was not going in the right way for Hood performances ( gunnery most likely ), that is what I simply wanted to say.

Surely Hood fire at the Prinz Eugen early on was very accurate till the point she was hit, Brinkmann used his depth charges to confuse the Hood spotters and available photos do show the Hood salvoes were very close. Brinkmann became very nervous, in my opinion tremendously nervous as distances were quickly reducing and he was the closest to the enemy and under Hood main guns precise fire, .... and I can understand why ...... I can see the 'Mighty Hood' proudly running into the battle and despite the initial hits received keep on shooting the enemy, ..... put yourself into Brinkmann shoes in that moment, on board an heavy cruiser under a battleship fire, ...... but despite all, no hits received.

Hood was the only ship not to score, Prinz Eugen the only ship not to receive any shell on board on that battle.

As I said, for Moultrie almost an impossible job under those circumstances, and probably he died early on the battle, you are right my friend, he deserves same excellent rating for sure , I though it was obvious .. but thanks for reminding me to underline it.

Everybody can think what they like ( lucky factor, etc etc ) I personally think this been the result of Adm Lutjens decision and order to concentrate fire on the leading ship, the Hood, for both Bismarck and Prinz Eugen while keeping positions and stable course on 220 degrees.

This gave Schneider and mostly Jasper an enourmous advantage on shooting precisely 'all ' their guns early on, compared to McMullen and Moultrie because of VAdm Holland approach with the turns.
This decided Hood destiny and at the end reversed the battle result in favour of the Germans.

@ Karl,

Paul did explain to you the time sequence of the hits received by Hood that you can find precisely on my article and Hood drawing.
The correlation of the 4 hits with the German ship is presumed based on the available witness accounts.
You can read on the Hood website on a dedicated post ( very good one by the way ) all the detailed story of each hit.

Hood was firing forward turrets only pretty soon, so only 4 guns, while PoW at least 5 ( she lost immediately 1 gun on A turret ).
YES, PoW optic was probaly better than Hood, same probably do apply as well at the fire control equipment and fire direction structure on the ship, been a newer one.

The battle damages received by both Bismarck and PoW did not compromize their fighting ability as ships, on both cases in my opinion on the immediate time.

Surely been hit heavily did create some more problems on PoW compared to Bismarck, but if Hood was still there and her turrets working properly I think PoW was going to keep on fighting that battle, despite the received 7 hits.

But here is were all the discussion on PoW retreat from the battle can start developing further more if you like.

After the tremendous 2 minutes when she received most of the hits, Leach decided to turn away, not knowing precisely the damages yet, but knowing he was under a terrible and accurate fire ( here the hit on the compass platform did counted too) and some of his guns were lost on A quadruple turret (loss of 2 ) and Y quadruple turret ( loss of other 2 ).

So he was having 6 guns only working out of 10 he had when he turned the PoW away around the Hood sinking.
But turning the A turret had to rotate and the ring blocked her ( bad design those quadruple turrets , .. as it happened to KG V as well on May 27th ), so he lost other 2 guns of the A turret going down to 4 only : 2 on B turret ( all of them ) and 2 on the Y quadruple turret with obvious limitation of use due to his course now.

His ship was damaged and he was having more and more troubles, 2 guns working on B turret ( the twin turret performed very well, so not a gun design problem, but a turret mechanical design type problem, 4 vs 2 guns ) and other 2 on Y turret firing in local, than only 1, than ... no one.

Not big problems, but on that moment he was forced to do what he did to save his ship, ..... and I agree with his conduct, .. what else could have been done

Still without Brinkamm torpedo alarm,... PoW was not going to increase the distances with both enemies, ... and also suddendly and unexpectedly not able anymore to hit him again like before, .... because of the forced turn to west on 270 degrees, .... and so quickly because on the combined turns of both squadrons,..... I can imagine Schneider thoughts vs Lindemann, ....... on that moment, .... we do not have his words to him, ... we do have Jasper ones to Brinkmann reported by F.O. Busch book, ....... you can read them ......

Ciao Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Antonio my friend.....

It's always good to see that you and I are on the same page!

It makes very good sense and explains a lot of the observations, bringing together the spotting top hit, the "Hood out of action" entry on PoW's salvo plot, Hood's failure to hit the Prinz after getting so close AND problems with the change of target. I alluded to it in the spotting top thread, in that the change of target would have caused a temporary cease-fire, then the hit itself took out Hood's spotting and possibly (if you agree with Wadinga) her Chief Gunnery Officer. This would have led to a further delay in re-opeing fire giving PoW the impression that Hood was out of action.

