Naval History Forums

..... Contemporary RN references indicated 8in effective range as 17,000 yards. B Despite this, Dorsetshire and Norfolk opened fire at 20.000yards on May 27th. Suffolk fired at 28000yards against Prinz Eugen. ..... I just reported what the RN source states - that EFFECTIVE 8in range = 17,000 yards....

..... Contemporary RN references indicated 8in effective range as 17,000 yards.

B

..... The Rowell map makes best sense from a time versus motion perspective. If the avoidance turn to starboard was minor in nature and performed under easy helm (15deg rudder), then the time progression of the following turn to port (change of heading versus elapsed time) fits. The only comment to ...

..... FWIW, the following are approximated SWAGs re PoW's turn performance (has anyone found actual data on PoW's turning performance?) - At 29 kts, PoW would probably have a tactical diameter of about 1,000 yards (500 yard radius) at full (35deg) rudder. From the time of the order to commence a tur...

... I know what the report says. Still firing 1 shot every 40 seconds seems rather slow. As you can see above, averages of 24 seconds were normal for US BBs. Bismarck only ordered rapid firing after salvo 4. This is why the average rof seems so low. In fact, accoring to Bismarcks artillery report o...

The above graphical fall of shot chart represents fall of shot of multiple salvos fired without radar fire control. Hence, ranging and spotting errors of the salvos themselves almost certainly would presumably have accounted for the great majority of the apparent dispersion. It is not possible to de...

Short Range Battle Practice explains the 2.5 spgpm RoF value cited and corresponds to the previously mentioned reverse extrapolation of the graph curve and does in fact approach the mechanical rate of fire of the gun. According to gunnery doctrine documents (1939, 1944, 1945, 1946), the higher RoF w...

The important mention to make is that we do not know the spgpm figure of the night firings. Most likely it was higher than the one achieved by the USS Washington in the real battle. Why? In training they often fire more slowly than in actual combat. Concentration firing meant all ships were firing ...

pgollin wrote:.

It is entirely pointless to compare WW2 training/exercise firing rates and accuracy with real life.

.

Well ..... except when the engagement conditions actually parallel a training shoot, which I would argue was the case here.

B

The aggregate results 14/45, 14.50 and 16/45 main batteries in the Advanced Day Battle Practices of 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940 and 1941 gave an accuracy score of19.3 pct. Considering the inclusion of the 14in results, this correlates very closely to the prediction for 15,000 yards. 27 pct hits under ac...

Visual observation was not very good, see points O and P in the Reccomendations section of the action report. A few of the times that they were able to see the effect of fire on target they reported seeing "main battery projectiles exploding." Now this is odd considering the MB was firing...

It is stated in her gunnery report that Washington's main battery salvoes were "walked back and forth" across the Kirishima, but the interval is not stated. The 200 yard interval mentioned in the report was related to the fire of her secondary guns. 16in interval was likely much less (+/- ...

@Byron I see you are getting rather emotional on the issue.Before this goes further, please: 1) take a closer look at the damage drawings and see for yourself what was the beam of Kirishima at the points mentioned for the hits. 2) ask yourself how did the 16" 0.033 sec fuze exploded repeatedly...

As I said earlier, the best way to reconcile the sources appears to be taking the underwater hits as damaging near-misses - which certainly could happen, and could cause massive hull damage and let water inside. Really? A 40lb burster just isn't going to much in the way of UW damage, unless it actu...

... The action report that we have (Washington's), does not fit Lundgren's analysis, which is the only source mentioning 22 heavy hits. This source draws exclusively from 1 (key) eye wittness. ..... Horishi was second in command of AA/secondary armament under Lt Cdr Ikeda (the man who preserved Hay...