But going back to the main topic of this thread - PoW's damage - I believe that the British themselves perpetuated the myth of the ship being "badly" damaged in the battle. They HAD to in order to explain her retreat! They could never announce to the world that they had sent a brand new, virtually untrained, untested and defective battleship into action. They could never let their enemies or even their allies know that the gun turrets on their new battleships were flawed.

As such, it was said that the damage was serious in order to justify her precipitous withdrawal - which was decidedly uncharacteristic of Royal Navy ships in any battle. On top of that, the hits that Bismarck received were initially thought to have come from Hood (see Admiral Tovey's original commentary). Prince of Wales was unfairly painted as cowardly or a "Jonah". IIRC at one point her crew was jeered and taunted by Rodney's crew.

Today we know much more of the facts - her damage was not serious, no German shell penetrated her armour belt or deck, and her guns, though defective found their target three times in the most furious part of the battle, sewing the seeds of that target's ultimate demise. It is only fair that this should be acknowledged for the memory of a great ship and her gallant crew.

All the best

Paul

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Paul and all,

THANKS Paul

When you can talk with fair and competent persons everything comes out pretty easily

That is why I like it so much, .. we all have our preferences and passions, .. and that is absolutely ok and correct, ..... but we never have to forget we are talking mostly heroes, died persons and soldiers that do own a lot of respect from our evaluations and judgements on their actions, ... at the end we do not know everything for sure.

Been an average historical researcher always on the learning path, .. I try to be as fair as I can, .. all sides,.... and to provide my opinions with this type of respect,..... at least, ... I try

In between this website and the HMS Hood website I think we have done a very good job, .. and explained a lot of things that can bring forward our researches ,...... I am very satisfyied

YES, the Hood gunnery sequence has been a lot impacted during those crucial minutes and I think we are bringing on the table all we can,..and analyze it very well, ... from every point of view,... fairly and very accurately, ... everybody is adding a lot of value, .. lately also Wadinga ( Yes, I agree with his observations ) with his radar infos, .. gave good inputs as well, ... not to talk about the very competent others always involved, guys like Bill Jurens, Frank Allen, Bruce Taylor and David Mearns, .. I hope Bill Garzke Jr will join in as well.

Of course I agree with you on the ' politically correct ' way to provide to the British population the infos about Hood loss, PoW retreat and DS battle on May 1941, very easy to be understood concept.

But now having the full set of infos, the PoW damage report from Rosyth dockyard ( I must thank a very good Australian friend for that ) and the complete knowldge about KG V class quadruple turret design, everything must be analyzed under this light, if one wants to really know the historical truth.

PoW was as good as KG V, DoY, Anson and Howe, no difference and to say to you my personal opinion she did quite well based on her training status, a good ship and a very gallant crew, I fully agree

McMullen did a superb job ( immediately realized which was Bismarck despite wrong communications and acted accordingly, made 3 hits on those very difficult circumstances, what one wants more from a Gunnery officer ).

Captain Leach conducted PoW into action very well, did not loose his leadership on a very critical moment after the compass platform hit, saved his ship under enemies killing fire distance, .... the ship was immediately repaired and continued the action doing her job shadowing the Bismarck waiting for a new action to come.

I understand but do not agree with Sir Winston Churchill that she must have remained there on those circumstances because a British battleship never retreat in front of the enemy.

That is OK to build your naval traditions, but cost you a battleship and 1500 men, ..... a huge price to reinforce your tradition, ... that is the Bushido and what Yamato did, ... but the British ( been Europeans ) are not like the Japanese ( which traditions I fully respect of course ).

When you have no chances anymore and nothing to gain but all to loose, and that is what PoW was having on that precise moment, you must save your weapon, .. not die for nothing, .. this is what I think, that was Captain Leach precise duty as an Officer.

But to explain all the above, ... they must have said a lot of things and details about the battle and other's mistakes, .. and that is what they did not wanted to do on that moment, .. and they choose to provide PoW this bad 'label'.

To evaluate even more we must know the real discussions among Adm Tovey, Holland, Wake-Walker, Leach, Kerr, Phillips and Ellis, before during and after that battle.
I hope in London there are those infos and one day I will be able to read them too.

But let me tell you that a similar thing occurred on the German side as well
Adm Lutjens image did non came out as good as it should have been ( on some post war movies and documentaries just the opposite ), and some others responsibilities have been covered a lot during those years.
It started with Adm Raeder report to Hitler at Berghof on June 1941, .. and continued thru the years, obviously.

Now, 65 years after the events, everything can be read and evaluated a lot differently, .. and everybody can have what deserved by history, ... that was my goal, ... with no judgements, .... positive or negative,... just the truth .

Ciao My Friend and keep on the good job, .... Antonio

[Karl Heidenreich]

Antonio and Paul,

excellent posts those last ones! And incredible clarifying about the DS battle, probably the most famous classical naval combat in the Atlantic at least.

Best regards.

[RF]

Going back to the above points about the effectiveness of Hood's gunnery and that PE (the target initially fired at) wasn't hit, it does seem clear that Hood's third salvo straadled PE.

What is not clear is what happened in Hood immediately after that. Were the guns then retargeted on Bismarck? Or was the continued firing on PE suffering from degraded fire control due to battle damage?

[paulcadogan]

Hi RF,

I'm not sure if Hood's shells actually straddled PE - because as is shown in the photo of one of Hood's salvoes that fell off her starboard quarter, the spread was very narrow indeed. A straddle would probably have caused at least one very near miss with considerable splinter damage. Hood was firing two gun salvoes, which according to Capt. Brinkmann and others, fell on all sides, as close as 50 yards (one dead ahead, and one just short )which caused cascades of collapsing water over the ship's decks.

I have a very strong suspicion, which I think explains why Hood fired at the Prinz for so long - the actual order to switch targets was not made until after the GERMANS opened fire. When you read eyewitness testimonies, it becomes very clear that the timing and sequence of events can become very confused. Some say the order was given at the moment Hood opened fire or just before. Ohers say it was after.

Unless there was some breakdown in communications aboard Hood right at that very time, I find it very unlikely the Gunnery Officer Moultrie would have ignored his orders. It seems to me that he continued to believe that the Prinz was Bismarck until the two ships returned fire at 5:55 with the resulting gun flashes making it abundantly clear who was who. By that time, four to six salvoes would have been aimed at the Prinz. A target shift would have required a ceasing of fire while the directors and guns re-trained to the new bearing and new range, inclination and other data computed, PLUS the ship then altered 20 degrees to port - not a quick task by any means given Hood's old-fashioned equipment.

By this point Hood started taking hits, one of which apparently knocked out her spotting top, taking out her type 284 radar which was very likely playing a big role in her accurate opening salvoes. IF her CGO Moultrie was in the spotting top as is believed by some (though others are fairly certain he was in the conning tower DCT) her primary gunnery controller would have been lost, or at least her fall-of-shot spotting ability would have been hampered.

The delay caused by all this to her guns firing could have given PoW the impression that she must have been badly damaged by the hits - hence the notation at 5:57 "Hood out of action". When fire was re-opened, with visual info from the spray drenched conning tower DCT and the gun turrets range finders, accuracy would have likely been lost - maybe the shells falling between Bismarck & Prinz Eugen (which were by then closer together) making both ships consider she was firing at them. On top of that, ANOTHER course change 20 degrees to port started at 5:58-59, once again fouling her rate of change of range and deflection calculations, adding to her breakdown in accuracy. Then the end came....

Prince of Wales, with her more modern equipment coped with the course changes much better and was able to stay on target very well until the drastic course change to avoid the sinking Hood, at which point she was heavily hit and then at 6:03 she turned sharply away, leaving her after turret firing in local control with a jammed shell ring.

That's my theory for what it's worth.....

All the best!

Paul

[Karl Heidenreich]

Which was the PoW´s Fire Control Sistem?

[paulcadogan]

Prince of Wales had the Admiralty Fire Control Table (AFCT)that was fitted first in Nelson & Rodney and then in all ships that were extensively reconstructed (Warspite, Valiant, Queen Elizabeth, Renown) followed by the KGV's.

Hood had a Mk. V Dreyer Table which, according to Bruce Taylor's book, suffered from many flaws which "limited its effectveness under battle as against practice conditons"(p. 49). All older, non-rebuilt British capital ships had Dreyers (Barham, Malaya, the R's and Repulse). Apart from Barham at Matapan (which was a one-sided slaughter anyway) Hood was the only one of this group who faced the test of a full scale battle at sea in WW2.

The AFTC apparently corrected many, if not all of the flaws of the Dreyer. It begs the question why weren't they all replaced... The answer IIRC - given very by Dr. Taylor himself in the Hood's Gunnery thread in the Hood forum - is that it was not simply a matter of switching them, but the AFTC required a more stable bridge structure, hence the tower bridges of the new and reconstructed ships.

In addition, Prince of Wales' modern DCT, located on top of the massive bridge structure was relatively safe from the heavy spray that was drenching the two ships as they stormed into action. Hoods main gunnery director was low on the conning tower. AND PoW was firing relatively undisturbed by incoming shells, with both B & PE firing at Hood until Lutjens ordered the Prinz to switch at 5:58. By that time Bismarck had already been hit twice.

Take care!

Paul

[wadinga]

All,

To avoid any confusion the Dreyer or the AFCT were located in the Transmitting Room several decks down from the main deck, at the very base of the Conning Tower (in Hood). You can see Belfast's in a similar below the waterline location today. Whether there was a tripod mast, Tower Bridge or barquentine rig above decks made no difference.

The First World War British director tower according to my researches so far was just a remote set of sights where a layer and trainer kept crosswires on the target. The Hood's dual director tower installation is no different. Since they were the Main Armament sights there was a requirement for it to be high up so as to get the furthest view and be clear of spray/smoke etc. The Conning Tower back-up fitted in Hood, the QEs etc didn't have either of these desirable features so it was always just a back-up. As the layer and trainer had no use for raw range data, where there was range finder fitted to the cupola as well, they ignored its information which was sent down to the the Transmitting Room and returned to them only as adjustments in azimuth and elevation applied to their sights, including all the other factors including spotting corrections. They were busy enough keeping the sights on target. Merely having a rangefinder, whatever its size, does not make anything "Primary Fire Control" since it is the spotting corrections that are the largest factor. The Spotting Team led by the Chief Gunnery Officer also needed a distant clear horizon so where there was a spotting top they were based there. So Hood's Main Gunnery Director at DS was at the masthead and even higher than PoW's DCT. When the Tower Bridge allowed a much heavier, larger Director "Control" Tower to be developed for the Nelsons onwards, the spotting team moved into it for even better communication with the Director Team. Which is where McMullen was in PoW, read McMullen's letter on the Hood website.

In terms of data in and out I can't see that whatever is located in the Transmitting Room much cares whether the Director and Control functions are physically seperated as in Hood or together as in PoW. In fact if an unexploded 15" hit Hood's masthead it probably only knocked out either the Director or the Spotting Top because they were physically seperate. If it was the former, then the back-up unit on the Conning Tower could take over. The latter would present more of a problem.

All the Best
wadinga

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao All,

@ Karl,

many thanks for the compliments

@ Paul,

your evaluations on Hood salvoes to Prinz Eugen given battle timetable and accuracy are very good and with very competent thought too....

Same apply to Hood - PoW fire control equipment, I mean the comparison of an old set of equipment on board Hood versus a new set of Equipment on board PoW.

@ Wadinga,

many thanks my friend, as your competence on those ships equipment is very precious

Those analysis go exactly on the right direction, now we do not evaluate anymore opinions, based on old books written with an intention to sell a preconceived view, ''politically correct'' of course for the time been, .. but historically wrong and not supported by the facts and evidences.

Those analysis as happened to me years ago, while providing some elements of evidence, do raise additional unanswered questions of course, some you already wrote about,.....

The main one I have, correlated with this set of events is about the opening fire sequence by the British squadron, Hood and PoW.

In line of theory, the best approach would have been a straight course with all the turrets on both British warships able to bear on the enemy, that is an elementary evaluation.

Of course the above executed with the most acute angle possible in order to provide the highest coverage to Hood deck exposure to enemy plunging shells.

Now here there is the 'KEY' in my opinion to try to understand and imagine what could or might have happened.

The ' KEY' is the difference between Hood aft turrets blind angle of 30° degrees ( she could have turned the aft turrets X-Y by 150° degrees each side, so with 30° blind each side of course ) and PoW similar angles that are a lot different for the Y aft turret of a KG V class battleship like PoW was.
PoW had a blind angle on the Y turret of 45° degrees ( she could bear Y turrets 135° degrees each side ) and not 30° degrees, so 15° degreees difference.

Given the above the 'best' possible approach angle was a course of 280° degrees to cut the T on the German squadron.

That was exactly the angle of approach VAdm Holland ordered when at 05.37 they visually saw the enemy squadron .

Now you can imagine all the activities on both Hood and PoW to get the turrets and the guns ready to open fire while fastly both squadrons were now converging at a very 'suicidal' angle of approaches determined by the British squadron turn on 280° degrees to cut the German course on 220° degrees.

Minutes passing,... 38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,.... everything ready,... 46,47,48,49,50,.. suddendly a 20° degrees turn to starboard ordered by VAdm Holland on Hood, ... now on course 300° degrees PoW follows Hood on the turn of course,... been on close formation,...... now Hood can still fire the aft turrets, almost at their extreme limits ( 337-300-30= 7 degrees still available to fire ),.. but now PoW cannot fire anymore 4 of her own guns, the all Y quadruple turret ( 335-300-45= -10 degrees, the Y turret is wooden by 10 degrees ).

Those 15° degrees difference between Hood and PoW aft turrets blind angle is now becoming a crucial factor, .........

Last minutes passing,.. very fast now,... too fast,... and I can imagine McMullen thoughts on boad PoW now, ... after realizing he had suddendly lost 4 of his 10 guns, ... while getting the new sets of fire parameters very fast,.... 51, 52 and 30 seconds OPEN FIRE !

The battle goes on,.. Hood fired and PoW joined in 30 second after,.... at 05.53,.. but only whit A+B turrets,.. as Y turret 4 guns were wooden,.. due to the choosen angle of approach too acute for PoW,... what would have you done on McMullen shoes now ??

Have you ever thought about this ?

How many guns according to you were fired by the Hood ?

What do you think happened after, ... logically, ...

..... thoughts and opinios are welcome, .....

Ciao Antonio

[paulcadogan]

Everyone,

Thanks for the positive comments!

Wadinga - thanks for the clarification. I know the tables were way down in the T/S, so question.....why the bridge structure requirement as outlined by Bruce? I would think that it was not just the table, but all it's associated systems - including the DCT?

And Antonio...remember that even if Hood could have theoretically trained her after turrets to the extreme forward bearing, firing at that angle was impractical! The blast would have done significant damage. One fact that both Hood's survivors and PoW observers generally agree on is that Hood's after turrets did not open fire until a few seconds before she blew up.

The RELATIVE bearing of the two squadrons, that is, the angle off the bow that the Germans were to the British, would have changed as the ships converged. Since the British were closing the range -it was the Germans who would have crossed their T. The relative bearing would have been decreasing, thereby forcing the British to adjust their course to port to prevent this AND to get their after turrets onto the target.

Hence, Hood was only firing her forward guns - two-gun salvoes, with the left and right guns of each turret alternating as is customary. She could have fired with all four guns of the two turrets, but this would have slowed her rate of fire. (I think the practice was for all guns to be fired simultaneously in a night action). Firing with only two guns makes hitting a target all the more difficult - adding to Hood's disadvantage. Had she been firing with all four turrets, the story of Prinz Eugen might have been very different!

Even if the course change at 5:55-56 had made Hood able to fire her after turrets (and I don't think that turn was enough at the point given the reduced relative bearing) - that was precisely when she was likely trying to switch targets, and then took the hit which may have disabled her spotting top.

Uh oh! Gotta go...now I'm late for work!

Later guys!

Paul

[WGarzke]

I have read the various responses and want to thank Antonio for his summary of hits. I do suggest, however, for those who have access to the book that Bob Dulin and I wrote on Battleships, Allied Battleships in World War II, there is a very detailed discussion on the hits that Prince of Wales received from Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. The times were not given but my subsequent research shows the following:

After Prinz Eugen managed a hit on Hood in her second salvo, she was ordered to switch targets to Prince of Wales. Her second salvo and possibly the third scored hits aft on Prince of Wales stern. These two hits came around 0559. They both had a slight underwater trajectory and produced low order detonations. The third hit came a few minutes later that penetrated a boat and came across the ship into the port handling room of one of the 134-mm mounts. Evidently the German cruiser may have had one other hit, but the naval constructors who examined a hit topside in way of the Admiral's charthouse, were not sure of the caliber since the projectile was deflected upwards. If it had been a heavy shell, it was believed that the trajectory would have not been altered.

Shell hits from Bismarck that are definite were the one on the Compass Platform that passed through without exploding within the ship, the hit on the high angle director, and the one that exploded abaft the second funnel.

What is truly amazing about the German gunnery is that neither ship had calibration tests done on their armament before being deployed. My review of the ordnance inspection of Bismarck is that the the ship was deployed before some of the problems in her ordnance was corrected. I believe that Adalbert Schneider and Jasper achieved miracles with their gunnery in that battle. In the final battle Schneider had to work with a ship that had directional instability. Therefore, it was more difficult for him to hit targets in a beam sea.

James Cameron did an excellent job of photographing the Bismarck wreck and items of interest. I spent 14 hours with him last summer going over his videos of the wreck. His photography of the bow damage was excellent and has resulted in a new theory on just what damage was caused by this hit. For those interested in the Norfolk and Newport News area of Virginia, Mr. Dulin and I will be making a presentation there on 15 February. For those who want to attend, contact the Hampton Roads Section of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers for details.

Bill Garzke